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The  Uruguay  Round  of  trade  negotiations  resulted  in  three  main  areas  of  trade 
liberalization  in  agriculture,  namely  market  access,  domestic  support,  and  export 
subsidies. In terms of market access, the introduction of tariff rate quotas (TRQs) was 
one of the main tools to facilitate greater market access.  After the liberalization of the 
agricultural  sector  and  phasing  out  of  past  protection  mechanisms  South  Africa 
introduced  a  process  of  tariff  reform  in  compliance  with  WTO  regulations.  
Furthermore, a system of TRQs was introduced in compliance with WTO regulations.   
 
Literature on South African agricultural trade shows that very little research has been 
conducted  on  the  impacts  of  TRQs.    In  this  study  the  impacts  of  further  TRQ 
liberalization on the South African livestock industry were investigated using four TRQ 
liberalization scenarios, namely: 33 per cent expansion of import quotas, 33 per cent 
reduction in ad valorem MFN tariffs, a combination of the first two scenarios and a 
complete removal of tariffs.   
 
The approach followed in this study is spatial partial equilibrium in nature and consists 
of the primary (beef cattle, broilers, pigs, and sheep) and secondary (beef, poultry, pork   iv 
and sheep meat) sub-sectors. The model delineates South Africa into its nine provinces, 
as well as neighbouring important meat producers – Namibia and Botswana.  
 
For the four secondary products (beef, poultry, pork and sheep meat) the border prices 
declined by between 0.89 and 2.39 per cent for scenario one, 2.35 and 7.96 per cent for 
scenario two, 2.96 and 9.97 per cent for scenario three and 8.25 and 25.19 per cent for 
scenario four.  The largest decline in beef and sheep meat prices due to liberalization was 
recorded in the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal Provinces. Cattle and sheep numbers 
owned by emerging producers are more than those of the established commercial farmers 
in these two provinces. The implication is that the development efforts by government 
aimed at commercializing emerging commercial stock farming in order to address equity 
and poverty may be slowed down considerably with further trade liberalization. 
 
The study used the consumer and producers surplus concepts, as well as the equivalent 
variation concept to measure the impact on welfare of potential trade policy changes 
mentioned. Welfare as measured by consumer surplus increases by R230.8 million in 
scenario  1  to  R1  880.8  million  in  scenario  4.    Producer  surplus  decreases  by  R77.6 
million  in  scenario  1  to  R656.89  million  in  scenario  4.    Welfare  as  measured  by 
equivalent  variation  increased  by  R60.6  million  in  scenario  1  to  R468.2  million  in 
scenario 4.  The equivalent variation concept revealed much more moderate changes to 
consumer  well  being.    The  reason  for  this  is  that  consumer  and  producer  surplus 
estimations assume linearity of the demand and supply curves, whereas the model used in 
this study accounts for the non-linearity of demand and supply curves.  Consumer and 
producers surplus estimates nevertheless provide useful insight into the relative impact of 
trade policy changes. 
 
Should further TRQ liberalization be considered in the South African livestock industry, 
consideration should first be given to expanding the existing quota rather than reducing 
tariffs.   
 
   v 
Further research on the following aspects is recommended, (i) products differentiated by 
place of origin based on the Armington assumption, (ii) expansion of current modelling 
framework to include additional products and (iii) explicit modelling of TRQs such as the 
creation of rents and its distribution. 
 
Keywords: Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQ), Livestock and Meat Trade, Trade Liberalization, 
Partial Equilibrium Model, Applied Welfare Economics. 
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Die  Uruguay-rondte  handelsonderhandelinge  het  gelei  tot  handelsvryheid  op  drie 
belangrike  landbougebiede,  naamlik  marktoegang,  die  ondersteuning  van  plaaslike 
produkte en uitvoersubsidies. Wat marktoegang betref, het die instelling van tariefkoers 
kwotas (TKK’s) onder meer die toon aangegee om groter marktoegang in die hand te 
werk.  Na die liberalisering van die landbousektor en die uitfasering van voormalige 
beskermingsmeganismes, het Suid-Afrika in ooreenstemming met WHO-regulasies, ‘n 
proses  van  tariefhervorming  ingestel.    Voorts  is  ‘n  stelsel  van  TKK’s  ingestel  in 
ooreenstemming met WHO-regulasies.   
 
Literatuur oor die Suid-Afrikaanse landbousektor dui daarop dat baie min navorsing oor 
die uitwerking van TKK’s gedoen is.  In hierdie studie is die uitwerking van verdere 
TKK-liberalisering  op  die  Suid-Afrikaanse  lewendehawe  sektor  ondersoek  deur 
gebruik te maak van vier TKK-liberalisering scenario’s, naamlik: 33 persent uitbreiding 
van  invoerkwotas,  33  persent  vermindering  in  MFN-tariewe  volgens  waarde,  ‘n 
kombinasie van die eerste twee scenario’s en ‘n algehele wegdoen met tariewe.   
   vii 
Die benadering wat in hierdie studie gevolg is, is ruimtelik gedeeltelike ewewig van 
aard en is saamgestel uit die primêre (vleisbeeste, braaikuikens, varke en skape) en 
sekondêre  (bees-,  hoender-,  vark-  en  skaapvleis)  sub-sektore.  Die  model 
verteenwoordig  Suid-Afrika  se  nege  provinsies,  asook  belangrike  vleisproduserende 
buurlande – Namibië en Botswana.  
 
Sover dit die vier sekondêre produkte (bees-, hoender-, vark- en skaapvleis) aangaan, het 
die marginale pryse met tussen 0.89 en 2.39 persent afgeneem vir scenario een, tussen 
2.35 en 7.96 persent vir scenario twee, tussen 2.96 en 9.97 persent vir scenario drie en 
tussen  8.25  en  25.19  persent  vir  scenario  vier.    Die  grootste  afname  in  bees-  en 
skaapvleispryse as gevolg van liberalisering is in die provinsies van die Oos-Kaap en 
KwaZulu-Natal aangeteken. Bees- en skaapgetalle in besit van opkomende produsente 
oorskry dié van gevestigde kommersiële boere in dié twee provinsies. Die aanduiding is 
dat  die  ontwikkelingspogings  deur  die  regering  wat  daarop  gemik  is  om  opkomende 
kommersiële veeboerdery te kommersialiseer om sodoende gelykheid te weeg te bring en 
armoede hok te slaan aanmerklik vertraag kan word deur verdere handelsliberalisering. 
 
Die studie het gebruik gemaak van die verbruikers- en produsentesurplus konsepte, sowel 
as  die  ekwivalent  variasie  konsep  om  vas  te  stel  wat  die  uitwerking  van  genoemde 
potensiële handelsbeleidsveranderings op welvaart sal wees. Welvaart soos gemeet deur 
verbruikersurplus neem met R230.8 miljoen toe in scenario 1 tot R1 880.8 miljoen in 
scenario 4.  Produsentesurplus neem met R77.6 miljoen af in scenario 1 tot R656.89 
miljoen in scenario 4.  Welvaart soos gemeet deur ekwivalent variasie het in scenario 1 
met R60.6 miljoen toegeneem tot R468.2 miljoen in scenario 4.  Die ekwivalent variasie 
konsep  het  heelwat  meer  gematigde  veranderinge  aan  verbruikersbelange  aan  die  lig 
gebring.  Die rede hiervoor is dat verbruikers- en produsentesurplus beramings aanneem 
dat daar lineariteit in die vraag- en aanbod-kurwes is, terwyl die model wat in hierdie 
studie gebruik is, voorsiening maak vir die nie-lineariteit van vraag- en aanbodkurwes.  
Desnieteenstaande verskaf verbruikers- en produsente surplus beramings dienlike insig in 
die relatiewe uitwerking van handelsbeleidsveranderings. 
   viii 
Indien verdere TKK-liberalisering in die Suid-Afrikaanse lewendehawe bedryf oorweeg 
sou word, moet daar eers aandag geskenk word aan die vergroting van die bestaande 
kwota, eerder as om die tariewe te verlaag.   
 
Verdere  navorsing  oor  die  volgende  aspekte  word  aanbeveel,  (i)  onderskeid  tussen 
produkte op grond van die plek van oorsprong soos gegrond op die Armington-aanname, 
(ii) uitbreiding van die huidige model raamwerk om bykomende produkte in te sluit en 
(iii)  eksplisiete  modellering  van  TKK’s,  soos  die  daarstelling  van  hure  en  die 
verspreiding daarvan. 
 
Sleutelwoorde:  Tariefkoers  Kwotas  (TKK),  Lewendehawe-  en  vleishandel, 
Handelsliberalisering, gedeeltelike ewewigsmodelle, Toegepaste Welvaartsekonomie. 
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  CHAPTER ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 
INTRODUCTION 
  
1.1  Background  
 
South  Africa’s  agricultural  sector,  as  presently  constituted,  has  undergone 
fundamental changes in three main areas in respect of WTO rules since 1995, namely 
domestic support, export subsidies and market access. Furthermore, South Africa is 
currently a signatory to several trade agreements within the Southern African region, 
the African continent and across the globe. 
 
According to Vink and Kirsten (2003), prior to the trade reform of the 1990s, South 
Africa’s trade regime had been characterized by quantitative restrictions, a multitude 
of tariff lines, a wide dispersion of tariffs and formulae, specific and ad valorem 
duties and surcharges. However, the introduction of the Marketing of Agricultural 
Products Act of 1996 led to the elimination of all marketing boards, removal of price 
regulations and single channel markets. Furthermore, the termination of the General 
Export  Incentive  Scheme  in  1997  resulted  in  the  elimination  of  export  subsidies; 
while the replacement of import permits by import duties, the reduction of the bound 
levels, as well as various market access quota commitments, improved access to the 
South African market (Jooste, Van Schalkwyk and Groenewald, 2003).  
 
Trade has continued to play a major role in the South African agricultural economy. 
For instance, although the economy as a whole went into a recession from the early 
1990s up until 1997 when the economy began to experience some growth, agriculture 
remained a net earner of foreign exchange throughout the period. Between 1990 and 
2000, agricultural exports contributed a substantial annual average of 8.4% of total 
exports (Fenyes and Meyer, 2003). In addition, despite the drop in the contribution of 
the agricultural sector to GDP from about 20% in the 1930s to around 4% in early Introduction 
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2000s,  it  remains  an  important  sector  to  the  economic  growth  of  the  country 
contributing  13%  to employment  while the  gross value of agricultural production 
reached R67 billion in 2004/05 (NDA, 2005c). 
 
South Africa' s commitment to trade liberalization has resulted in strong growth in 
import demand. Import intensity in South African agriculture increased from 4% in 
1995  to  7%  in  2000,  with  an  average  change  of  52.8%  between  1994  and  2000 
(Jooste et al., 2003). However, the increasing potential for agricultural imports is 
linked  to  the  challenge  of  monitoring  the  impact  of  such  imports  on  both  the 
producers and consumers of agricultural products. For instance, Cassim, Onyango, 
and  Van  Seventer  (2002)  observed  that  the  South  African  tariff  schedule  is  still 
complex and that a cumbersome tariff structure may mean uneven protection, and 
may  limit  gains  from  openness,  while  Lewis,  Robinson  and  Thiefelder  (1999) 
observed a slight worsening of South Africa' s terms of trade due to increased demand 
for imports.  
 
Given the foregoing, it is worth mentioning that the effects of an increase in import 
demand for agricultural products in South Africa are unevenly distributed among sectors 
and product groups. For instance, apart from rice imports, which increased by about 9 
per  cent  annually  in  value  terms,  and  wheat  and  meslin  increasing  by  14  per  cent 
annually between 1993 and 2004, other grains have experienced either major decreases 
(for  instance,  maize  imports  declined  drastically  following  liberalization),  slight 
decreases or constant import values.  
 
For oilseeds, the value of imports showed an annual increase of about 9.56% over this 
period.  The imports of livestock products generally increased between the period prior 
to and following trade liberalization.  
 
South Africa is a net importer of major livestock products such as beef, sheep meat, pork 
and poultry.  The gross value of imports of livestock products has grown by 9 per cent 
annually since 1995, from R530 million in 1995 to R1.25 billion in 2004.  Between 
1994 and 1995, at the commencement of trade liberalization, total imports of livestock 
products increased by 21.1 per cent from R437 million to R530 million. Beef imports 
increased  by  about  29.5  percent  in  value  terms  at  the  commencement  of  trade Introduction 
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liberalization in 1995, but have experienced a decrease of 3.3 per cent annually since 
then.  From 1995 to 2004, pork imports increased by 11.4 per cent annually, sheep-meat 
imports by 9.3 per cent annually, and poultry meat imports by 13.6 per cent annually.  
Cognizance should be taken however, that imports are usually of specific cuts and these 
values represent the aggregates. 
 
Therefore, the challenge of monitoring the impact of import demand viz a viz trade 
policy would prove more rewarding if conducted on an industry level.  In this study, the 
impact of tariffs and tariff rate quotas (TRQs) by South Africa on its livestock industry 
are investigated. 
 
1.2  Problem statement and need for the study 
 
The  liberalization  of  the  agricultural  sector  in  South  Africa  has  wide  ranging 
implications  for  the  domestic  agricultural  sector  in  general.  Favourable  prices  for 
commodities  guaranteed  by  a  fair  trading  regime  is  an  important  factor  in  granting 
market access and aiding continued production by South African farmers. However, 
factors such as accessibility of markets, opportunities to trade, as well as price and 
policy variables (especially tariffs and tariff rate quotas) will greatly impact on the 
performance of agricultural subsectors. The resulting state of events, as well as the 
current  global  agricultural  trade  policy  regime,  especially  for  livestock  trade, 
promises distributional and allocational effects within the domestic livestock sector. 
 
Of the many tools available to governments to liberalise trade, tariffs and tariff rate 
quotas are frequently used. According to Kindleberger and Lindert (1978) a tariff can be 
justified by the existence of a distortion in a less than perfect world.  Houck (1992) also 
provides  various  reasons  why  countries  will  implement  measures  to  protect  its 
agricultural sector.  On the other hand Van Schalkwyk, Van Zyl and Jooste (1995) point 
out  that  users  of  agricultural  commodities  may  rightfully  claim  that  prices  of  these 
commodities should be as low as possible, which implies that it may also be imported if 
it is cheaper than the locally produced product.  Having stated the opposing arguments 
the fact remains that countries through history have opted to protect their national 
agricultural sectors, but have at the same time also shown resilience to change trade 
distorting measures. Introduction 
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 The question is how to use various trade policy instruments so that they have the 
least  distortionary  effects.  The  agreements  reached  during  the  Uruguay  Round  of 
trade negotiations in terms of agriculture are evidence to this.  Of specific importance 
are  TRQs,  as  these  have  become  one  of  the  principal  mechanisms  for  trade 
liberalization,  especially  in  the  agricultural  sector,  after  the  Uruguay  Round  of 
Agreements  on  Agriculture  (URAA)  (Tangermann,  1996;  Ingco  and  Townsend, 
1998).  
 
Several studies have attempted to model the impact of trade and tariff policies using 
South  African  data.  Van  Seventer  and  Edwards  (2001)  attempted  to  measure  the 
welfare impact of tariffs on South African consumers by using data which cut across 
a wide array of domestic sectors in South Africa. Ad valorem tariffs were specifically 
modelled within a partial equilibrium framework, with data being a mixture of HS 
classifications. This analysis gave a broad indication of the cost impact of tariffs.  
 
Jooste (2001) conducted a comparative static analysis within a spatial partial equilibrium 
framework to measure the impact of various economic and trade interventions on the red 
meat  industry  in  South  Africa.  Specifically,  the  effect  of  tariff  liberalization  was 
analyzed using different liberalization scenarios. The modeling framework differentiated 
South  Africa  into  its  nine  provinces  and  also  integrated  the  neighbouring  countries 
(Botswana  and  Namibia),  which  are  important  meat  producers.  Although  the  study 
quantified the welfare effects of tariff liberalization, it did not incorporate tariff rate 
quotas in its simulations. This study emphasized the necessity of analyzing the impact of 
tariff rate quotas, not only on the red meat industry, but the entire livestock industry in 
South Africa. 
 
Using a partial equilibrium multi-commodity multi-country model, Pustovit and Schmitz 
(2003) conducted a comparative static analysis to quantify the effects of protection in 
OECD countries combined with South Africa’s own agricultural and trade policies on its 
agriculture. A variety of crop and livestock products, including wheat, coarse grain, rice, 
oilseeds,  sugar,  milk,  beef,  pork,  and  poultry,  were  taken  into  account.  Although 
simulations  were  conducted  to  measure  the  impact  of  trade  liberalization  on  South 
Africa,  only  domestic  policy  interventions  such  as  net  protection  rates,  intervention Introduction 
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prices, and production quotas, direct payments to farmers, input subsidies and general 
subsidies were considered. They did not directly consider the effects of tariffs or TRQs. 
 
However, various studies outside South Africa have modeled TRQs, either in a country-
specific or in a global context. Among these, Von Lampe (2000), and Junker, Wieck, 
Jansson  and  Perez  (2003)  provided  descriptions  of  the  handling  of  TRQs  in  the 
WATSIM and CAPRI models, respectively, using the sigmoid function approach. 
Elbehri,  Hertel,  Ingco  and  Pearson  (2000),  and  later  Elbehri  and  Pearson  (2005), 
provided revised versions of the technical aspects involved in the implementation of 
TRQs in the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) – a standard general equilibrium 
model. Other studies modelled TRQs in a global context as a Mixed Complementarity 
Problem (MCP); these include Van der Mensbrugghe, Berhin and Mitchell (2003), 
Kuhn (2003), and Nicholson and Bishop (2004). While these studies have modeled 
TRQs with different regional aggregates and product coverage, this study specifically 
models the TRQs applicable to the South African livestock industry.   The majority of 
the studies mentioned that a major difficulty when studying the potential impacts of 
tariffs and TRQs on trade is quantifying the variables to be used.   
 
The regional approach to modelling the agricultural sector in South Africa offers an 
opportunity  for  analyzing  varying  policy  implications  across  the  provinces;  of 
particular  importance  is  livestock  production  which  exhibits  certain  peculiarities 
across provinces. For instance, Jooste (1996) discovered that, if tariffs were to be 
reduced to zero in the beef industry, emerging farmers would be affected, even in the 
coastal regions where herd size in the emerging sector exceeds that of the commercial 
sector. In order to ensure that domestic producers of livestock products become more 
competitive and are guaranteed greater market access it is, however, necessary to 
account for the important policy instruments that regulate prices. The importance of 
TRQ in this regard can not be over-emphasized.  
 
South Africa, with 46 per cent, is ranked sixth in the world in terms of the percentage 
of agricultural tariff lines covered by tariff rate quotas (US, CBO report, 2005). As far 
as the livestock and meat industry is concerned, of the total initial TRQs reported at 
the WTO by 2000, 18% were used for meat products, while13% of South Africa’s 
TRQs covers the meat sector.  Considering the economic importance of the livestock Introduction 
 
  6 
industry in South Africa, it is important to determine the impact of TRQs, viz-à-viz 
trade liberalization on the industry, particularly: 
 
·  the impact of increases in import quotas on consumers; 
·  the impact of tariff reduction on farm income; and 
·  the balance between the two; that is where does the interest of producers and 
consumers meet.  
 
Another question of interest relates to the impact of further liberalization of trade on 
the livestock industry in South Africa when the volume of trade is constrained by 
TRQs. It is expected that the use of TRQs will serve to balance the effects of uneven 
benefits of trade liberalization. However, the behavioural pattern of both consumers 
and producers (that is, on the demand and supply side) will influence the terms of 
trade. 
 
1.3  Objectives of the study 
 
The primary objective of this study is to design a spatial equilibrium model which is 
capable of quantifying the effects of trade liberalization vis-à-vis sophisticated trade 
policy instruments (particularly TRQs) on trade flows, terms of trade and consumer 
welfare for the South African livestock industry. The secondary objectives of the 
study include: 
·  The  establishment  of  a  regional  database  of  relevant  parameters  such  as 
prices, demand, supply, demand and supply elasticities, quota and tariff levels, 
and transport costs for the major livestock products in South Africa. 
·  A  review  of  literature  on  similar  studies  done  world-wide,  especially  in 
countries  with  similar  patterns  of  trade  to  South  Africa.  Particularly,  the 
methodological approach of such studies will be reviewed critically with a 
view to explicitly model trade policy instruments that constrain both prices 
and quantities (like tariff rate quotas). 
·  To  determine  both  the  welfare  and  trade  effects  of  policy  changes  on  the 
demand and supply sides of the livestock industry in each of South Africa' s 
provinces using well-behaved demand and supply systems.  Introduction 
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·  To measure the impact of increases in import quotas on farm income, the 
impact of quota reduction on consumers, as well as the balance between the 
two;  that  is,  the  determination  of  where  the  interests  of  producers  and 
consumers meet.  
 
1.4  Motivation 
 
The need to balance the effects of trade liberalization of the agricultural sector in 
South Africa has led to the introduction of trade rationing instruments such as the 
TRQ. With this comes the challenge of  measuring the impact of such two-edged 
policies on the domestic sector. There is therefore an urgent need for a model which 
will  simulate  South  Africa' s  commitment  in  multilateral  trade  negotiations, 
particularly for the livestock industry. It is furthermore important to determine how 
much benefit South African producers and consumers derive from trade liberalization 
and import rationing, given the changing landscape of livestock trade.  For example, 
the European Union, which used to be South Africa’s major source of imports of 
livestock products, has been sidelined by more competitive countries such as Brazil, 
Argentina, Australia and New Zealand, despite the implementation of the EU-SA 
Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA). 
 
1.5   Research hypothesis and method used 
 
Further  trade  liberalization  may  result  in  an  unfavourable  trade  regime  for  South 
Africa. It is therefore important that South African policymakers, as well as trade 
negotiators, understand how much additional trade is needed to offset the loss of 
South Africa’s quota rents. Modelling trade in the presence of TRQs is the only way 
to obtain this information. 
 
Furthermore, it is expected that net welfare gains will change with changes in import 
quotas, tariff rates and the combination of the two. With the incorporation of TRQs it 
is expected that the modeling framework will be capable of measuring the following 
in the domestic livestock industry: Introduction 
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·  Effects of changes in tariff rates on regional production, trade flows, demand, 
and prices. 
·  Effects of changes in import quota levels on regional production, trade flows, 
demand and prices. 
·  Effects of combined changes in import quota levels and tariff rates on regional 
production, trade flows, demand and prices. 
 
As  TRQs  are  applied  continuously,  it  is  expected  that  any  expansion  in  quota, 
decrease  in  over-quota  tariffs  or  the  combination  of  the  two  has  the  potential  to 
further liberalize the livestock industry. It is also expected that, with the introduction 
of  TRQs,  imports  can  be  rationed,  possibly  in  a  way  that  the  interests  of  both 
producers and consumers are represented.  
 
Empirical literature reports several approaches to studying the implications of trade 
liberalization on the agricultural sector. The approach taken by this study is based on 
the mathematical programming models developed by Samuelson (1952), Takayama 
and Judge (1964a, b, 1971) and McCarl and Spreen (1980). This approach allows for 
sectoral analyses of the allocation of resources among spatially separated markets. 
Based on this framework, several extensions and empirical applications have been 
implemented  for  different  combinations  of  commodities  and  regions  (see  Van 
Tongeren and Van Meijl (1999, 2003); and Westoff, Fabiosa, Beghin and Meyers 
(2004) for developments in agricultural trade modeling). However, quite unique is the 
explicit modeling of the processing level (that is the slaughtering process) within a 
regionalized framework such as this. A further strength of this study is the integration 
of a globally well-behaved demand system in a spatial equilibrium model, as it is 
required of a system explicitly incorporating welfare in the objective function. 
 
1.6  Chapter outline 
 
Chapter 2 presents an overview of relevant developments in trade theory leading to 
the modern-day perception of trade, including applicable literature on issues such as 
TRQs,  mathematical  and  economic  programming,  as  well  as  the  methodological 
approach to TRQ modelling. An overview of the industry as well as trends in South Introduction 
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Africa’s  livestock  trade  is  presented  in  chapter  3.  Chapter  4  describes  the 
methodological framework involved in spatial partial equilibrium modeling, as well 
as the calibration of an applied economic model. Empirical results of the analyses are 
reported  in  chapter  5,  while  chapter  6  concludes  with  a  discussion  of  the  trade 
liberalization implications of TRQ scenarios, with conclusions and recommendations.  
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CHAPTER ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1  Introduction  
 
The concept of trade has two diverging viewpoints. One involves recognition of the 
benefits of international exchange, while the other relates to concerns that certain 
domestic  industries  could  be  harmed  by  foreign  competition  (Ohlin,  1933; 
Samuelson,  1962;  Porter,  1990).  Although  notable  authors  have  proven  the 
advantages of free trade theoretically with such arguments as comparative advantage 
and competitiveness, the world of the late twentieth century, up to the present day, 
has not been ready to acknowledge and implement a full free market regime. Instead, 
countries  have  opted  for  trade  blocs  (which  include  Free  Trade  Areas,  Customs 
Unions, Common Markets and Economic Unions) and trade-restricting instruments 
(tariffs, quotas and tariff rate quotas).  
 
The increasing interdependence of world trade has led to the emergence of policies 
that affect agricultural trade, albeit in lesser or greater magnitude. Following the 
progress  made  at  the  Uruguay Round  Agreements  of  the  General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the World Trade Organization (WTO) has continued to 
attempt to liberalize agricultural trade further. The ongoing Doha Round, which was 
planned to conclude in Hong-Kong in December 2005, provides another opportunity 
for trade liberalization, as trading countries are prepared to negotiate at a multilateral 
level. Measuring the performance of trade liberalization has been difficult, given the 
existence of the various mechanisms involved.  In this case economic models have 
been useful, both for the implementation and assessment of trade policies.  
 
This chapter provides a review of theoretical literature on tariff rate quotas as a trade 
policy instrument, including its complexity and value to trade.  Its implementation,Literature Review 
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administration  and  liberalization  will  be  emphasized.  In  addition,  selected  studies 
relevant to the methodology involved in modelling tariff rate quotas are reviewed. 
This includes the evolving trend in the use of mathematically programming for trade 
policy  analyses,  as  well  as  the  economic  background  of  the  properties  of  the 
functional forms, including the demand and supply systems used in this study. 
 
2.2  Comparative advantage and trade theory 
 
The fundamental trade theory by Ricardo is based on the notion that international 
exchange patterns are determined on the basis of comparative advantage. The concept 
of comparative advantage extends Adam Smith’s concept of absolute advantage in 
that it states that, even if a country has an absolute disadvantage relative to a potential 
trading partner country in the production of two commodities, there is still a basis for 
mutually  beneficial  trade.  The  premise  for  exchange  in  such  a  situation  is  the 
difference in “comparative cost of production” (Gandolfo, 1998), which results from 
technological differences. However, the sufficient condition is that the terms of trade 
must  lie  between  these  two  comparative  costs.  Salvatore  (2004)  described  the 
Ricardian concept of comparative advantage using the relative cost concept to arrive 
at  equilibrium  price,  export  and  import  quantities.    Figure  2.1  shows  how  the 
equilibrium  relative  price  of  a  commodity  is  determined  under  trade  in  a  partial 
equilibrium condition.  
 Literature Review 
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Figure 2.1:  A representative price equilibrium for a partial equilibrium trade 
analysis 
Source: Salvatore, 2004 
 
Panels A and C represent the demand and supply conditions of the commodity being 
traded by the two trading countries A and B. The exporting country (nation 1) has a 
lower relative price than the relative price in the importing country (nation 2), i.e. P1 
< P3. This situation gives rise to an excess supply of the commodity by nation 1 (i.e. 
export  quantity  represented  by  the  line  BE),  while  nation  2  demands  the  excess 
supplied by nation 1 (i.e. import quantity represented by the line B’E’). The import 
demanded equals the export supplied at the price P2, where the equilibrium relative 
price (Px/Py) with trade is attained; as represented in panel B. 
 
Heckscher (1919) and Ohlin (1933) approached the two issues raised by both Smith 
and  Ricardo,  namely  the  basis  of  comparative  advantage  and  the  effects  of 
international trade on earnings of factors of production in two trading nations. They 
introduced another viewpoint to the theory of international trade by explaining the 
causes of comparative cost advantage (rather than assuming it) and gains from trade 
on the basis of relative scarcity of factors of production among countries. Heckscher 
(1919) extends Ricardo’s theory of trade when he argues that the relative difference 
in endowment of factors of production is the basis for international exchange. He 
contends that Ricardo' s assumption of relative factor immobility must be relaxed, 
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since international exchange has an influence on the prices of factors of production 
which, in turn, affects factor mobility.  He therefore concludes that relative factor 
abundance is the basis for international exchange and that factor price convergence 
could result from trade among trading partners.  
 
Further  expounding  Heckscher’s  theory,  Ohlin  (1933)  postulates  that  the  free 
mobility of factors of production can be partially substituted by the free mobility of 
commodities  under  the  condition  of  international  exchange.  He  argues  that  this 
situation  will  lead  to  a  partial  equalization  of  relative  and  absolute  factor  prices. 
However, Stolper and Samuelson (1941) argue that, when two trading economies use 
different factors of production intensively, the rate of return to the scarce factor in the 
respective economies reduces. Furthermore, in terms of both factors, the relative price 
of the scarce factor will decrease and more of the scarce factor than can be utilized in 
the  economy  will  be  freed  as  the  economy  moves  toward  specialization  in  the 
commodity that absorbs its more abundant factor. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem 
provides an indication of the possibility of factor equalization. This means that free 
trade equalizes factor rewards between countries and thus serves as a substitute for 
external factor mobility. 
 
Based on the reasoning behind the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the Heckscher-Ohlin 
theorem was critically analyzed by Samuelson (1948); its assertion that, whilst free 
factor mobility equalizes factor prices fully, free commodity movements can only be 
achieved by a partial equalization of factor prices. There are four situations which 
guarantee that perfect mobility of goods results in complete factor-price equalization 
as proven by Samuelson (1948). One is partial specialization, that is, the production 
of a quantity of goods to be exchanged by both trading partners. Secondly, the initial 
factor endowments, although unequal, should not be too unequal. Thirdly, even with 
an  extreme  inequality  of  factor  endowment,  factor  mobility  would  migrate  to  an 
extent  which  is  sufficient  for  full  price  equality.  Lastly,  as  long  as  commodity 
movements are perfect substitutes for factor movement, absolute and relative returns 
on factors will ensure optimum world productivity. Samuelson' s analyses sufficiently 
demonstrate  that  the  partial  and  incomplete  nature  of  factor-price  equalization 
postulated in the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem is, after all, a rare exception rather than 
the norm. Literature Review 
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Using the two-good, two-factor assumption, Rybcynski (1955) suggests that, when 
the coefficients of production are given and factor supplies are fully employed, an 
expansion  in  the  endowment  of  one  factor  of  production  raises  the output  of  the 
commodity that uses the expanded factor intensively and reduces, in terms of both 
commodities, the real reward of the other factor. The implication is that the relative 
price of the commodity which uses the factor whose supply has risen will fall. Taking 
the two-good, two-factor assumption further, Krugman (1979) proves, by means of a 
simple  model,  that  economies  of  scale  are  the  drivers  of  trade,  and  not  factor 
endowment or technology. He shows that, when factor endowment and technology 
between countries are assumed equal, the potential for trade and gains from trade still 
exists.  However, some  aspects of his analysis  correlate with  the  Heckscher-Ohlin 
theory. For instance, the Heckscher-Ohlin theory proved substitution between global 
trade and factor mobility. It also supported the notion of movements of factors being 
induced by such impediments as tariffs and transportation costs. These issues are also 
alluded to by Krugman (1979). 
 
Krugman (1980) extended the theory of trade by developing a model that explains the 
pattern  of  trade  between  imperfectly  competitive  economies  with  similar  factor 
endowments and technology, where economies of scale and product differentiation 
exist. The analyses reveal that, when increasing returns to scale exists, an individual 
differentiated  product  is  produced  in  only  one  country,  leading  to  trade  among 
countries.  Gains  from  trade  thus  emanate  from  the  increased  variety  of  goods 
available within the global economy which permits wider range of choices. However, 
as with other models of trade which are based on economies of scale, Krugman’s 
model can only determine the magnitude (in terms of volume) of trade, while the 
direction of trade flow remains undetermined. 
 
In his subsequent writing, Krugman (1999) agreed that, although not explicitly stated, 
the notions of trade raised by subsequent authors are all embedded in Ohlin’s theory. 
However, he further expresses a view of trade in which a combination of differences 
in  factor  endowments  (comparative  advantage)  and  increasing  returns  to  scale 
economies are drivers of trade. He agrees with the notion that factor intensity or 
abundance results in trade. Furthermore he showed how change in factor prices after Literature Review 
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trade affects the purchasing power of two trading countries. Finally, gains from trade 
will  be  reinforced  by  economies  of  scale  where  constant  returns  allow  more 
purchasing power than before trade, and increasing returns guarantees purchase of 
additional units of the goods. 
 
2.3  Trade liberalization and protection 
 
There is overwhelming cross-country evidence that trade liberalization and openness 
to  trade  increase  the  growth  rate  of  income  and  output  (Sachs  &  Warner,  1995; 
Dollar, 1992; Edwards, 1998; Ben-David, 1996; Frankel & Romer, 1996), especially 
in sub-Saharan Africa (Rodrik, 1998). The inward-looking approach of many African 
economies has been identified as the cause of their insignificance in global trade 
(Collier, 1995). Whereas a liberal trade policy is necessary for growth and poverty 
reduction (Hoekman, Michalopoulos, Schiff, Tarr, 2001), substantial tariff and non-
tariff barriers remain the norm rather than exception in most sub-Saharan African 
countries (Rodrik, 1998). Although the adjustment costs associated with trade reforms 
may be escalating, empirical evidence shows that the adjustment costs are relatively 
low compared to the benefits of trade liberalization to the economy (Matusz & Tarr, 
2000).  For  his  part,  (Yeats  (1997),  quoted  by  Rodrik,  1998)  concludes  that 
appropriate trade and structural adjustment policies must be installed if Africa is to 
reverse  its  unfavourable  export  trend  and  capitalize  on  opportunities  offered  by 
foreign markets. 
 
Developed  countries  are,  however,  not  exempt  from  protectionist  tendencies.  For 
instance, Pustovit and Schmitz (2003) observed that, assuming complete liberalization 
of agricultural policies in all OECD countries, South Africa would be a net exporter of 
all the major meat products, including beef, pork and poultry. Presently, however, South 
Africa  remains  a  net  importer  of  most  of  these  products  due  to  the  high  level  of 
government  support  and  other  non-tariff  measures  in  OECD  countries.  This  fact 
necessitates  some  sort  of  protection  to,  at  least,  provide  a  level  playing  field  for 
domestic agricultural producers; typically tariffs and tariff rate quotas can be used, 
which  are  the  only  legal  measures  of  protection  allowed  under  the  Marrakech 
Agreement (Skully, 2001a).  
 Literature Review 
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While it is obvious that Africa’s participation in global trade must increase in order to 
reverse  the  continent’s  marginalization  (Rodrik,  1998),  it  has  been  said  in  many 
forums that industrialized countries are partly responsible for the negative effects of 
trade in many developing countries. For instance, Pustovit & Schmitz (2003) mention 
that,  in  industrialized  countries,  the  level  of  protection  afforded  the  domestic 
agricultural  sector  against  imports  from  developing  countries,  coupled  with  the 
dumping of surpluses through massive export subsidies, have had a negative effect on 
developing countries. This development necessitates some type of protection to, at 
least, provide a level playing field.  
 
2.3.1  Trade policy and instruments 
 
The strong theoretical argument for free trade, notwithstanding legitimate demands for 
protection, has necessitated the formulation of protectionist policies by governments. In 
opting for policies such as tariffs, import quotas, domestic content regulations, packing 
and labeling requirements, export subsidies, sanitary restrictions, variable import levies, 
export controls etc., governments strive to protect local interests (Houck, 1992). It is 
common knowledge that almost every nation that can afford to support its food and 
agricultural sector (and even some that cannot) channel public expenditure into this 
sector. In many cases, the motives are not ill-conceived, as nations strive to influence 
domestic  and,  where  possible,  international  markets  to  the  benefit  of  their  local 
producers and to ensure food self-sufficiency. 
 
Recent developments relating to global trade policy have seen agricultural trade taking 
centre  stage.  Issues  which  have  come  to  fore  relate  mostly  to  how  governments 
implement domestic policies which impact on the long-term behaviour of prices and 
income, terms of trade and ultimately producer and consumer welfare. Houck (1992) 
reasons  that  government  intervention  in  agricultural  markets  is  mostly  due  to  the 
essential  nature  of  food  and  fiber  to  human  welfare,  the  biological  character  of 
agricultural production, as well as the long-term behaviour of prices and incomes in 
agriculture.  Sodersten and Reed (1994) state that, while there are many reasons for a 
country to restrict trade, tariffs have long been used for this purpose. In fact, Houck 
(1992) describes tariffs and import quotas as the meat and potatoes of protective trade 
policy. Literature Review 
  17 
Sodersten and Reed (1994) are of the opinion that governments'  motives for restricting 
imports include a desire to "protect" domestic producers from the imported, competing 
goods, a wish to reduce the consumption of the good, a desire to reduce imports for 
reasons relating to balance of payments, and a need to raise revenue. Demands for 
protection  by  industries,  farmers  and  consumers  has  led  to  the  formulation  of 
protection policies by governments (Houck, 1992), and these include import limiting 
policies (e.g. import tariff). An import tariff is a tax on the affected foreign item, levied 
as it passes into the domestic economy, while an import quota is a physical limit on the 
amount of the affected foreign item that can be imported within a specified time period 
(Houck, 1992). However, according to Sodersten and Reed (1994), tariffs may be either 
specific (the tariff is specified in money terms per unit) or ad valorem (the tariff is a set 
proportion of the price of the good at the border).  
 
2.3.2  The three pillars of agricultural trade reform 
 
The aim of the 1994 Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)  was  to  achieve  freer  trade  among  member  countries  (Skully,  2001a).  A 
major landmark was the inclusion of agriculture in GATT negotiations at the Uruguay 
Round (Ingco, 1995), which  saw agricultural trade liberalization  negotiated  under 
three broad disciplines of agricultural policy. The three disciplines, often referred to 
as “pillars” of the URAA, include (WTO, 2000): 
 
·  market access; 
·  domestic support;and 
·  export subsidies.  
 
Countries who were signatories to the URAA agreed that liberalization of agriculture 
should continue beyond the 1994 agreement and that, one year before the end of the 
implementation  period,  progress  in  implementation  should  be  reviewed  (Europa, 
1999). 
 
At  the  2001  Doha  Ministerial  Conference,  member  countries  of  the  WTO  again 
committed themselves to liberalization based on the three pillars of agricultural trade: Literature Review 
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·  Substantial improvements in market access; 
·  Reduction, with a view to phasing out, of all forms of export subsidies; 
·  Substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support (WTO, 2004). 
 
Due the scope of this study only issues related to market access will be discussed 
further. 
 
2.3.3  Market access 
 
The  market  access  provision  of  the  URAA  involves  the  conversion  of  non-tariff 
barriers to tariffs (the so called “tariffication”) and the establishment of bound tariffs, 
i.e. the maximum tariff that may be applied at a border (Ingco, 1995). Following 
tariffication, the minimum access commitment (MAC) was established to eliminate 
existing limitations on trade due to non-trade barriers (Abbott and Paarlberg, 1998). 
In addition, measures were established to safeguard existing market access, through 
the so called “current access”, which was set at the initial base period of 1986-88 
(IARTC, 2001).  
 
Newly established bound tariffs had to be reduced by not less than 36 per cent over 
six  years  and  24  per  cent  over  ten  years  in  industrial  and  developing  countries 
respectively on a simple (unweighted) average, while previously existing tariffs were 
to be reduced by not less than 15 per cent and 10 per cent over the same period for 
industrial and developing countries respectively (Ingco, 1995). In complying with the 
market access provision, which stipulates that countries convert all their non-tariff 
trade barriers to bound tariffs (with reduction commitments) and the minimum access 
commitment  in  the  form  of  import  quotas,  it  was  considered  necessary  that  a 
compromise  instrument  in  the  form  of  a  “tariff  rate  quota”  (TRQ)  be  introduced 
(Abbott, 2001). 
 
Several concerns were, however, raised with regard to the implementation of TRQs 
for  market  access  at  the  time  of  its  introduction.  Many  analysts  believed  that 
minimum access may be the only real improvement to market access permitted by the Literature Review 
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tariff rate quota (Tangermann, 1996). While Tangermann (1996) is opposed to such 
views, he noted that the likelihood of exports taking place under TRQs depends on 
whether  the  tariffs  are  prohibitive  or  not.  Some  studies  have  concluded  that  the 
conversion of non-tariff barriers (NTB) to tariffs (under the “tariffication” obligation) 
has mostly led to tariffs being much higher than the NTB equivalents (Ingco, 1995; 
Josling, 1998; Monnich, 2003). In addition, setting a current access agreement to a 
base period of 1986-1988 has been criticized, as world prices were generally low 
during this period, which meant high levels of protection (Ingco, 1995). 
 
The  establishment  of  TRQs  emphasized  such  issues  as  licensing  procedures  and 
administration methods, which continue to permit government interference in trade 
(Ingco and Townsend, 1998). The FAO (2000) states that uncertainty surrounding 
procedures for allocating minimum access quotas has caused countries to allocate 
licenses to domestic traders, rather than foreign traders, even though this may be 
entirely  inconsistent  with  most  favoured  nation  (MFN)  principles.  Ingco  and 
Townsend (1998) further state that traders, in turn, will have an incentive to lobby for 
continuation of the high levels of applied and bound tariffs. The conclusion, however, 
was that the challenge for the next round of WTO negotiation on market access will 
be  to  prevent  TRQs  from  interfering  more  than  necessary  in  the  competitive 
development of trade. These issues will be discussed in detail in subsequent sections 
of this chapter. 
 
2.4  Tariff rate quotas  
 
The aim of introducing TRQs as a compromise policy instrument was to ensure that 
minimum access commitments were met, contrary to the fear among negotiators that 
tariff bindings at base period trade would result in very high tariffs, and thus prevent 
the minimum access commitment from being met (as they could discourage greater 
imports rather than permit imports up to their minimum access commitments at very 
low or zero tariffs, and would set higher MFN tariff binding) (Abbott, 2001). 
 
Even though TRQs were virtually absent from world agricultural trade until the early 
nineties,  at  the  introduction  of  TRQs  to  agricultural  trade  in  1999,  37  countries 
notified the WTO of 1 368 TRQs, with South Africa reporting 53 (WTO, 2000). By Literature Review 
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2002, the number had increased only slightly to 1 425, of which the EU accounts for 
about 54 per cent and North American countries 6 per cent.  Africa accounts for 5.8 
per cent, Asia 11 per cent, South America 18.8 per cent and Oceania 0.35 per cent. Of 
the total number of TRQs 217 are country specific and the EU and North America 
account for 187 of them (WTO, 2002).  
 
The  low  rate  of  adoption  of  TRQs,  especially  by  developing  countries,  has  been 
attributed  to  many  factors,  ranging  from  its  complexity  to  lack  of  administrative 
capacity and know-how (IATRC, 2001). For instance, it has been observed that, while 
most  developed  countries  have  implemented  their  TRQs  as  applied  tariffs 
(Walkenhorst  and  Dihel,  2003),  developed  countries  have  implemented  TRQs  in  a 
variety  of  ways,  including  granting  preferential  access  and  implementing  trade 
agreements (Khorana, 2004). 
 
There is a belief that, if market access improvement focuses on successive reduction 
of  MFN  tariffs,  it  has  the  potential  of  eliminating  TRQs  (Matthews  and  Laoche-
Dupraz, 2002). Nevertheless, since there introduction TRQs has continued to generate 
research  interest  and  debate.  Several  studies  have  examined  the  effectiveness  of 
TRQs in granting market access (Abbort and Paarlberg, 1998; Abbott and Morse, 
1999; 2000, Boughner, De Gorter and Sheldon, 2000; Skully, 2001a; Matthews and 
Laroche-Dupraz, 2002; Walkenhorst and Dihel, 2003; Khorana, 2004). Noteworthy is 
that  Abbort  and  Morse  (2000)  are  strongly  of  the  opinion  that  at  the  time  of 
introduction of TRQs many did not fully understand the working of the two-tier tariff.  
 
Despite  mixed  perceptions  about  TRQ  usage  for  market  access,  it  is  certain  to 
continue forming part of agricultural trade negotiations, as shown by discussions at 
the 2002-2003 preparations for “modalities”, where the major part of the discussions 
about market access focused on TRQs and related subjects (WTO, 2004).  
 
2.4.1  Economics of tariff rate quotas 
 
A TRQ is a trade policy instrument which is basically a two-tier tariff on the import 
of a commodity. Figure 1 shows how a tariff quota works and how it can influence 
the  incentive  to  import.  The  effect  of  a  tariff  quota  on  trade  depends  on  excess Literature Review 
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demand for imports. A certain amount of the commodity may be imported at a lower 
tariff (the in-quota tariff), while imports exceeding this quantitative import quota are 
taxed at a higher tariff (over-quota tariff).  
 
 
Figure 2.2:  Effect of tariff rate quotas on import demand  
Source:  Adapted from Skully, 2001b 
 
Four possible outcomes of increasing levels of import demand can be observed in 
Figure 2.2. No trade occurs at M1 because domestic excess demand is insufficient to 
support imports at world prices, even without the in-quota tariff. This is reflected by 
the low domestic price, lower than the world price, plus the in-quota tariff. At M2, the 
quota is not binding (M2<Q), although domestic excess demand is sufficient to result 
in imports of M2; they are not high enough to cause the quota to bind and therefore 
the tariff quota functions as an ordinary tariff. The quota is binding (M3=Q) at M3; if 
a tariff quota did not exist and a tariff was merely applied at the in-quota rate imports 
of Q3 would result
1. With free trade, i.e. a tariff applied at the rate of zero, imports of 
F3 would result (F represents free trade). At M4, the quota is no longer binding. 
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Imports can be less in the case of a binding TRQ than with an unconstrained in-quota 
tariff, as shown in this case, where M3 units of imports must be rationed among Q3 
units of demand due to the TRQ restriction.  
 
2.4.1.1 Trade regimes under tariff rate quotas 
 
Issues of interest in the implementation of TRQs can be divided into administration 
and  liberalization,  both  of  which  have  reasonable  impact  on  trade.  While  TRQ 
administration  provides  information  about  how  countries  implement  their  TRQ 
system (Liapis and Britz, 2002), tailoring reforms to individual TRQ fill-rates can 
expand market access and reduce trade bias, hence liberalization (Skully, 2001a). The 
IARTC  (2001)  highlighted  major  challenges  in  TRQ  administration  and 
implementation: 
 
·  Discrimination among exporters and importers; 
·  Under-fill, i.e. the extent to which the minimum access commitments are not 
met; 
·  State trading as an implementation mechanism; and 
·  The impact on protectionism (or liberalization) resulting from its adoption. 
 
It has been said that the TRQ system was not well understood at the time of its 
adoption at the Uruguay Round negotiations (Abbott and Morse, 2000), leading to its 
low level of adoption by developing countries (IATRC, 2001). However, as shown by 
Skully (2001b), TRQs can serve as an important instrument for import rationing.  
 
Most of the (few) developing countries which have adopted TRQs have implemented 
it as either applied MFN tariffs well below the relatively high GATT stipulated in-
quota  tariff  bindings  (making  import  levels  well  in  excess  of  minimum  access 
requirements), or as a modification of state trading and licensing regimes (IATRC, 
2001). In the case of developed countries, for instance the US-China agreement on 
agricultural trade, TRQs have been used as maximum trade levels (USTR, 1999 as 
reported in IATRC, 2001). However, notifications of TRQs by some countries have 
not been transparent. For instance, the EU notifies the WTO of the level of imports Literature Review 
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issued in licenses rather the actual imports (Bureau and Tangermann, 2000), making 
it difficult to measure the extent of market access. 
 
The minimum market access and tariffication commitments have been implemented 
by  several  WTO  member  countries.  For  instance,  Matthews  and  Laroche-Dupraz 
(2001) showed that EU TRQs were established in three ways: current access quotas 
(which  allow  for  maintaining  pre-existing  preferential  access  commitments  e.g. 
Cotonou, previously the Lomé Convention), minimum access quotas and non tariffied 
product quotas (that is, quotas established for products for which non-tariff barriers 
are  converted  to  tariffs  without  necessarily  undergoing  tariffication,  while  still 
complying with the AoA). This trend exists mainly because many European countries 
proposed  and  implemented  tariff  rate  quotas  before  signing  the  Uruguay  Round 
Agreements in 1994 (Abbott and Morse, 2000).  
 
Figure 2.3 shows three possible alternative trade regimes under TRQs (Abbott and 
Morse, 2000). In regime 1 weak demand results in net import demand being less than 
the minimum access requirements. Thus, the domestic price is the sum of the world 
price and the low in-quota tariff. This therefore functions as a pure tariff. A second 
regime (regime 2) functions as a pure TRQ. Due to strong demand, imports exceed 
the minimum access requirements. Thus the domestic price is the sum of the world 
price and the MFN tariff. This was the original intention of introducing TRQs, i.e. to 
constrain imports. This is therefore a pure TRQ regime. A third regime (regime 3) 
functions as a quota. Due to a “prohibitive” MFN tariff, imports exceed the minimum 
access requirements at the lower in-quota tariff, but are lower than the minimum 
access requirement at the MFN tariff. Therefore, the domestic price lies between the 
world price plus the in-quota tariff and the world price plus the MFN tariff. 
 
The two latter cases result in rent creation and hence the need for an administration 
mechanism  for  distributing  the  rent.  Table  2.1  shows  the  outcomes  of  emerging 
domestic  price,  rent  creation  and  whether  administration  is  required  under  the 
alternative TRQ regimes discussed above. 
 Literature Review 
  24 
 
Regime 2: True TRQ  Regime 1: Pure tariff  Regime 3: Quota 
Figure 2.3:  Alternative TRQ regimes  
Source:  Adapted from Abbott and Morse, 2000 
 
Table 2.1:  Outcomes of alternative TRQ regimes  
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2.4.1.2 Tariff bindings 
 
Tariff bindings are countries’ commitments to maximum tariffs. Applied tariffs are 
often lower than these bindings, both for TRQs and for MFN tariffs (Ingco, 1995). 
Walkenhorst  and  Dihel  (2003)  report  that  in  most  developed  countries,  particularly 
Canada, the European Union and the United States, MFN-applied tariffs equal bound 
rates. On the other hand, OECD (reported by Walkenhorst and Dihel, 2003) reports the 
largest difference between applied and bound tariff rates for Brazil, India and South 
Africa, giving an indication of the level of unused protection in the agri-food sector in 
these countries.  
 
Furthermore, the combination of specific (i.e. per unit) and ad valorem rates has been 
considered a very effective means of protecting particular segments of the market 
(Bureau,  Fulponi  and  Salvatic,  2000  quoted  in  Walkenhorst  and  Dihel,  2003). 
However, the complementarity and substitutability between products, the equilibrium 
effects and changes in terms of trade have created linkages which are difficult to 
evaluate without the use of economic models (Walkenhorst and Dihel, 2003). 
 
While developing countries have mostly implemented TRQs as MFN tariffs short of 
GATT bindings, or as modifications of previously existing state trading or licensing 
regimes, true TRQs have been widely used in Eastern European countries to protect 
certain markets (Abbott and Morse, 2000).  
 
2.4.1.3 Market stability under TRQ 
 
In a TRQ regime, either one of the three (in-quota tariff, quota limit and over-quota 
tariff)  can  be  effective  for  specific  import  quantities,  while  the  two  others  are 
redundant. When a policy instrument determines the level of the domestic and world 
prices  directly,  it  is  considered  “effective”;  it  is  however  redundant  when  the 
domestic price is determined by another policy instrument (Boughner et al., 2000). A 
prohibitively high over-quota tariff allows for the same volume of imports as a pure 
quota (Skully, 2001a). However, if the over-quota tariff is less than the difference 
between domestic and international prices, more imports are allowed than under a 
normal tariff (Khorana, 2004). Literature Review 
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Abbort and Paarlberg (1998) observed that price variations and market behaviours 
under TRQs depend on the level of excess demand and excess supply. That is, when 
demand and supply conditions bring imports to the quota, price variations and market 
conditions are as under a pure quota, and can result in the alteration of policy regime. 
Boughner  et  al.,  (2000)  showed  regime  switches  under  TRQs  due  to  changes  in 
market conditions. Changes in market conditions (due to changing intersections of 
demand and supply curves) determine which policy instrument is effective and under 
what conditions. These outcomes are reported in Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2:  Effective  policy  and  market  conditions  under  alternative  TRQ 
regimes 
Effective policy  Redundant policies  Conditions 
Quota  Tiq and Tmfn  Pw Tmfn +  > Pd  
and 
Pw Tiq + <Pd  
Tmfn  Quota and Tiq  Pw Tmfn +  < Pd  
Tiq  Quota and Tmfn  Pw Tiq +  > Pd  
Source: Boughner et al., 2000 
 
2.4.2  TRQ administration 
 
There is an on-going debate about the impact of administration of TRQs on market 
access. Abbott (2001) observed two characteristics of commodities for which TRQs 
exist. One is that they are politically sensitive commodities and the other is that they 
are likely to be essentially non-tradable. The political sensitivity of these products 
emphasizes the issue of TRQ administration, because as the commodities become 
more  tradable  (especially  meat  and  diary  products),  exporting  countries  seek 
improved market access. 
 
For TRQ administration, it is important to determine how quotas are distributed. It is 
noteworthy  however  that  the  distribution  of  licenses  does  not  correlate  with  the 
distribution  of  quota  shares.  While  the  former  serves  as  a  rule  by  which  import 
licenses  are  allocated,  permitting  potential  individual  traders  to  import  under  the Literature Review 
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quota, the latter determines the amount of quota reserved for particular exporting 
countries. When an importing country sets the in-quota tariff, quota level and out-of-
quota tariff without country preferences, it is referred to as a global quota, while 
quotas  reserved  for  specific  countries  are  termed  country  specific  allocations 
(Hermann, Kramb and Monnich, 2000). 
 
Matthews  and  Laroche-Dupraz  (2002)  state  that  preferential  TRQs  could  be 
administered in favour of developing countries in three ways; firstly by lowering or 
eliminating  in-quota  tariffs  for  imports  from  developing  countries,  secondly  by 
reserved quota allocation for developing countries and thirdly by transferring quota 
rents to exporters from these countries using licensing arrangements. They further 
show, using evidence from the EU agricultural market, that increasing quotas could 
influence market access positively for developing countries. However, the conclusion 
was that MFN tariff reductions are more important for developing countries’ market 
access. 
 
However, Hermann et al., (2000) show that country-specific allocations introduce 
inefficiencies, as the favoured countries are excluded from competition with other 
exporters, in contrast to a global quota regime where market forces would determine 
how imports are allocated. It can therefore be concluded that, with country specific 
quotas in place, high-cost suppliers are granted access to markets, displacing low-cost 
suppliers (Skully, 2001b). 
 
2.4.2.1 Description of TRQ usage 
 
Of the initial 1 368 TRQs declared in 1999, 47 per cent were administered as applied 
tariffs (WTO, 2000). The consequence of using simple applied tariffs is that the over-
quota tariff is not applied and there is no effective limitation on imports at the in-
quota tariff. However, as observed by Skully (2001b), the administration of TRQs as 
applied tariffs is associated with the challenge of the importing country enforcing the 
TRQ at any time, thereby distorting trade flows. 
 
Examining  the  use  of  TRQs  in  meeting  the  minimum  access  commitments  by 
developing  countries,  Abbott  and  Morse  (2000)  observed  that,  since  developing Literature Review 
  28 
countries have met the minimum access commitments by applying TRQs to particular 
commodities in 1999, imports have increased in 72 per cent of cases and decreased in 
28 per cent of cases. They also found that in 23 per cent of the cases where imports 
increased the increase exceeded two standard deviations of imports, while in 1 per 
cent of the cases where imports decreased it exceeded two standard deviations of 
imports. They added however that it will be incorrect to attribute this trend to TRQs, 
as most developing countries’ TRQs are implemented as pure tariffs. 
 
The form of tariffs in place under TRQs (i.e. either ad valorem or specific tariff) has 
implications for domestic price stability. Using an empirical model for the Philippine 
pork trade, Abbott and Paarlberg (1998) show that, when all tariffs are ad valorem 
under TRQs, the domestic price is more stable than with a pure tariff, but less stable 
than  for a  pure quota.  However, the specific tariffs  showed  the greatest  stability. 
Therefore,  under  a  TRQ  regime,  domestic  price  shows  greater  stability  when  the 
above and below quota tariffs are specific rather than ad valorem. 
 
Some  complex  TRQ  or  TRQ-like  regimes  have  been  established  for  politically 
sensitive products, involving several rates applied to the same products. One such 
example is the Common Market Organization for Bananas (CMOB) for the EU. As it 
is presently constituted, the CMOB established two different quota systems for the 
TRQs, namely the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) quota and the MFN quota. 
These quota systems ensure that the in-quota and out-of-quota tariffs are lower for the 
ACP  countries  than  for  third  countries  (Hermann  et  al.,  2000).  Another  country-
specific  quota  was  allocated  under  the  MFN  quota  system  to  four  “substantial 
suppliers”; this accounted for 91 per cent of the MFN quota. The remaining 9 per cent 
is left as a global quota (in which the ACP countries can partake). 
 
It is interesting to note that TRQs, if implemented in the spirit of the URAA, will 
result in greater market access. Some countries, like New Zealand, have demonstrated 
the spirit of the agreement by keeping their in-quota tariff at zero per cent. A recent 
study by Drogue and Ramos (2005) simulated the impact of greater market access 
through  TRQs  on  major  agricultural  products  in  the  EU  and  MERCOSUR.  The 
results  show  that,  although  relatively  low  increases  in  global  welfare  will  be 
experienced, there will be substantial changes in the terms of trade and quota rent Literature Review 
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transfer.  Due  to  the  competitiveness  of  MERCOSUR  countries  in  most  of  these 
products, there would be greater market access to EU markets and quota rents would 
accrue to MERCOSUR exporters. 
 
2.4.2.2 “Dirty tariffication” 
 
Consequent to the adoption of tariffication and tariff bindings to convert NTBs to 
tariffs at the end of the URAA, Ingco (1995) observed that many countries set both 
their specific and ad valorem tariffs at levels higher than the tariff equivalent (that is, 
the difference between the domestic and world market prices), a situation she termed 
“dirty tariffication”. 
 
Boghner  et  al.,  (2000)  identified  various  examples  of  dirty  tariffication.  These 
include: manipulation of calculations pertaining to domestic consumption in setting 
current access and minimum access commitments, reduction of already low tariffs 
relatively more than that of other sectors with higher tariffs in order to  meet the 
required 36% average reduction and the miscalculation of tariff equivalents to allow 
for a wider gap between in-quota and over-quota prices. 
 
Abbott  and  Morse  (2000)  found  evidence  of  dirty  tariffication  in  the  initial  14 
developing countries (South Africa not included) which notified the WTO of their 
TRQs. They however added that the trend is an indication of the extent of trade 
liberalization  in  developing  countries’  markets.  Bureau  and  Tangermann  (2000) 
confirmed the presence of manipulation in domestic consumption calculations in the 
United States and Canada dairy trade, as well as in the meat trade of the EU. 
 
Given the prevalence of dirty tariffication in agricultural TRQs, the current schedule 
“unweighted  average”  approach  has  been  criticized.  As  an  alternative,  different 
approaches have been proposed (Josling, 1998) to remove the high bound tariffs and 
thus unused protection from agricultural TRQs.  These include the Swiss Formula, 
which was applicable to industrial goods at the Tokyo Round, the zero-to-zero tariff 
reductions agreement and several other alternatives differentiated or across the board 
tariff reductions. The major issue however is how to remove much of the unused 
protection in tariff bindings.   Literature Review 
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2.4.2.3 Quota fill-rates 
 
Fill rates, measured by the actual imports as a ratio of potential imports under TRQs 
(Bureau  and  Tangermann,  2000),  remain  a  common  means  of  measuring  the 
performance of TRQ administration methods (Matthews and Laroche-Dupraz, 2002). 
However, it is not a perfect measure of countries’ implementation of market access 
commitments due to the effects of market forces (Bureau and Tangermann, 2000). 
Abbott (2001) identified two causes of underfill. One is inadequate demand at the 
price determined by the in-quota tariff. A second cause is the case of transaction cost 
incurred in complying with TRQ administration methods. In the second case, the 
effective  tariff  will  be the  in-quota  tariff  plus the  transaction  cost. Therefore, the 
domestic price will be the world price plus the in-quota tariff and transaction costs. 
 
When demand is sufficient, the level of quota fill risk is still attributable to the TRQ 
administration method. For instance, quota fill risks are limited under state trading 
and  producer  groups  (Skully,  2001a).  However,  the  issue  of  trade  distribution 
resulting from transparency persists with these administration methods. One measure 
of  transparency  is  the  level  of  consistency  in  setting  in-quota  tariffs  across 
commodities. Bureau and Tangermann (2000) reported that, in meeting its market 
access obligation the EU has set its in-quota tariffs at 32 per cent of the out-of-quota 
(MFN), initial or base tariff, except for a few cases. However, unlike the trend with 
the  EU,  neither  the  United  States  nor  Canada  specify  their  in-quota  tariff  nor 
distinguish between current access and minimum access; a situation which indicates a 
lack of transparency. 
 
Skully (2001a) explains that TRQ fill rates, due to the random year-to-year changes, 
may be considered as a “Markov Process” due to such effects as weather, which 
affects changes in supply, while demand is subject to macro-financial and exchange 
rate  shocks.  Khorana  (2004)  however  contends  that  quota  fill  rates  alone  do  not 
measure  the  effectiveness  of  TRQs  in  granting  market  access  adequately.    He 
concludes that the effectiveness of TRQ administration must be judged by whether it 
allows for full utilization of import quotas, transparency and whether it efficiently 
separates distribution of trade from distribution of rents.  
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De Gorter and Sheldon (2000) argue that quota underfill does not necessarily imply 
inefficiency, just as a filled quota is not a reflection of efficiency. Abbott and Morse 
(2000) show that the prevalence of overfilled quotas in developing countries is the 
result of extensive use of applied tariffs which are set below the tariff rate under a 
TRQ regime, bilateral quotas, as well as varying quotas emanating from domestic 
“need” and production (which is reminiscent of state trading or licensing). Underfill 
may  result  from  inefficiency  due  to  insufficient  demand,  unavailable  supply  or 
effective in-quota tariff (De Gorter and Sheldon, 2000). 
 
Abbott and Morse (2000) observed two trade regimes which result in underfill or 
overfill. The effect of complex TRQ administration mechanisms, which effectively 
lead to transaction costs, may be high enough to raise domestic prices to a level where 
imports are less than the minimum access commitments, resulting in underfill. On the 
other  hand,  the  practice  of  using  applied  tariffs  without  setting  appropriate 
mechanisms for limiting imports to the minimum access requirements (common in 
developing country TRQ regimes) mostly set the applied tariff below the over-quota 
tariff, thus allowing for over-fill.  
 
A recent empirical study by Carter and Li (2005) reports that an in-quota tariff has 
much more influence on quota fill rates than the over-quota tariff, despite the high 
protection  offered  in  value  terms  by  the  over-quota  tariff.  This  may  explain  the 
situation in the OECD countries, where an under-utilization of TRQs measured by the 
fill rates has been reported. From an average fill rate of 67 per cent in 1995 to 57 per 
cent in 1999 (OECD, 2001), the case of TRQs in the OECD countries serves as an 
example  of  under-performance  of  TRQs  in  granting  improved  market  access  and 
increased trade flows.  
 
2.4.2.4 Administration methods 
 
The administration methods permitted for TRQs under WTO rules include applied 
tariffs, first come-first served, licenses on demand, auctioning, historical importers, 
state trading, producer groups and miscellaneous categories (WTO, 2000). Table 2.3 
provides a description of each of these methods. 
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Table 2.3:  Categories of principal TRQ administration methods 
Code  Description 
AT  "applied tariff”: No shares are allocated to importers. Imports of the products 
concerned are allowed into the territory of the Member in unlimited quantities at 
the in-quota tariff rate or below. 
FC  “first  come-first  served”:  No  shares  are  allocated  to  importers.  Imports  are 
permitted entry at the in-quota tariff rates until such a time as the tariff quota is 
filled; then the higher tariff applies automatically. The physical importation of 
the good determines the order and hence the applicable tariff. 
LD  “licenses–on-demand”:  Importers’  shares  are  generally  allocated,  or  licenses 
issued, in relation to quantities demanded and often prior to the commencement 
of  the  period  during  which  the  physical  importation  is  to  take  place.  This 
includes methods involving licenses issued on a first come-first served basis and 
those systems where license requests are reduced pro rata where they exceed 
available quantities. 
AU  “auctioning”: Importers’ shares are allocated, or licenses issued, largely on the 
basis of an auctioning or competitive bid basis. 
HI  “historical  importers”:  Importers’  shares  are  allocated,  or  licenses  issued, 
principally in relation to the past imports of the product concerned. 
ST  “imports  undertaken  by  state  trading  entities”:  Import  shares  are  allocated 
entirely or mainly to a state trading entity which imports (or has direct control of 
imports undertaken by the relevant Member) the product concerned. 
PG  “producer groups or associations”: Import shares are allocated entirely or mainly 
to  a  producer  group  or  association  which  imports  (or  has  direct  control  of 
imports undertaken by the relevant Member) the product concerned. 
OT  “other”:  Administration  methods  which  do  not  clearly  fall  within  any  of  the 
above categories. 
MX  “mixed allocation methods”: Administration methods involving a combination of 
the methods set out above, with no single method being dominant. 
NS  “non-specified”:  Tariff  quotas  for  which  no  administration  method  has  been 
notified. 
Source: WTO (2000).  Literature Review 
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Several  studies  have  shown  that  the  administrative  method  used  by  an  importing 
country  determines  the  level  of  transparency,  efficiency  and  distribution  of  trade 
(Abbott, 2001; Skully, 2001a; Khorana, 2004). Using theoretical arguments, Skully 
(2001a) ranked these administration methods into three groups based on the risk of 
biased trade and quota underfill. These are market allocation methods, quasi-market 
methods  and discretionary methods.  Market  allocation  methods comprise auctions 
and applied tariffs. These methods are inherently unbiased toward trade. A market-
based approach has been described as the most transparent and economic method of 
quota  administration.  However,  the  performance  of  TRQ  administration  under 
auctioning depends on the degree of liquidity of the market (Skully, 2001a).  
 
Quasi-market  methods  comprising  first  come-first  served,  license  on  demand  and 
historical allocation, is the second category. The random effects introduced to market 
allocation processes by these methods result in the displacement of efficient low-cost 
suppliers by inefficient high-cost foreign suppliers. However, the absence of a large 
volume  of  buyers  and  sellers  may  make  the  application  of  auctioning  methods 
difficult in which  case “licenses-on-demand”,  being a  combination of  market  and 
political processes, may be used. 
 
Matthews and Laroche-Dupraz (2001) identified two impediments to trade brought 
about by the method of TRQ administration concerned with quasi-market methods, 
namely business risks and misallocation of resources. Under a first come-first serve 
administration method long-term contracts without specific allocation of quota rights 
may result in business risks. For instance, in the absence of specific rights an exporter 
could find that the quota for a specific product is filled only at the border of the 
importing  country.  Furthermore,  over-dependence  on  preferential  TRQs  by  an 
importing  country,  even  for  products  for  which  it  has  no  long  term  comparative 
advantage, results in wasteful misallocation of resources.  
 
De Gorter, Falk and Hranaiova (2003), using a game theoretical analysis, established 
that competition for import quota licenses under a licenses-on-demand  method of 
quota administration allows higher cost firms to meet their desired quota allocation 
while lower cost firms receive increasingly lower quota licenses from their desired 
quota allocation. Furthermore, the analysis shows that the absolute inefficiency may Literature Review 
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be reduced by reducing in-quota tariffs due to the possible elimination of highest cost 
importers, while increases in quota can progressively lead to a 100 per cent quota fill. 
Based on the foregoing, trade liberalization in the face of license-on-demand must be 
implemented by reducing in-quota tariffs or expanding quotas because these measures 
have the ability to reduce the inefficiency of the license-on-demand method. 
 
Skully (2001a) argues that the distribution of trade may be inefficient if allocation is 
based  on  the  quasi-market  methods.  His  argument  arises  from  the  fact  that  rents 
generated by applying these methods may not be absorbed fully through a tariff or 
auction, thereby creating an incentive for higher-cost suppliers to gain access to the 
market,  displacing  lower-cost  suppliers.  Despite  this  trend,  however,  these  two 
methods, “licenses-on-demand” and “first come-first served”, are the most commonly 
used in TRQ administration.  
 
The third category comprises the discretionary methods which include state trading 
entities  (STEs)  and  producer  groups.  These  methods  are  the  least  efficient  TRQ 
administration methods with the greatest potential for distortionary trade and rent-
seeking; the same as that reported to be an impediment to trade rather than market 
access (Abbott, 2001, Skully, 2001a, Khorana, 2004).  In addition, these methods 
introduce market uncertainty and high transaction costs in some cases. These impede 
imports  and  result  in  a  high  probability  of  underfill.  Nonetheless,  Abbott  (2001) 
reported  the  highest  fill  rates  in  developing  countries  for  these  less  transparent 
administration methods. However, he attributes this trend to attempts by countries to 
meet  their  market  access  obligations,  prompting  them  to  use  these  methods  in 
bringing imports to commitment levels. 
 
In  order  to  ensure  transparency  of  state  trading  enterprises,  WTO  rules  require 
member countries to report the mark-up on domestic prices in their notifications of 
state trading, making it easier to determine whether the mark-up level exceeds the 
bound  tariff  rate.  This  can  however  be  avoided  using  institutional  arrangements 
(McCoriston  and  MacLauren,  2001).  McCoriston  and  MacLauren  (2001)  further 
argue that, since import licenses are either auctioned or allocated to importing or 
exporting  firms  using  other  administration  methods,  state  trading  enterprises  as  a 
stand-alone cannot reduce the level of quota utilized or lower quota fill rates. Literature Review 
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A recent empirical study conducted by Carter and Li (2005) to measure the impact of 
the administration methods on market access (proxied by the quota fill rates) in all the 
countries which notified the WTO of TRQs, revealed that administration methods are 
of  great  importance  for  TRQ  performance.  As  expected,  applied  tariff  methods 
(although not a real TRQ, in that it does not pose any quantitative restriction), appear 
superior to other methods. However, the results of this study show some deviation 
from theory. For instance, despite their varying method of allocation, first come-first 
served, license-on-demand and historical importer methods show similar effects on 
market access. Furthermore, although “state trading and producer groups” is the least 
transparent method of TRQ allocation, results of the empirical study show it has a 
moderate impact on market access. This argument is supported by WTO data on the 
average fill rates of the principal administration methods (WTO, 2000) where STEs 
demonstrate better fill rates than other theoretically better administration methods. 
 
Monnich  (2003)  conducted  an  empirical  study  to  determine  the  impact  of 
administration  methods  on  EU  fill  rates.  As  expected,  it  was  established  that 
administration methods do matter, albeit not following theoretical expectations. For 
instance,  historical  allocation  (although  it  limits  market  competition),  as  well  as 
export certification, were found to not cause quota underfill, while license-on-demand 
was  reported  to  be  the  poorest  in  terms  of  performance  of  all  the  administration 
methods applied by the EU. 
 
A more surprising result from Monnich (2003) is that the in-quota tariff, as well as 
the wedge between domestic and import prices, does not have a significant impact on 
fill rates; in contrast, out-of-quota tariffs as well as quota limits do. This trend was 
attributed to domestic policies (e.g. subsidies to farmers) in the EU, which are still 
effective despite the introduction of TRQs to EU agricultural trade (OECD, 2002, 
quoted by Monnich, 2003). Furthermore, the analysis shows the intermingling of two 
aspects in which WTO rules apply, i.e. market access and domestic support. In fact, 
OECD (2002) reports that, even with a general expansion of quotas by 50 per cent in 
the EU, domestic prices will not be affected. 
  
Apart  from  the  principal  TRQ  administration  methods  in  Table  2.3,  additional 
conditions which have the potential to cause biased trade and affect fill rates were Literature Review 
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specified by the WTO. These include domestic purchase requirements, limits on TRQ 
shares per allocation, export certification, past trading performance and combinations 
of  the  listed  conditions  (WTO,  2000).  Of  these  four,  limits  on  TRQ  shares  per 
allocation remains the most intensively used, accounting for about 40 per cent of total 
additional administration methods in 1999. Past trading performance followed with 
about 30 per cent, domestic purchase requirements with about 20 per cent, while the 
other 10 per cent is administered by export certificates and a combination of past 
trading performance and limits on shares (WTO, 2000).   
 
2.4.3  TRQ liberalization 
 
TRQs were introduced as a transitional instrument to free trade (Boughner et al., 
2000).  Skully  (2001b)  reported  that,  although  TRQs  were  introduced  as  an 
intermediate step towards converting quota restrictions to tariffs, in order to effect the 
greatest  increase  in  non-discriminatory  market  access  using  TRQ,  it  must  be 
ascertained which of the three elements present in a TRQ regime (in-quota tariff, 
quota, and over-quota tariff) constrain trade or is likely to constrain it. 
 
Several  studies  (Bureau  and  Tangermann,  2000;  De  Gorter  and  Sheldon,  2000; 
Khorana,  2005)  examined  approaches  to  liberalizing  TRQs  which  will  result  in 
greater  market  access.  While  it  is  obvious  that  increasing  the  quota  volume  or 
lowering the in-quota tariff can both result in improved market access, Bureau and 
Tangermann (2000) argue that each of the two forms of reform are applicable under 
different  scenarios.  They  maintain  that  both  the  fill  rate  and  import  demand  can 
influence  the  mode  of  TRQ  reform  which  would  be  effective.  A  low  fill  rate 
combined with limited import demand (even at a lower tariff) would not respond to 
either  larger  quota  volume  or  lower  in-quota  tariffs.  However,  substantial  TRQ 
liberalization  exists  with  the  expansion  of  import  quota  when  existing  TRQs  are 
filled, but in such cases a reduction in in-quota tariff will only create rents (Bureau 
and Tangermann, 2000). 
 
Using the case of Switzerland, Khorana (2004) established that TRQs in itself does 
not  reduce  market  access  for  developing  countries.  However,  except  for  a  few 
developing countries like Argentina, Brazil, China, Thailand and South Africa, which Literature Review 
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have advanced integration into the global trading system, many developing countries 
have  not  fully  utilized  their  export  potentials  under  TRQs,  given  the  generalized 
system of preferences.  
 
Matthews and Laroche-Dupraz (2002) observed that the distribution of EU imports 
under TRQs between developed and developing countries was 60 and 40 per cent 
respectively  in  1997,  with  a  high  share  in  imports  of  meat  products.  This  was 
confirmed by Khorana (2004), who established that the largest share of Switzerland' s 
imports  from  developing  countries  in  2001  under  TRQ  was  in  meat  and  meat 
products. 
 
The practice of allocating quotas to specific countries, as opposed to allowing imports at 
MFN  basis  for  all  countries,  determines  the  extent  of  liberalization.  Matthew  and 
Laroche-Dupraz (2001) examined the appropriateness of allocating TRQs to developing 
countries from an economic, legal and negotiation cost perspective. They concluded 
that,  while  preferential  access  seems  to  be  a  development  approach  to  developing 
countries, there seems to be conflict in the legal provisions
2 allowing such approach to 
trade under TRQs. From an economic point of view, sometimes, quotas are allocated to 
countries  with  low  capacity  to  meet  the  quota.  Considering  the  extent  to  which 
preferential  agreements  allow  greater  access  to  certain  markets,  preferential  TRQ 
allocation is a major consideration when evaluating the implementation of countries’ 
market access commitments (Bureau and Tangermann, 2000).   
 
2.4.3.1 Rent creation under TRQ 
 
Theoretically, the percentage increase in quota required to prevent an in-quota tariff 
reduction from creating quota rent is proportional to the price elasticity of import 
demand (Skully, 2001b). Boughner et al., (2000) identified the lack of uniformity 
across countries and commodities in the implementation and reduction of both in-
quota and out-of-quota tariffs as the cause of varying trade liberalization effects. They 
                                                 
2 Special Binding Commitment and the Reform Programme of GATT versus Enabling clause 2(a) of the 
Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller participation of developing 
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further pointed out that inflation of tariffs (dirty tariffication) and deflation of quotas 
resulting from protection tendencies both imply rent-seeking. 
 
Rent creation is a direct consequence of the TRQ administration method. Market-
based administration methods remove the incentive for quota rents. In contrast, the 
risk of displacement of a lower-cost seller by a higher-cost seller, and thus biased 
trade, is enhanced by increasing deviation of the TRQ administration method from 
market equilibrium (Skully, 2001a). Since deviation from market equilibrium creates 
a potential for rent generation the risk of displacement of a lower-cost seller by a 
higher-cost seller is directly proportional to the extent of quota rent generated. 
 
In auctioning, quotas are allocated to the highest bidder based on prices; therefore all 
quota rents are absorbed (Skully, 2001b). Despite this trend, however, auctioning is 
rarely used in developing countries (Abbott and Morse, 2000). Moreover, the two 
elements of TRQ administration, namely distribution of trade and distribution of rent, 
affect  how  much  trade-distorting  risks  are  associated  with  quota  rent  allocation. 
However, prioritizing the distribution of trade over the distribution of rents results in 
the elimination of the trade distorting risk element in quota rent allocation, since the 
economic  principle  guiding  the  distribution  of  trade  is  the  minimization  of  trade 
distortions in the face of TRQ (Skully, 2001a). 
 
2.4.3.2 Quota rent and trade liberalization 
 
The tendency for TRQs to function as a quota, thereby generating rents, brings to the 
fore  the  issue  of  import  allocation  and  rights  (Abbott  and  Morse,  2000).  Using 
arguments of economic efficiency, Skully (2001b) explains how quota rents can result in 
biased trade. He argued that the generation of quota rents provides an opportunity for 
higher-cost suppliers to displace lower-cost suppliers when a binding quota increases the 
demand price to a level that permits higher-cost suppliers'  entry into the market. This 
however  results  in  a  reduction  in  global  welfare,  as  higher-cost  suppliers  make 
inefficient use of resources. 
 
Abbott and Morse (2000) report that most developing countries implement their TRQs 
using MFN regimes which are devoid of mechanisms for allocating rents or means of Literature Review 
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enforcing quotas or limits. However, the re-introduction or continuation of state trading 
permits governments'  involvement in managing trade; hence issues of “rent seeking” 
remain prominent. However, Boughner et al., (2000) are of the opinion that, since the 
share of rent and tariff revenue depends on both the relative gap between the in-quota 
and over-quota tariffs, combined with the import quota, it is expedient to ascertain 
which policy instrument is effective and what potential exists for regime switches. 
The result will determine how to liberalize trade effectively.  
 
Any  TRQ  liberalization  reform  which  ultimately  results  in  an  increase  in  rent 
increases the likelihood for biased trade and reduction in welfare (Skully, 2001b). 
Furthermore,  Boughner  et  al.,  (2000)  demonstrated  how  the  tariff  equivalent  (i.e. 
) Pw Pd -   relative  to  the  quota  provides information  about  the  effectiveness  of  a 
quota increase and tariff reductions in causing trade liberalization. They observe that 
reductions in the over-quota tariff are effective in causing trade liberalization where it 
is either less than or greater than, but close to the tariff equivalent. In a situation 
where the over-quota tariff is far greater than the tariff equivalent, trade liberalization 
is guaranteed to a greater extent with an increase in import quota. In the same vein, 
when the in-quota and the over-quota tariffs are close to each other both tariffs must 
be reduced for trade liberalization to take effect, except when the tariff equivalent is 
much less than the in-quota tariff (in which case only a quota increase will result in 
trade liberalization). 
 
The ability to transfer TRQ rights could determine who captures the revenue from 
quota allocation. Where transfer of rights is allowed private traders mostly capture the 
rent, unlike when rights are not transferable, in which case the distribution of rent is 
determined by the distribution of trade (Skully, 2001a). 
 
2.5  Competitive equilibrium and trade modelling 
 
Early trade theory built on the concept of comparative advantage by Ricardo raised a 
lot  of  questions  which  economists  have  subsequently  responded  to  with  further 
economic theories. However, a major limitation inherent in all the early concepts of Literature Review 
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international trade was the inability to explicitly incorporate transport costs in trade 
analysis (Finner, 1959)  
 
Judge and  Wallace  (1958)  observed  that  the  general  equilibrium contained  in the 
early  trade  theories  focused  on  an  economy  in  which  neither  factors,  producers, 
products  or  consumers  are  separated  by  geographical  location  and  space  (that  is, 
transportation  costs  are  assumed  to  be  non-existent).  For  instance,  according  to 
Ricardo’s theory, the location of production is to be determined by relative, rather 
than absolute, costs of production. This concept has serious limitations when more 
than two regions and/or two products are considered in that it does not explicitly 
incorporate transportation costs of commodities among regions, and the fact that it 
takes factor costs as point values instead of price-quantity functions (King and Henry, 
1959).  
 
Finner (1959) reports that early formulations of international trade analysis based on 
economic  theory  were  mainly  concerned  with  national  aggregates  and  the 
significance of time as an influencing variable. Enke (1951) and Samuelson (1952) 
were among the first trade theorists to take into account the interconnectedness of 
competitive  markets  that  led  to  the  development  of  the  notion  of  competitive 
locational equilibrium and spatial pricing systems. 
 
2.5.1  Mathematical programming approach to trade modelling  
 
Takayama and Judge (1971) report the efforts of economists to develop a general 
theory which would address all the concerns and challenges of the earlier theory, such 
as  the  spatial  pricing  and  allocation  problem,  the  problem  of  partial  equilibrium 
among spatially separated markets and the problem of inter-connection of competitive 
markets. Pioneering work by notable authors such as Koopmans (1949 and 1951), 
Dantzig  (1951)  (mentioned  in  Takayama  and  Judge  (1971)),  Enke  (1951)  and 
Samuelson  (1952)  resolved  these  problems  with  spatial  equilibrium  and 
transportation formulations which could be solved using mathematical programming. 
King  and  Henry  (1959)  confirmed  that  transportation  models  provide  valuable 
insights into the interrelationships of markets during change in supply and demand 
conditions. Finner (1959) further stated that the inclusion of interregional commodity Literature Review 
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movements  as  significant  variables  in  the  analysis  of  trade  flows  has  provided  a 
measure of the economic effects of changes in a given region on national aggregates 
and on the economies of other regions within the national aggregate.  
 
2.5.2  Use of mathematical programming for policy analysis 
 
Earlier uses of mathematical programming for regional trade analysis employed the 
linear  programming  technique  to  arrive  at  equilibrium  price  and  trade  flows.  For 
instance, Judge and Wallace (1958), using comparative static analysis, demonstrated 
how regional trade analysis can be used to determine the response to changes such as 
transport  costs,  the  level  of  regional  distribution  of  production,  the  level  and 
distribution of consumer income, as well as the level and regional distribution of 
population on regional prices, production, consumption and commodity flows. This 
was done by determining the optimum regional price differentials, equilibrium prices, 
consumption  and  surpluses,  as  well  as  deriving  minimum  cost  commodity  flows 
among regions using the mathematical programming approach. 
 
Empirical applications of theoretical formulations of existing competitive equilibrium 
and trade theories stand as a bridge between theory and reality, as it ascertains the 
practicability  of such theories.  The  need for such empirical application has given 
mathematical  programming  an  increased  importance  in  the  past  century  as  an 
analytical approach to agricultural problems (McCarl & Spreen, 1980).  
 
2.5.3  Developments in trade models of the agricultural sector 
 
The bias in the regional emphasis of models with global coverage to date has been to 
the disadvantage of developing countries. For instance, the regional composition of 
WATSIM,  as  modelled  by  Kuhn  (2003),  does  not  take  developing  countries  into 
account,  while  the  market  module  of  the  CAPRI  model  described  by  Wieck, 
Dominguez  and  Britz,  (2003)  divides  the  world  into  12  regions,  with  only  an 
aggregation of the ACP countries. However, while almost all existing agricultural 
policy models have been developed mainly for the developed countries, the FAO 
World Food Model takes into account the consequences of policies in developing 
countries.  Conforti  (2001)  describes  the  latest  version  of  this  model,  which  has Literature Review 
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incorporated TRQs and takes intra-industry trade into account.  However, the level of 
product aggregation assumed in the model limits its analytical capability. 
 
Even with the existence of a few disaggregated models that are capable of simulating 
the effects of trade policies on developing countries (including South Africa), such 
models are not necessarily dependable. As Westhoff, Fabiosa, Beghin and Meyers, 
(2004) point out, obtaining reliable and current information on applied tariffs and 
TRQs is not easy. However, even if initial data are accessible, they are difficult to 
update,  leading  to  erroneous  and  biased  results.  Therefore  it  is  important  that  a 
country-specific model be developed for regular and updated results. 
 
2.5.3.1 Measuring the impact of agricultural trade policy  
 
Most  of  the  existing  product-specific  models  of  agriculture  have  concentrated  on 
trade in developed countries, whilst those focussing on livestock trade have focused 
more on dairy products (IATRC, 2001; Cox and Yhu, 1997; Nicholson and Bishop, 
2004). The reason is that dairy trade attracts much political attention in the developed 
world and is perceived to be highly distorted.  In addition, Nicholson and Bishop 
(2004) point out that most of the product-specific models have aggregated policy 
instruments, i.e. not being specific with regard to a particular instrument, and have 
not included explicit representation of discriminatory ad valorem tariffs. 
 
Among the new tools introduced to agricultural trade policy making, TRQs seems to 
be the most ignored in trade policy analysis (Conforti, 2001). The introduction of 
TRQs to global agricultural trade at the end of the URAA has added new dimensions 
to  trade  policy  modelling.  This  is  the  case  because  the  administration  and 
implementation of this policy instrument requires high levels of sophistication. Rae 
(2001) makes a case for the inability of most trade models to explicitly model TRQs. 
He suggests either data or modeling complexities, or both, as the common reasons for 
this trend. Being a relatively new policy instrument, few of the existing models have 
been adjusted to accommodate TRQs. Van Tongeren, Van Meijl and Surry (2001) 
note  that  switching  cost  and  the  degree  of  adaptability  are  the  major  factors 
responsible for the slow rate of redesigning existing models to accommodate newer 
policies.   Literature Review 
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2.5.3.2 Model specification for policy analysis 
 
In terms of identifying areas of research pertaining to interregional trade analysis, 
Finner (1959) points out that the principal problems that could be solved by such 
specifications include spatial and locational problems, industry studies, demand and 
consumption studies, transportation problems, business operating decisions, as well as 
regulatory programs.  King and Henry (1959) add to this by stating that the study of 
the economic effects of interregional changes in production and consumption levels, 
imposition of duties, introduction of subsidies, blocking of trade on particular routes 
and  changes  in  transport  costs  on  particular  routes  can  be  conducted  by  using 
comparative statics in the transportation model.  
 
Francois and Reinert (1997) make a case for the appropriateness of economic and 
trade models for policy analysis within a comparative static framework. They argue 
that the three major factors impacting on the accuracy of the model results are the 
functional forms adopted, the base data used and behavioural elasticities. However, 
measuring change in trade policies using economic models requires the conversion of 
such policies to price effects in order to determine their impact on such variables as 
trade  flows,  economic  welfare  and  other  useful  variables.  Therefore,  the  level  of 
impact (in terms of both magnitude and direction) of the change in trade policy on 
particular variables will respond to both the price effects (i.e. the shocks) and the 
behavioural relationships in the target economy (McDaniel and Balistreri, 2003). In 
this regard, the model structure can be analyzed either by using the assumption of 
homogeneity or imperfect substitution between imported and domestic goods. 
 
A limitation of model structures which assume homogeneity of goods is that they 
seldom capture the intra-industrial trade that takes place between the importing and 
exporting countries. Therefore, although consistent with theory, the assumption of 
perfect  substitutes  in  demand  for  goods  does  not  represent  a  real-life  situation 
(Francois and Reinert, 1997). However, Armington (1969) proposed a theory which 
takes  into  account  the  imperfect  substitution  in  demand  between  domestic  and 
imported goods using a constant elasticity of production (CES) functional form. This 
phenomenon of differentiating demand for products by place of production or origin 
has been termed the Armington Assumption. Although this assumption has been used Literature Review 
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widely  in  both  general  and  partial  equilibrium  trade  models,  it  is  not  without  its 
critics. 
 
According  to  McDaniel  and  Balistreri  (2003),  the  major  criticism  against  the 
Armington elasticities relates to the estimated level of substitutability of domestic and 
imported  goods,  which  many  trade  economists  believe  are  smaller  than  the  real 
situation.  Furthermore,  McDaniel  and  Balistreri  (2003)  reviewed  studies  which 
employed econometric methods for estimating the Armington elasticity and came up 
with three major findings. One is the level of trade response to short-run and long-run 
estimates, i.e. the long-run Armington elasticities are more responsive than the short-
run.  Secondly,  the  level  of  aggregation  is  directly  proportional  to  the  size  of 
Armington elasticity estimates. Lastly, the methodological approach is of importance 
due to observed differences in results recorded by cross-sectional as against time-
series studies. Substitution rates are higher for the studies that apply cross sectional 
data than for those that used time-series data. 
 
2.5.4  Spatial equilibrium modeling 
 
Almost  all  the  agricultural  trade  modeling  approaches  can  be  traced  back  to  the 
Samuelson-Takayama and Judge (STJ) framework (Samuelson 1952; Takayama and 
Judge 1964, 1971). The analysis of the “equilibrium” flow of trade was derived by 
Samuelson (1952) when he applied the fundamental principle of “marginalism” to 
economic analysis. He proposed that the relationship among production, costs and 
revenue can be represented by both marginal equality and non-equality equations. His 
explanation arises from the fact that where marginal equalities (while accounting for 
transport costs and price differentials between regions) fail to explain equilibrium in 
trade  and  comparative  advantage  among  spatially  separated  markets,  marginal 
inequalities apply. 
 
One important element in trade modeling is the regional composition of the model 
due  to  its  implications  on  the  efficiency  of  economic  models  in  policy 
recommendation.  In  conducting  sectoral  analysis  two  major  approaches  can  be 
employed for defining the regions involved in order to measure the impact of policy, 
as well as the impact of various trade scenarios. As described by Kuhn (2004), a Literature Review 
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country  (say  South  Africa)  could  be  separated  into  regions  based  on  existing 
categories (for instance on a provincial basis) and then the aggregate market named 
“rest of the world”. Another way of doing this, as reported by Pustovit (2003), is to 
use certain reasonable forms of categorization. For instance, the country' s regions 
(say  South  Africa' s  provinces)  could  be  aggregated  and  then  trade  relations  (for 
instance EU-SA TDCA) could be separated rather than having an aggregate “rest of 
the world”. 
 
2.5.5  Partial equilibrium modeling 
 
Market equilibrium models can take the form of an economy-wide model (general 
equilibrium) or a partial equilibrium model. Although general equilibrium models 
take an economy-wide approach, the complexity of such models, as well as their huge 
data requirements, have constrained modelers to partial equilibrium models, which 
are better at handling many sector-specific analyses (Hertel, 1993 and Francois, 1999; 
quoted by Jooste, 2001). As concluded by Jooste (2001), the modeling framework 
adopted for any trade analysis should be driven by such considerations as the specific 
problem  at  hand,  the  anticipated  solution,  the  sectoral  or  regional  focus  of  the 
potential model and the representation of trade. 
 
Van Tongeren and Van Meijl (1999) observed that most of the partial models of 
agricultural trade capture the demand and supply relations of primary products while 
processed commodities are not modeled explicitly. Notwithstanding the higher share 
of secondary commodities in agricultural trade, many partial models have not fully 
exploited the linkages between primary and secondary agricultural sectors such as 
beef processing or dairy processing. Conforti (2001) also observes that in almost all 
existing partial trade models, all the supply relations fail to consider food processing 
and  distribution.  However,  some  more  recent  partial  equilibrium  models  like  the 
WATSIM  (Kuhn,  2003)  and  @2030  model  (Britz,  2003)  take  such  linkages  into 
account by introducing technical coefficients which handle the conversion of primary 
to secondary products.  
 
Another equilibrium concern raised by Conforti (2001) is that most existing models 
(general and partial) have depended extensively on the use of trends and calibration to Literature Review 
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derive their parameters, while failing to test existing behavioural hypotheses based on 
micro-economic theory. However Britz (2003) shows in the @2030 framework that, 
whilst missing model parameters can be derived by calibration of model parameters, 
the  same  can  be  formulated  to  ensure  compliance  with  requirements  of  micro-
economic theory for supply and demand parameters. 
 
2.6  Quadratic programming 
 
Following  the  formulation  of  spatial  price  equilibrium  models  using  Samuelson' s 
(1952) linear programming approach, in replacing marginal equalities with marginal 
inequalities for defining such relations as competitive equilibrium and comparative 
advantage in economic models, Takayama and Judge (1964a) showed that the Enke-
Samuelson formulation can be converted to a quadratic programming problem. 
 
The  linear  dependencies  for  interconnected  competitive  markets  require  that  the 
supply and demand prices be equal for any given region, the supply and demand 
relations between each region be represented by a linear function and transport costs 
between  demand  and  supply  regions  to  be  included  for  flow  activities  between 
demand and supply points.  Based on this foundation Takayama and Judge (1964a) 
further added equations which specify the handling of (a) linear regional demand 
functions and fixed regional demand, (b) fixed regional demands and linear regional 
supply  functions,  as  well  as  (c)  multi-product  linear  regional  demand  and  supply 
functions which involves linear substitution and complementarities. Such relations 
can  however  only  be  handed  mathematically  within  a  quadratic  programming 
framework.   
 
2.6.1  Scope of quadratic programming 
 
Market equilibrium models ensure the determination of both equilibrium prices and 
quantities, given sets of interrelated markets, as well as the behaviour of economic 
agents to changes in prices. One major requirement in such a situation is for the 
market to “clear” in which case endogenous prices have to be generated, which are 
linked to both the domestic and world markets (Van Tongeren and Van Meijl, 1999). 
 Literature Review 
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Although  the  basic  spatial  equilibrium  model  developed  by  Takayama  and  Judge 
(1971) is a price endogenous model which extends the basic transportation problem 
by relaxing the assumption of fixed supply and demand; modelling of this class only 
addresses the questions of who will produce and consume what quantities and what 
level of trade will occur (McCarl and Spreen, 2000). However, in core economic 
analysis, the behavioural response of market agents can be determined by imposing 
certain optimizing assumptions, which involves the specification of the demand and 
supply relations as a function of income, prices and elasticities (Van Tongeren and 
Van  Meijl,  1999).  In  such  analyses,  the  quadratic  programming  approach  easily 
accommodates the additional constraints and allows for the determination of market 
equilibrium. 
 
2.7  Duality theory 
 
Diwert (1974) identified the two major applications of duality theory; one is that it 
allows  for  deriving  demand  systems  which  satisfy  the  maximizing  or  minimizing 
behavior of the consumer or producer within the context of consumer or producer 
theory. Secondly, it provides a basis for the generation of “comparative static” results 
consistent with the maximizing behaviour of an economic agent.  
 
In many studies of the type conducted here, the need to generate demand parameters 
required for the modeling approach necessitates the calibration of available elasticity 
estimates from econometric studies. When the equilibrium price and quantity in the 
base year are available, the slope and intercept coefficients can be calibrated using 
these  elasticity  estimates  by  specifying  a  linear  price  dependent  demand  form 
(Howitt,  2005). This  approach is derived from  the  first application of  the  duality 
theory mentioned above. 
 
2.7.1  The derived demand 
 
The calibration of the demand system of an economic model is not as straightforward 
as mentioned by Howitt (2005), since some theoretical conditions must be satisfied 
for the derived demand function to be judged credible. Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) 
summarized  the  basic  properties  of  a  demand  function  as  being  homogenous  of Literature Review 
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degree zero in prices and total expenditure, having symmetrical compensated price 
responses  and  forming  a  negative  semi-definite  matrix  (that  is  the  curvature 
condition).  Since  few  empirically  estimated  functional  forms  satisfy  all  of  these 
conditions, it is important to impose them on the specified demand function, so as to 
satisfy the associated conditions implied by economic theory.  
 
Diewert  (1971)  identifies  two  distinct  methods  to  obtain  solutions  to  a  cost 
minimizing production function. The first method would be to obtain the derived 
demand function through mathematical programming techniques from a production 
function using a plausible functional form. An alternative method is to generate the 
derived demand function from a cost function using partial differential techniques 
with respect to the input prices. Based on the uncertainties associated with satisfying 
the regularity conditions when a production function (derived from a cost function) is 
transformed back to the original cost function, the second method may prove more 
complicated. However, the latter method must satisfy the micro-economic conditions. 
 
2.7.2  Flexible functional forms 
 
The estimation of utility, demand or cost functions within a production or consumer 
context often fails to satisfy the theoretical curvature conditions required by economic 
theory. However, a major factor in complying with these conditions is the flexibility 
of the chosen functional form. Diewert (1974) defines a flexible functional form for a 
cost function as one which allows for a second order approximation to an arbitrary 
twice continuously differentiable cost function that satisfies the linear homogeneity in 
prices, as well as the concavity conditions at any point in an admissible domain. By 
extending the Samuelson-Shephard and Shephard-Lemma duality theorems, Diwert 
(1974) developed the now commonly used generalized Leontief “flexible” functional 
form.  
 
Ryan and Wales (1996) estimated consumer demand functions which permit income 
flexibility by allowing for the curvature conditions to be imposed while constraining 
the demand function with two price functions; one which is homogenous of degree 
one in prices and the other which is homogenous of degree zero. The price function 
homogenous of degree one in prices is a quadratic form normalized by a linear form Literature Review 
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to yield a function linear in prices, hence the term “Normalized Quadratic-Quadratic 
Expenditure System”. By deriving a demand system from the indirect utility function 
in this manner, Ryan and Wales (1996a) proved that the first derivative of demand 
with respect to prices and income can take up arbitrary values at a particular point, 
and that the second derivatives of demand with respect to income can also take up 
arbitrary values at the same point. Hence the curvature condition can be imposed 
during estimation without making the function inflexible. 
 
2.7.3  Model integrability  
 
The symmetry condition, also termed “integrability” (Hurwicz and Uzawa, quoted by 
McCarl and Spreen, 1980), is the fundamental constraint associated with deriving 
factor demand equations from a cost minimization process (Diewert, 1971). For a 
demand function this condition can be guaranteed by the matrix of the first derivative 
of the Slutsky equation by treating maximization of utility as the minimization of 
costs (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980), since the expenditure function is to a consumer 
what the cost function is to the producer. This can be proven by showing that the 
Hicksian demand function can be rewritten as a derivative of the cost function that 
integrated into it. That is: 
 






This solves for C as a function of price. However, the mathematical conditions to 
ensure that the cost function solves the partial differential are: 
 



















Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) conclude that, since the left-hand side of the above 
equation is the Slutsky equation it shows that the Slutsky substitution matrix is a 
fundamental integrability condition of the demand theory. Following Ryan and Wales 
(1996a) it has been proven using a number of consumer demand functions that, with 
the identification of the appropriate reference point, the Slutsky matrix can be forced 
to be semi-definite by imposing the curvature conditions at that point. Literature Review 
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According to McCarl and Spreen (1980), the integrability condition requires that the 
effect of income on consumption is uniform across a combination of commodities in 
an economic model if the cross-price effects are to be symmetric. In ensuring that this 
condition  holds,  Ryan  and  Wales  (1996b)  estimate  demand  systems  in  which 
quantities demanded are quadratic functions of total expenditure or income, while 
also satisfying the flexibility condition.  
 
2.7.4  Elasticities 
 
Ryan and Wales (1996b) tested two of their postulated derived demand systems, i.e. the 
Normalized  Quadratic-Quadratic  Expenditure  System  and  the  Translog-Quadratic 
Expenditure System, by comparing the results obtained when the demand systems are 
calibrating against the micro-economic conditions and otherwise. The coefficients on 
the quadratic terms (elasticities) obtained were found to be highly significant when the 
micro-economic  conditions  were  imposed.  The  result  demonstrated  the  relevance  of 
these demand systems and the micro-economic conditions in economic modeling. 
 
The integrability conditions require the cross-price effects to be symmetric. According 
to McCarl and Spreen (1980), this implies that the effect of income on consumption is 
identical across all commodities of interest. However, Takayama (1994, as reported by 
Waquil  and  Cox,  1995)  distinguishes  mathematical  integrability  from  economic 
integrability.  While  mathematical  integrability  refers  to  the  condition  in  which  the 
matrix  of  the  first  derivatives  is  symmetric,  economic  integrability  refers  to  the 
condition in which the matrix of first derivatives is positive semi-definite for supply 
functions, and negative semi-definite for demand functions.  
 
2.8  Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided an overview of the emergence of the fundamental theory of 
trade and the developments thereafter. Current challenges in trade among nations and 
the structures in place to regulate the global trade arena, especially as it concerns 
agricultural trade, were highlighted. Within this context, the emergence of complex Literature Review 
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trade policy instruments and the need for proper understanding of these instruments 
was emphasized. 
 
TRQs are one of the trade policy instruments currently widely used in agricultural 
trade. The assertion that the functioning of this instrument is not properly understood 
has led to an in-depth literature survey which covers the three major facets of TRQs, 
namely  implementation,  administration,  and  liberalization.  This  is  especially 
important if considers the fact that no extensive study has been conducted on this 
subject in South Africa. It is therefore important to give an elaborate insight of this 
nature before conducting an empirical study on TRQs. 
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CHAPTER ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 
INDUSTRY OVERVIEW AND TRENDS IN THE 
LIVESTOCK TRADE OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
About 80% of South Africa’s 1 million km
2 agricultural land is suitable only for animal 
husbandry due to climatic and natural resource constraints.  Moreover, livestock farming 
forms the core of agriculture for both commercial and emerging commercial farmers. It is 
therefore  not  a  coincidence  that  the  Integrated  Sustainable  Rural  Development 
Strategy (ISRDS, 2004) identifies livestock farming as the agricultural enterprise with 
the most likely chance of improving household food security and addressing poverty 
alleviation  in  the  small-scale  communal  farming  areas  of  South  Africa  (Coetzee, 
Montshwe  and  Jooste,  2005).    Furthermore,  the  livestock  industry  was  a  highly 
regulated  sub-sector  controlled  by  various  policies,  such  as  the  distinction  between 
controlled and uncontrolled areas, restrictions on the creation of abattoirs, the compulsory 
auctioning of carcasses according to grade and mass in controlled areas, supply control 
via permits and quotas, the setting of floor prices and the floor price removal scheme 
etcetera  before  the  commencement  of  deregulation  in  the  1990s  (Jooste,  2001).  The 
industry became totally deregulated when all control boards were abolished in 1997. 
 
The livestock industry remains a major employer of rural labour, with about 425 000 
people employed in 2001 and 2 125 000 depending on it for their livelihood (Meissner, 
2004). Livestock products accounted for an average of 40% of gross farming income 
since  2000  (NDA,  2005a).  Due  to  the  high  rate  of  utilization  of  products  of  other 
industries (for instance, the poultry industry alone uses about 30 per cent of all maize 
produced) and increasing output by both established and emerging farmers, the livestock 
industry  through  forward  and  backward  linkages  (to  such  industries  as  theIndustry overview 
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food  industry),  increased  its  contribution  to  the  national  economy  by  10%  in  2003 
(Meissner, 2004).  
 
In South Africa 40% of the livestock are owned by emergent producers from previously 
disadvantaged  communities,  the  same  group  that  forms  the  focus  of  government 
development policies (NERPO, 2005).  Therefore, the livestock industry takes priority 
in  government’s  fundamental  objective  of  equitable  access  and  participation,  global 
competitiveness and profitability of the agricultural sector. 
 
This chapter consists of three major parts. Firstly, an overview of the South African 
livestock industry will include production, consumption and trade trends. Secondly, 
the  tariff  regime  on  imports  and  market  access  quota  on  meat  products  in  South 
Africa, as well as the relative importance of TRQs in South Africa’s meat imports 
will be presented. The chapter ends with a brief conclusion. 
 
3.2  Livestock production in South Africa 
 
3.2.1  The beef sector 
 
Figure 3.1 shows the South African cattle herd and animals slaughtered since 1975. 
From a total herd size of 12.6 million in 1994 the cattle herd size in South Africa 
increased to 13.8 million in 1998. Since then, it has remained within the range of 13.5 
and 13.6 million to date. In addition, the number of cattle slaughtered in South Africa 
which dropped to about 2.1 million in 1994 rose again to about 2.66 in 1999. It has 
since ranged between 2.2 and 2.6 million per annum. According to latest statistics, the 
commercial herd comprises approximately 60% of the total cattle herd. This means 
that approximately 40% of all cattle in South Africa are owned by non-commercial 
farmers. Of the total commercial herd, 88% is used for meat production while the 
remaining 12% is for dairy. 
 Industry overview 
 

















































































































































































Cattle herd number Number of cattle slaughtered  
Figure 3.1: The South African cattle herd and slaughtering (1975-2004) 
Source: NDA, 2005a; own computations. 
 
3.2.2  The pork sector 
 
SAPPO (1999) reported that approximately 80% of the total pigs in South Africa are 
found in commercial areas while approximately 20% are in the developing areas. 
Figure 3.2 shows the trend in the number of commercial pigs slaughtered in South 
Africa and the domestic pig herd. There has been an upward trend in both the number 
of pigs slaughtered and the herd size in this industry from 1975 to the early 1990s. 
This  trend  can  be  largely  attributed  to  the  continued  investment  in  the  technical, 
scientific and marketing aspects of pig production. For instance, the acquisition of 
computerized  feeding  and  environmental  maintenance  equipment,  better  disease 
control by improved housing facilities and the free market approach has aided the 
production efficiency and competitiveness of the industry (Visser, 2004).  Industry overview 
 












































































































































































Swine herd number Number of pigs slaughtered
 
Figure 3.2: The South African pig herd and slaughtering (1975-2004) 
Source: NDA, 2005a; own computations. 
 
Although a general upward trend is observed, the period following the early 1990s up 
until 2004 has experienced stagnation in both the number of pigs slaughtered and 
herd number. The sharp drop in swine herd numbers around 1999 can be attributed to 
the outbreak of Foot and Mouth disease in that year. Many producers went out of 
business or at least cut back on their herd numbers after the incident. Many herds 
were being fed but were not marketable. The sub-sector has however recuperated 
from the crisis. 
 
3.2.3  The sheep sector 
 
The South African sheep flock and number of sheep slaughtered is depicted in Figure 
3.3.  From  about  the  early  1980s,  sheep  numbers  began  to  drop  but  picked  up 
appreciably towards the end of that decade. The significant drop in the number of 
sheep during the 1980s can be largely attributed to the collapse of the wool industry. 
However the recovery of the late 1980s did not last long as it dropped again shortly 
thereafter and has continued to drop. Since 1994 to 2005, production of sheep meat 
has dropped annually by about 2.8 per cent. 
 Industry overview 
 









































































































































































Sheep flock Number of sheep slaughtered
 
Figure 3.3: The South African sheep flock and slaughtering (1975-2004). 
Source: NDA, 2005a; own computations. 
 
3.2.4  The poultry sector 
 
According to Table 3.4, the number of broilers produced per week in South Africa 
has experienced an upward trend since 1992, with a peak value of 11.8 million per 
week in 2002. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Average broiler production per week in South Africa: 1990 - 2005      
Source: South African Poultry Association – SAPA (2005) 
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Of the total production of poultry meat, 65% amounting to about 0.9 million tonnes in 
2004, was contributed by 30 major producers while the total production of the small-
scale emerging producers amounted to about 2 % of the national aggregate (SAPA, 
2005).  According  to  SAPA  statistics,  the  Western  Cape  Province  is  the  largest 
producer of broilers accounting for 26.9% of total production, followed by Gauteng 
with 16.3%, North West with 15.8%, and Mpumalanga with 15%. 
 
The poultry sector uses 69% of the production output of the feed industry, as well as 
between  15  and  25%  of  the  total  maize  output.  Therefore,  feed  prices  have  an 
appreciable impact on poultry production. However, in recent years feed prices have 
decreased, partly due to the strong rand. The size of domestic grain production which 
has resulted in excess supply, coupled with the linkage to the Chicago Board of Trade 
(CBOT) prices which affect the import and export parities, largely account for low 
feed prices. For poultry producers this state of affairs resulted in lower feed costs. 
 
3.3  Consumption of meat in South Africa 
 
3.3.1  The beef sector 
 
The per capita consumption of beef experienced a downward trend from 1978 up 
until the late 1980s, then picked up and increased until the early 1990s. Since then, 
there has been a sharp decline in the per capita consumption of beef as shown in 
Figure 3.5. From the figure, it is evident that trends in per capita consumption of beef 
and  per  capita  disposable  income  have  a  very  close  correlation.  Therefore,  the 
downward trend experienced in per capita beef consumption since the early 1990s can 
be attributed to a large extent to the stagnating per capita disposable income. This 
perceived  correlation  was  confirmed  by  Nieuwoudt  (1998)  who  reported  a  high-
income elasticity of demand for beef. Taljaard, Jooste and Asfaha (2005) also argue 
that the decline in per capita consumption can be explained by increased consumer 
sophistication. 
 Industry overview 
 




















































































































































Per capita disposable income Per capita consumption of beef
 
Figure 3.5:   Relation between real per capita disposable income and the per 
    capita consumption of beef (1975-2003) 
Source: SARB; 2004; NDA, 2005a; own computations. 
 
According  to  Nieuwoudt  (1998),  the  racial  distribution  of  the  South  African 
population  has  serious  implications  for  food  demand.  For  instance,  the  highest 
population growth rate is recorded among the black population but this does will not 
necessarily translate into an increase in average per capita food consumption. That is, 
although all the population groups may experience increasing growth in per capita 
consumption,  the  average  per  capita  food  consumption  may  decline.  Nieuwoudt 
(1998) explained that this phenomenon is attributable to the impact of the group with 
the  highest  population  growth,  which  most  often  records  the  lowest  per  capita 
demand and consumption of livestock products. 
 
3.3.2  The pork sector 
 
The per capita consumption of pork has remained relatively constant for a couple of 
decades now (Figure 3.6), as opposed to the declining trends in other red meat (beef 
and  mutton).  This  is  similar  to  global  trends,  with  pork  and  poultry  serving  as 
substitutes for beef.  One of the reasons for this is that pork is considered as the 
alternative white meat, which tends to increase the level of acceptance of pork. Industry overview 
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Figure 3.6 depicts the extent of correlation between trends in per capita disposable 
income and per capita pork consumption. The figure reveals that even in periods of 
sharp decline or rise in per capita disposable income, per capita pork consumption has 
been relatively stable. This relationship confirms the finding of Nieuwoudt (1998) 





















































































































































Per capita disposable income Per capita consumption of pork  
Figure 3.6:   Relation between real per capita disposable income and the per 
    capita consumption of pork (1975-2003) 
Source: SARB; 2004; NDA, 2005a; own computations. 
 
Nieuwoudt (1998) reported a much lower income elasticity of pork relative to other 
red  meat  products.  The  implication  of  this  finding  is  that  even  when  per  capita 
income increases, consumers will purchase, in relative terms, more other red meat 
products, and vice versa. As reported by Nieuwoudt (1998), the demand for pork will 
increase relatively lower than other red meat products under growth in the economy 
and low-income scenarios. This result can be attributed to the fact that pork is mainly 




 Industry overview 
 
  60 
3.3.3  The sheep sector 
 
Figure 3.7 shows the relation between per capita disposable income and per capita 
consumption of sheep meat. As with beef, the trends in per capita consumption of 



















































































































































Per capita disposable income Per capita consumption of sheep meat  
Figure 3.7:   Relation between real per capita disposable income and the per 
    capita consumption of sheep meat (1975-2003) 
Source: SARB; 2004; NDA, 2005a; own computations. 
 
Nieuwoudt (1998) projected  a similar trend  unfolding in the  demand for  meat  of 
sheep as with the demand for beef. 
 
3.3.4  The poultry sector 
 
Poultry meat remains the largest and most affordable source of protein for South 
African households. Per capita consumption of poultry meat has been consistently 
higher than that of red meat with a 14.45 kg per capita in 1992 and 21.13 kg per 
capita in 2004 (See Figure 3.8).   Industry overview 
 













































































Per capita disposable income Per capita consumption of broiler meat
 
Figure 3.8:   Relation between real per capita disposable income and per capita 
    consumption of broiler meat in South Africa: 1992-2003 
Source: South African Poultry Association – SAPA (2005), own computations. 
 
The  unfolding  trend  in  meat  consumption  in  South  Africa  may  be  attributed  to 
affordability and the racial composition relative to income distribution of the South 
African population. The greater percentage of the South African population is made 
up  of  blacks,  many  of  whom  prefer  to  consume  poultry  meat  due  to  reasons  of 
affordability resulting from sparsely distributed income growth. 
 
3.4  Trade in livestock products by South Africa/SACU 
 
3.4.1  Distribution of trade 
 
By means of a Lorenz curve, the distribution of market shares among the firms in an 
industry can be established graphically. Earlier uses of the Lorenz curve compared 
income distributions to the cumulative function of income. Using a similar analogy, 
the  distribution  of  market  shares  among  importers  or  exporters  of  a  particular 
commodity from a particular country can be represented by a Lorenz curve. In this 
case, the cumulative number of importing or exporting countries is drawn on the 
horizontal axis and a function of the share of trade on the vertical axis. Therefore, the Industry overview 
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straight line Lorenz curve (at 45 degrees from the origin) corresponds to an equal 
distribution of import or export shares.  
However,  Lubbe  (1992)  established  that  the  GINI-coefficient  is  a  more  precise 
measure of concentration; it is determined as the ratio of the area between the Lorenz 
curve and the 45 degree line. Hanson and Simmons (1995) showed that this ratio (the 
GINI coefficient) can be expressed as a percentage, i.e. 
( )( ) i i
N
i




1 1  
Where  X s  and  Y s  are cumulative percentages of  Xs and Ys(in fractions) and  N is 
the number of elements (observations). 
A GINI-coefficient equal to zero denotes that trade is equally distributed amongst 
countries; while it means trade is restricted to one country if it is equal to one.  
 
3.4.1.1 Imports of bovine meat into South Africa
3 
 
The  GINI-coefficient  for  bovine  meat  imports  was  calculated  at  0.768,  which 
indicates  a  relatively  high  degree  of  import  concentration.    Figure  3.9  shows  the 
relative  skewness  of  South  Africa’s  imports  of  bovine  meat  in  2003.  The 
concentration curve shows a high level of convexity to the 45 degree Lorenz curve, 
meaning that imports of bovine meat in 2003 were concentrated in a few countries 
(that is Argentina and Brazil). In fact, as the declining part of the graph shows, over 
80%  of  the  total  imports  of  this  product  into  South  Africa  came  from  these  two 
countries. 
 
                                                 
3 Bovine meat is the international classification used in the Harmonised System Code.  In the context of 
this study it refers primarily to beef.  Industry overview 
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Import share line  
Figure 3.9:   Lorenz trade inequality curve: South Africa’s imports of bovine 
meat in 2003 
 
Brazil and Argentina were ranked eight and tenth largest producers of the product 
respectively in 2003 (ITC, 2005).  This trend can be attributed to the competitiveness 
of these countries in the production of bovine meat. 
 
3.4.1.2 Imports of pork in South Africa 
 
The GINI-coefficient for pork imports was calculated at 0.745, which indicates a 
relatively  high  degree  of  import  concentration.    Figure  3.10  shows  the  relative 
skewness of South Africa’s import of pork in 2003. The concentration curve shows a 
high level of convexity to the 45 degree Lorenz curve, meaning that imports of swine 
meat was concentrated in a few countries (that is Brazil, France and Belgium). 
 
As shown by the upper part of the Lorenz curve convex to the perfect equality line, 
about 79% of the total imports of pork by South Africa in 2003 came from three 
countries, namely Belgium, France and Brazil. These countries were ranked sixth, 
eight and ninth largest exporters of this product respectively in 2003 (ITC, 2005).  
 Industry overview 
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Figure 3.10:   Lorenz trade inequality curve: South Africa’s import of pork  
    in 2003 
The outbreak of classical swine fever in France late in 2002 affected South Africa’s 
imports of pork from France in 2003. The South African Department of Agriculture 
placed a ban on the importation of French pork. Despite this, a large percentage of 
South  Africa’s  pork  imports  in  2003  still  came  from  France.  South  Africa  has 
increased its imports from Brazil to make up for French supplies, making Brazil the 
largest exporter of pork to South Africa to date.  
3.4.1.3 Imports of meat of sheep in South Africa 
 
The GINI-coefficient for sheep meat imports was calculated at 0.655, which also 
indicates a relatively high degree of import concentration.  Figure 3.11 shows the 
relative skewness of South Africa’s imports of sheep meat in 2003. The concentration 
curve shows a considerable level of convexity to the 45 degree inequality curve. This 
reflects the concentration of the share of imports of sheep meat between the two large 
exporters to South Africa. The result shows that imports were almost equally shared 
by the two largest exporters (New Zealand and Australia) while imports from the 
other two exporters do not have any appreciable impact on concentration. 
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Figure 3.11:   Lorenz trade inequality curve: South Africa’s import of  
    sheep meat in 2003 
 
It is evident from the figure that about 80% of South Africa’s imports of sheep meat 
came from Australia alone. New Zealand and Australia were the first and second 
largest exporters of meat of sheep respectively in 2003 in the world. Therefore, the 
high  share of  these  countries  in  South  Africa’s  imports  of  meat  of  sheep  can  be 
attributed to their global competitiveness. 
 
3.4.1.4 Imports of poultry meat in South Africa 
 
Poultry meat produced in South Africa has over the decades accounted for over 90% 
of domestic consumption. In 2004, however, imports of poultry meat amounted to as 
high as 18% of domestic production, a value that matches the total production of the 
third largest domestic producer (SAPA, 2005). 
 
The rather stable level of imports of poultry meat from 1998 to 2001 has experienced 
an upward trend since then owing to a strong rand, which has aided cheap imports of 
the product. Figure 3.12 shows the relative skewness of South Africa’s imports of 
poultry meat in 2004. 
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Import share line  
Figure 3.12:   Lorenz trade inequality curve: South Africa’s import of poultry 
    meat: 2004 
 
Imports from Brazil accounted for 76% of poultry meat imports into South Africa, 
followed by the United Kingdom with 6% and Canada with 5%, while Argentina and 
Australia have 4% each (SAPA, 2005). This portends a high level of concentration 
and may reflect the competitiveness of Brazilian producers in a highly competitive 
world market. 
 
3.4.2  Intra-industrial trade 
 
The degree of trade among countries has been proxied by the intra-industrial trade 
(IIT) index (Grubel and Lloyd, 1971). The intra-industrial trade index has been used 
to measure the extent of diversity of a sector and also to explain the simultaneous 
export  and  import  of  commodities  with  reference  to  the  competitiveness  and  the 
response of the sector to the changing policy environment (Oleh and Peter, 1997). 
Based  on  the  most  commonly  used  Grubel-Lloyd  index,  the  intra-industrial  trade 
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Where  ij X  and  ij M is the export and import of the product  i to country j . If the 
amount of exports equals that of imports ( ij X = ij M ), all trade in industry  i is intra-
industry trade, and 1 = ij ITT . The index of intra-industry trade takes values from 0 to 
1, and increases as the extent of intra-industry trade increases. 
 
3.4.2.1 Intra-industrial trade in bovine meat 
 
Figure 3.13 shows the intra-industrial trade indices of bovine meat between 1992 and 
2004 in South Africa. As shown by the figure, the value of the intra-industrial trade 
index for bovine meat between 1994 and 2004 has remained higher than the 0.6. 
Therefore since the liberalization of agriculture in South Africa, the extent of intra-
industrial trade has been consistently high in this product (meaning both imports and 

























Figure 3.13:   Intra-industry trade between South Africa and the rest of the  
    World: Bovine meat (1992-2004) 
 
The results of the analysis show that whilst trade liberalization has led to increased 
import of the meat of bovine into South Africa, the increase in exports nearly equals 
the increase in imports. Industry overview 
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3.4.2.2 Intra-industrial trade in pork 
 
The intra-industrial trade indices for pork between 1992 and 2004 in South Africa are 
as shown in Figure 3.14. The figure shows that the level of intra-industrial trade in 
pork by South Africa has remained lower than 0.5 from 1994 to 2004 owing to the 

























Figure 3.14:   Intra-industry trade between South Africa and the rest of the  
    World: Pork (1992-2004) 
 
3.4.2.3 Intra-industrial trade in sheep meat 
 
Figure 3.15 shows the intra-industrial trade indices for sheep meat between 1992 and 
2004 in South Africa. As shown by the figure the level of intra-industrial trade in the 
sheep meat of South Africa has consistently been low (lower than 0.2) over the period 
under  consideration,  trade  liberalization  notwithstanding.  This  is  due  to  the 
continuous dominance of imports over exports of this product.  
 Industry overview 
 
























Figure 3.15:   Intra-industry trade between South Africa and the rest of the  
    World: Sheep meat (1992-2004) 
 
3.4.2.4 Intra-industrial trade in meat and edible offal of poultry 
 
The intra-industrial trade indices of the meat and edible offal of poultry between 1992 
and 2004 in South Africa are shown in Figure 3.16. The figure does not show any 
regular trend in intra-industrial trade of this product (although largely greater than 5).  
 
The results of the analysis show that in spite of the effects of various other variables, 
such as the exchange rate on trade in this product, South African producers have 
remained competitive. This is evidenced by the domination of exports over imports, 
and thus consistently low intra-industrial trade value. 
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Figure 3.16:   Intra-industry trade between South Africa and the rest of the  
    World: Meat and edible offal of poultry 1992-2004. 
 
3.5       Market access commitments of South Africa in livestock meat trade 
 
3.5.1  Tariff regime in South Africa livestock industry 
 
South Africa, through liberalization of its agricultural sector and phasing out of past 
protection  mechanisms,  introduced  a  process  of  tariff  reform  in  compliance  with 
WTO regulations. Table 3.1 shows the tariff regime on imports of livestock meat 
products of South Africa applicable to exporting countries other than those belonging 
to SACU and SADC. 
 
Table 3.1: Current RSA tariff regime on imports of livestock meat products* 
HS8 Tariff 
line 














Meat of Bovine Carcasses, Fresh or Chilled: 
   -Carcasses and half carcasses 
   -Other cuts with bone in 

















Meat of Bovine Animals, Frozen: 
   -Carcasses and half carcasses 
   -Other cuts with bone in 
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HS8 Tariff 
line 























Meat of swine, Fresh, Chilled or Frozen 
   -Fresh or chilled: 
       =Carcasses and half carcasses 
       =Hams, shoulders and cuts thereof, with bone in 
       =Other: 
           -Rib 
           -Other 
   -Frozen: 
       =Carcasses and half carcasses 
       =Hams, shoulders and cuts thereof, with bone in 
       =Other: 
           -Rib 




















































Meat of Sheep or Goats, Fresh, Chilled or Frozen: 
  -Carcasses  and  half-carcasses  of  lamb,  fresh  or 
chilled 
  -Other meat of sheep, fresh or chilled: 
     =Carcasses and half carcasses 
     =Other cuts with bone in 
     =Boneless 
  -Carcasses and half-carcasses of lamb, frozen 
  -Other meat of sheep, frozen: 
     =Carcasses and half carcasses 
     =Other cuts with bone in 
     =Boneless 

















































Meat and Edible Offal of the Poultry of Heading 
No. 01.05, Fresh, Chilled or Frozen : 
  -Of fowls of the species Gullus domesticus: 
     =Not cut in pieces, fresh or chilled 
     =Not cut in pieces frozen 
     =Cut and offal fresh or chilled 
     =Cut and offal frozen 
       -Boneless (excluding cuts) 
       -Boneless cuts 
       -Offal  
       -Other 





















free   
free 





In terms of the Marrakech Agreement, the actual rate of duty should be phased down from a 
level that does not exceed the base rate to a level that does not exceed the bound rate within 
the specified period. 
Source: NDA, 2005b 
 
Allowing imports of livestock products at zero tariff level from the SACU-member 
countries while imposing higher tariff rate on imports from other countries has far-
reaching consequences on the trade pattern of South Africa in these products. Some Industry overview 
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of these countries are highly dependent on the South African market for exports (for 
instance, Namibia) and thus benefit immensely from the non-reciprocal agreement.  
 
3.5.2  Market access quotas in South Africa livestock industry 
 
The deregulation of agricultural marketing, globalisation and trade agreements have 
exposed  South  African  farmers  and  agribusiness  to  increased  foreign  competition 
(Groenewald  and  Nieuwoudt,  2003),  most  of  which  are  protected  by  government 
policies.  In  line  with  South  Africa’s  WTO  commitments,  market  access  quotas 
provide  a  basis  to  comply  with  minimum  access  requirements.    Table  3.2  shows 
South Africa’s market access commitments in the livestock industry. 
 
Table 3.2: Minimum market access quotas for livestock meat products* 
Tariff 
Heading 
Description of product  In-quota  tariff  (20% 








Meat of Bovine Carcasses, Fresh or Chilled: 
   -Carcasses and half carcasses 
   -Other cuts with bone in 
   -Boneless 
 
Full duty less 13.8% 
Full duty less 13.8% 





Meat of Bovine Animals, Frozen: 
   -Carcasses and half carcasses 
   -Other cuts with bone in 
   -Boneless 
 
Full duty less 13.8% 
Full duty less 13.8% 

















Meat of swine, Fresh, Chilled or Frozen 
   -Fresh or chilled: 
       =Carcasses and half carcasses 
       =Hams, shoulders and cuts thereof, with  
          bone in 
       =Other: 
           -Rib 
           -Other 
   -Frozen: 
       =Carcasses and half carcasses 
       =Hams, shoulders and cuts thereof, with  
          bone in 
       =Other: 
           -Rib 
           -Other 
 
 
Full duty less 7.4%** 
Full duty less 7.4%** 
 
 
Full duty less 7.4%** 
Full duty less 7.4%** 
 
Full duty less 7.4%** 
Full duty less 7.4%** 
 
 
Full duty less 7.4%** 










Meat  of  Sheep  or  Goats,  Fresh,  Chilled  or 
Frozen: 
  -Carcasses and half-carcasses of lamb, fresh or 
chilled 
  -Other meat of sheep, fresh or chilled: 
     =Carcasses and half carcasses 
     =Other cuts with bone in 
     =Boneless 
 
 
Full duty less 19% 
 
 
Full duty less 19% 
Full duty less 13.2% 
Full duty less 13.2% 
6002 Industry overview 
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Tariff 
Heading 
Description of product  In-quota  tariff  (20% 










  -Carcasses and half-carcasses of lamb, frozen 
  -Other meat of sheep, frozen: 
     =Carcasses and half carcasses 
     =Other cuts with bone in 
     =Boneless 
  -Meat of goats 
Full duty less 19% 
 
Full duty less 19% 
Full duty less 13.2% 
Full duty less 13.2% 












Meat  and  Edible  Offal  of  the  Poultry  of 
Heading No. 01.05, Fresh, Chilled or Frozen : 
  -Of fowls of the species Gullus domesticus: 
     =Not cut in pieces, fresh or chilled 
     =Not cut in pieces frozen 
     =Cut and offal fresh or chilled 
     =Cut and offal frozen 
       -Boneless (excluding cuts) 
       -Boneless cuts 
       -Offal  




Full duty less 16.4% 
Full duty less 16.4% 
Full duty less 16.4% 
 
Full duty less 16.4% 
Full duty less 16.4% 
Full duty less 16.4% 
Full duty less 16.4% 
29033 
*The National Department of Agriculture has a complete list of companies that qualified to 
import meat under MMA. They indicated that such information is confidential and could only 
be supplied on request by the Competition Commission. 
**Calculated based on the agreement that in-quota tariff must not exceed 20% of the bound 
rate. 
Source: NDA, 2003 
 
The minimum market access quotas commitments are implemented by imposing a 
lower in-quota tariff to imports within the quota while imports above this level attract 
a higher tariff (thus functioning like a tariff rate quota). 
 
3.5.3  Importance of TRQs in South Africa’s meat trade 
 
Table 3.3 provides information about the importance of TRQs in the South African 
livestock  industry  in  value  terms.  In  order  to  allow  for  a  good  presentation,  the 
product  categories  were  aggregated  to  the  HS4  categories.  Two  indicators  are 
employed for the measurements. Firstly, the potential value of imports in the HS8 
tariff lines for which TRQs are applicable and their importance relative to total value 
of  imports  are  shown  in  column  2.  Secondly,  the  actual  value  of  imports  are 
represented in value terms. This is done by multiplying the actual quantity of imports 
under TRQ by the unit price of each product (as in column 4). 
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Table 3.3:  Relative importance of TRQ to meat products and TRQ  
    imports by main commodity (2003) 
Product  Total 
imports 
Of  which: 
imports  of  HS8 
products  for 
which TRQs are 
opened 
As  per 




value  of 
TRQ 
imports 
As  per 
cent  of 
total 
imports 
Ratio of actual 
to  potential 
TRQ  imports 
i.e. fill rate 
   1  2  (3) 
=(2)/(1) 
4  (5)  = 
(4)/(1) 
(6) = (4)/(2) 
   Rand 
(‘000) 
Rand (‘000)  %  Rand 
(‘000) 
%  % 
Meat of bovine 
animals 
280,000  185,878  66  163,180  58  88 
Meat of swine  113,066  35,511  31  35,511  31  100 
Meat of sheep  64,823  29,350  45  29,350  45  100 
Meat and edible 
offal of poultry 
551,105  104,519  19  104,519  19  100 
Total  1,008,994  355,258  35  332560  33  94 
Source: own calculations 
 
The above analysis shows that of all imports of meat products in South Africa in 2003 
(which is worth about R1.01 billion), TRQs were used to administer 35% (worth 
about R0.36 billion). It should be noted that this is a substantial amount considering 
the fact that total imports included those from the SACU countries which attract a 
zero tariff. 
 
At a product-specific level, TRQs opened for bovine meat covered a greater value of 
trade than those of the other products. The value of TRQ imports of the meat and 
edible offal of poultry followed while sheep meat carries the lowest value. However, 
as a percentage of total imports, TRQs applicable to sheep meat followed those of 
bovine meat, ahead of swine meat and meat and edible offal of poultry, respectively.  
 
In terms of actual imports under TRQs, all the products except bovine meat carry the 
same value as the potential value of the TRQ opened for the respective products (as 
shown by column 4). The implication is that all the products, except bovine meat Industry overview 
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have a fill rate of 100% – shown by Column 6 (reflecting the spirit of the URAA).  
Overall, the average quota fill rates expressed in value terms was 94%.   
 
3.6  Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided an overview of the latest trends in production, consumption 
and trade in livestock meat products in South Africa. The market access commitment 
of South Africa was highlighted. More specifically, the importance of TRQs in South 
Africa’s  livestock  meat  trade  was  analyzed.  The  results  show  that  livestock  meat 
imports under the TRQ in South Africa is high enough to affect the pattern of trade in 
this industry.  
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CHAPTER ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 
SPECIFICATION AND CALIBRATION OF THE 
SPATIAL PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL FOR THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN LIVESTOCK INDUSTRY  
 
4.1  Background and aims of the modeling work 
 
The regional approach to modelling the agricultural sector in South Africa offers an 
opportunity for analyzing the effects of various policies which may lead to varying 
impacts  across  provinces;  especially  regions  with  certain  peculiarities.  This  is 
especially important when modeling the livestock industry of South Africa, which has 
the potential for different policies to generate diverse effects across provinces. The 
present model divides South Africa into its nine provinces. However, the domestic 
regions could be aggregated when specific trade relations need to be analyzed. 
 
A  unique  feature  of  this  modeling  framework  is  the  explicit  modeling  of  the 
processing (i.e. slaughtering) sector. Incorporating a conversion factor which reflects 
the intermediate stage of production ensures a closer representation of reality.  More 
importantly, however, is the derivation of a set of parameters for the demand system 
in line with consumer theory.  This is a fundamental requirement for a modeling 
system explicitly incorporating consumer welfare in the objective function.  
 
4.2  Empirical framework 
 
The model consists of a total of 12 regions between which livestock and meat are 
shipped. Eleven of the 12 regions are taken to be domestic regions while the last is 
classified as a foreign region. Domestic regions include the Western Cape, Eastern 
Cape,  KwaZulu-Natal,  Northern  Cape,  North-West,  Free  State,  Gauteng,Spatial Partial Equilibrium model 
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 Mpumalanga and the Limpopo Provinces. In addition, Namibia and Botswana are 
regarded  as  domestic  regions.  Three  transit  points,  Cape  Town  Harbour,  Port 
Elizabeth Harbour and Durban Harbour are also included while Rest-of-the-World 
component is the foreign region. The regions are denoted as: 
 
1 ,r r     denote all regions;  . 12 ,...., 2 , 1 1 , = r r  
rd     denotes all domestic regions;  . 9 ,...., 2 , 1 = rd  
where  r rd Ì   
rfn    denotes all foreign regions;  . 1 = rfn  
where  r rfn Ì  
 
The commodities in the model are denoted as: 
 
j i,     denote all commodities  n j i ,...., 2 , 1 , =  
where   j i =  
jp ip,     denote all primary commodities (cattle, sheep, broilers and pigs); 
n jp ip ,...., 2 , 1 , =  
where ip and  jp  Ì i 
js is,     denote  all  final  commodities  (beef,  sheep-meat,  poultry-meat,  and 
pork); 
n js is ,...., 2 , 1 , =  
where is  and  js Ì i 
jc ic,   denote all commodities in the calibration (i.e. final commodities; i.e. 
beef,  sheep-meat,  poultry-meat,  pork  and  all  other  commodities  not 
incorporated in the model per se); 
n jc ic ,...., 2 , 1 , =  
where ic and  jc Ì i 
 
4.2.1  Data specification 
 
The  model  takes the year  2000 as its  base.  The  data  were  obtained  from various 
sources; data on prices of domestic products were obtained from the South African Spatial Partial Equilibrium model 
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Meat  Industry  Company  and  the  Annual  Report  of  the  South  African  Poultry 
Association (SAPA, 2005) which contains data for previous years as far back as the 
late 1990s.  
 
Other  data sources  include  the  South African  National  Department of Agriculture 
(NDA, 2000) where trade data were sourced, while the elasticities were obtained from 
Taljaard (2003) and Meyer (2003).   
 
4.2.1.1 Demand and supply of livestock 
 
The original demand and supply of livestock are represented as follows: 
 
ip
r DEM   denotes the given quantity demanded of a primary commodity  ip in 





r Hrdsiz SUP = x
ip
r O  
where: 
ip
r SUP   denotes  the  given  quantity  supplied  of  a  primary  commodity  ip  in 
region r . 
 
ip
r HrdSiz   denotes the amount of the primary commodity ip that could be utilized 
for further processing in region r . 
ip
r O   denotes the off-take rate (constant proportion at all output levels) at 
which  a  primary  commodity  ip  is  made  available  for  further 
processing in region r .  
 
4.2.1.2 Demand and supply of meat 
 
The original demand and supply of meat are represented as follows: 
is
r DEM   denotes  the  given quantity  demanded of  a secondary  commodity  in 





, =  ´ 
ip
r DEM  Spatial Partial Equilibrium model 
 
 




r SUP   denotes the given quantity supplied of a secondary commodity  is  in 
region r . 
is ip
r CONV
,   denotes the rate (constant proportion at all output levels) at which a  
  primary commodity ip is converted, per unit, into a final commodity 
  is  in region r .  
ip
r DEM   denotes the given quantity demanded of a primary commodity is  in  
region r . 
 
4.2.1.3 Prices of livestock and meat 
 
The original livestock and meat prices in domestic regions are represented as follows:  
 
ip
rd BASPRD   denotes the base price of a primary commodity ipin region rd . 
is
rd BASPRD   denotes the base price of a secondary commodity is in region rd . 
 
The  tariff  protection  method  was  used  to  calculate  world  prices  for  the  different 
secondary subcategory products. Derivation of world prices using the tariff protection 
method is denoted as follows: 
 
) 1 /( pr p p T D W + =  
where: 
p W  = World price 
p D  = Domestic price, and 
pr T  = Tariff protection rate expressed as a percentage. 
 






rfn CIFCST BASPRD BASPRD + =  Spatial Partial Equilibrium model 
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where: 
is
rfn BASPRD   denotes the base price of secondary commodities in region rfn(in  
this case the transit regions). 
is
row BASPRD   denotes the base price of secondary commodities in region row(in  
this case the rest of the world). 
is CIFCST   denotes the cif  cost associated with secondary commodities is . 
 
4.2.2  The algebraic setup 
 
For the current version of the model, each region has primary commodity supply, 
conversion and demand functions. Given this, prices are expressed as a function of the 
quantities  in  the  different  functional  relations,  and  are  referred  to  as  the  quantity 
formulation. The specification of supply and demand functions are specified in this 
manner to comply with the Takayama and Judge (1971) approach to calculating the 
net quasi-welfare function.  
 
Given the above clarification, the supply, demand and conversion functions used in 
the model are specified as follows: 
 
4.2.2.1 Commodity supply functions 
 










r QS PP . , ￿ + = b a  
where: 
ip
r PP     denotes the endogenous producer price of primary commodity ip in  
region r . 
 
ip
r a  and 
ip
r ii, b   denote the intercept and slope coefficients respectively for the  
supply function of primary commodity ip in region r . 
 
ip
r QS     denotes the endogenous quantity supplied of the primary commodity Spatial Partial Equilibrium model 
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ip in region r . 
 
The  underlying  assumption  of  the  above  specification  is  that  the  actual  supply 
quantity 
ip
r QS  is to be greater than or equal to the effective supply from region  r  to 
all other regions. Mathematically this is expressed as  .
1






r QS QS  
 
4.2.2.2 Commodity demand functions 
 















r PD     denotes the endogenous consumer price of secondary commodity  
is in region r . 
 
is
r l  and 
is
r ii, w   denote the intercept and slope coefficients respectively, for the  
demand function of secondary commodity is  in region r . 
 
is
r QD     denote the endogenous quantity demanded of the secondary  
commodity is  in region r . 
 
The underlying assumption of the above specification is that the actual demand 
is
r QD  
is  less  than  or  equal  to  the  quantity  shipped  from  all  the  supply  regions. 
Mathematically, this is expressed as  .
1






r QD QD  
It is noteworthy that this specification of the demand function would be taken over by 
the Marshallian demand system and then calibrated in order to allow for appropriate 
welfare measurement. However, the above specification is useful for ensuring market 
equilibrium. Spatial Partial Equilibrium model 
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4.2.2.3 Commodity conversion function 
 
The  conversion  functions  denote  the  intermediate  industry,  i.e.  the  demand  for 
livestock and the supply of meat. The matrix for the conversion functions is different 
from the above functions in so far as it represents prices for final products and prices 
for  live  animals.  It  also  contains  both  commodity  groups,  i.e.  the  demand  side 
contains only live animals and the supply side only meat. The conversion functions 
























r PP     denotes the endogenous producer price of primary commodity ip in  
region r . 
is
r PD     denotes the endogenous consumer price of secondary commodity  




r andq q   denote the intercepts respectively for the demand and supply functions 
of the primary and secondary commodities in the processing sector in 




r andu u   denote the slope coefficients respectively for the demand and  
supply functions of the primary and secondary commodities in the  
processing sector r . 
ip
r QC   denotes the endogenous quantity demanded of the primary product for 
conversion into secondary commodities in region  . r  
is
r QP     denotes the endogenous quantity supplied of the secondary  
commodity in region  . r  
 
In this model, conversion factors are assumed “about” constant across regions. The 
reasoning behind this is that if livestock input increases by 1 per cent, meat output 
increases only by the percentage conversion factor due to inefficiencies with rising Spatial Partial Equilibrium model 
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output. Thus it may not be efficient to increase output beyond certain levels as this 
may  incur  higher  costs  of  transformation.  Therefore  production  efficiencies  are 
implicitly accounted for. 
 
4.2.2.4 Determination of slope variables and constant parameters 
 
The slope coefficients of price in the supply and demand equations are computed 
from  elasticities  pertaining  to  final  demand  and  supply  of  primary  and  secondary 















r j     denotes the slope coefficient of price in the demand and supply  
functions of commodity i in region r . 
i
r e     denotes the elasticity of supply (demand) of commodity iin region r .    
i
r q     denotes the quantity supplied (demanded) of commodityi in region r . 
i
r p     denotes the supply (demand) price of commodity i in region r . 
 
































r CONV BASPRD n q - =  
 
4.3  Properties of the partial equilibrium model 
 
The  model  is  technically  set  up  within  the  General  Algebraic  Modeling  System 
(GAMS) framework. GAMS is a tool widely used for quantitative economic analysis. Spatial Partial Equilibrium model 
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The  model  however  involves  partial  equilibrium  analyses.  That  is,  all  variables 
outside the agricultural sector (particularly the livestock industry), including factor 
availability and factor prices, are assumed to be exogenous and not influenced by 
changes on agricultural markets. Other properties of the model are: 
 
￿  Comparative static 
 
The spatial equilibrium model used in this study is comparative static. This means 
that, while outcomes of simulations for a particular target year can be compared with 
the base year (presently 2000), the linkage between the target year and the base year 
cannot  be  traced  within  this  framework.  In  addition,  the  model  assumes  perfect 
competition  and  homogeneity  of  products.  Therefore  domestic  and  imported 
quantities of any product in a particular region are assumed to be the perfect substitute 
in production and utilization in any other region. 
 
￿  Deterministic 
 
The model is assumed non-stochastic. This means that, for all processes, risk free 
conditions  are  assumed.  In  addition,  production,  consumption  and  processing  are 
assumed to take place at the same location and correspond to that used in Jooste 
(2001).  
 
￿  Synthetic 
 
The  parameters,  in  particular  elasticities  used  in  the  model,  are  not  estimated 
specifically for this study. They originate from other studies and are calibrated to fit 
the theoretical conditions derived from microeconomic theory. 
 
4.4 Market equilibrium  
 
The  model  allows  for  the  interregional  flow  of  commodities  among  the  domestic 
regions, or imports from the rest of the world. Hence, equilibrium is established for 
production, consumption and transfer of commodities across regions.  Spatial Partial Equilibrium model 
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The initial (base) market equilibrium, i.e. optimal transport flow is a validation of the 
adequacy of the structure of the model, as well as its ability to provide policy analyses 
and forecasts under alternative trade scenarios. 
 
Tables  4.1,  4.2,  4.3  and  4.4  show  the  interregional  trade  flows  for  secondary 
commodities beef, sheep meat, pork and poultry, respectively. The results reflect the 
optimum allocation of domestic production among regions and the Rest-of-the-world 
through the harbours (Durban, Cape Town and Port Elizabeth) due to cost efficiency. 
 
According to Table 4.1, Western Cape is unable to meet half its domestic demand for 
beef  and  thus  receives  imports  through  the  Cape  Town  harbour  as  well  as  from 
Namibia to meet its excess demand. On the other hand, the Northern Cape, Free State, 
Limpopo and the North-West are self-sufficient in beef production. Moreover, the 
excess production in the Northern Cape, Free State, Limpopo, North-West, Namibia 
and Botswana are transported to Gauteng where production is about 60 per cent of the 
demand. Spatial Partial Equilibrium model 
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Cape  Free State  Eastern 
Cape 
KwaZulu-
Natal  Mpumalanga    Limpopo  Gauteng  North-West  Namibia    Botswana  Rest-of-the-
world  Total production 
Western Cape  25663                            25663 
Northern Cape    11917              9728            21645 
Free State      34075            3531            37606 
Eastern Cape        46108                      46108 
KwaZulu-Natal          63693                    63693 
Mpumalanga            47829                  47829 
Limpopo            791    22297  918            24007 
Gauteng                  78351            78351 
North-West                  20257  28920          49176 
Namibia  951                8638    28702        38291 
Botswana                  3842        21051    24893 
Durban Harbour          6133                  6133 
Port Elizabeth 
Harbour        4100                    4100 
Cape Town 
Harbour  36831                          36831 
Rest-of-the-world                            49952936 
50000000 
Total demand  63445  11917  34075  50208  69826  48620    22297  125265  28919.700  28702.341    21051  50000000   
 
 Spatial Partial Equilibrium model 
 
 
  87 
The result of the optimum interregional flow for sheep meat in Table 4.2 shows that 
the Western Cape, Northern Cape, Free State and Eastern Cape produce sufficient 
amounts of sheep meat to meet their domestic demand. However, imports from the 
Rest-of-the-world through Durban Harbour are used to meet demand in KwaZulu-
Natal, Mpumalanga and Gauteng. North-West receives supplies from the Northern 
Cape and a little (less than 1 tonne) from Namibia to meet its demand, while Limpopo 
receives supplies from the Northern Cape. 
 
According  to  Table  4.3,  only  KwaZulu-Natal,  Limpopo  and  Gauteng  are  self-
sufficient in the production of pork. Excess production in KwaZulu-Natal is supplied 
to the Northern Cape, Free State, and Mpumalanga. Excess production in Limpopo is 
supplied  to  Mpumalanga,  while  the  excess  production  in  Gauteng  is  sold  in 
Mpumalanga  and  North-West.  Imports  entering  through  the  Durban  Harbour  are 
supplied to Mpumalanga, imports through Port Elizabeth to the Eastern Cape and 
those entering through Cape Town are sold in the Western Cape.  
 
Table 4.4 shows that individual regions consume the total of their own production of 
poultry meat. The commodity is also imported through the three harbours. Imports 
entering  through  Durban  Harbour  are  supplied  to  Northern  Cape,  Free  State, 
KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, Limpopo, Gauteng, as well as North-West. Imports 
entering through Port Elizabeth Harbour are sold in the Eastern Cape, while those 










 Spatial Partial Equilibrium model 
 
 
  88 
Table 4.2: Base optimum interregional trade flow: sheep-meat (tonnes) 
Region  Western 
Cape 
Northern 
Cape  Free State  Eastern 
Cape 
KwaZulu-




Western Cape  21365                696            22061 
Northern Cape    3739            3702  15753  3755          26950 
Free State      7638            2291            9929 
Eastern Cape        11495          3634            15129 
KwaZulu-Natal          3475                    3475 
Mpumalanga            2402                  2402 
Limpopo                381              381 
Gauteng                  4040            4040 
North-West                    2478          2478 
Namibia                      3938        3938 
Botswana                               
Durban Harbour          19096  7108      4109          30313 
Port Elizabeth 
Harbour                             
Cape Town 
Harbour                             
Rest-of-the-
world                            9969687 
10000000 
Total demand  21365  3739  7638  11495  22571  9510    4084  30523  6233  3938      10000000   
 
 Spatial Partial Equilibrium model 
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Table 4.3: Base optimum interregional trade flow: pork (tonnes) 
Region  Western 
Cape 
Northern 
Cape  Free State  Eastern 
Cape 
KwaZulu-




Western Cape  20069                            20069 
Northern Cape    1553                          1553 
Free State      9470                        9470 
Eastern Cape        9200                      9200 
KwaZulu-Natal    2669  864    18570  245                  22348 
Mpumalanga            4237                  4237 
Limpopo            3112    4938              8050 
Gauteng            3415      41937  114          45466 
North-West                    8274          8274 
Namibia                               
Botswana                               
Durban Harbour            1188                1188 
Port Elizabeth 
Harbour        4539                    4539 
Cape Town 
Harbour  5182                          5182 
Rest-of-the-
world                            79989091 
80000000 
Total demand  25251  4222  10334  13739  18570  12197    4938  41937  8388        80000000   
 Spatial Partial Equilibrium model 
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Table 4.4: Base optimum interregional trade flow: poultry (tonnes) 
Region  Western 
Cape 
Northern 
Cape  Free State  Eastern 
Cape 
KwaZulu-
Natal  Mpumalanga   Limpopo  Gauteng  North-




Western Cape  75568                            75568 
Northern Cape    15930                          15930 
Free State      52110                        52110 
Eastern Cape        123124                      123124 
KwaZulu-Natal          166838                    166838 
Mpumalanga            55258                  55258 
Limpopo                96762              96762 
Gauteng                  147324            147324 
North-West                    66086          66086 
Namibia                               
Botswana                               
Durban Harbour    1049  3431    10984  3638    6370  9699  4351        39522 
Port Elizabeth 
Harbour        8106                    8106 
Cape Town 
Harbour  4975                          4975 
Rest-of-the-
world                            5947397 
6000000 
Total demand  80543  16978  55541  131230  177822  58896    103132  157023  70437        6000000   
 Spatial Partial Equilibrium model 
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4.5  Calibration of the economic model 
 
Within a modeling framework, the requirements of micro-economic consumer theory 
translate into restricting the demand system (homogeneity of degree zero in prices and 
income, adding up to unity of the first derivatives to income and utility decreasing in 
increasing price, the symmetry condition and utility decreasing in increasing prices, 
the so-called curvature condition) . However, a functional form which will allow for 
these restrictions being imposed globally, as required for a system which explicitly 
integrates consumer welfare in the objective function, is a necessity in this case.  
 
Ryan  and  Wales  (1996)  proved  how  the  (symmetric)  normalized  quadratic 
expenditure system and the generalized Leontief demand system ensure that these 
conditions  are  imposed.  However,  the  Generalized  Leontief  demand  system  was 
chosen as it is capable of imposing the curvature restriction by restricting the sign of 
certain parameters in the system. Therefore, a Generalized Leontief demand system 
will be specified for final demand for regions, including Rest-of-the-world, using the 
welfare measurement of equivalent variation in the objective function.  
 
4.5.1  The demand system (Marshallian demand) 
 
Following Ryan and Wales (1996), the demand system specified for model calibration 
is based on the following family of indirect utility functions depending on consumer 
prices PD and per capita income Valuesum










=   
 
where  G  and  F  are functions  of  degree  zero  in  prices.  The budget-share  of  meat 
consumption in total per capita income (value-sum) is defined as: 
 
                                                 
4 Note: Per capita income and total expenditure are separated. Total expenditure on meat was calculated 
from per capita income and represented as budget-share; since expenditure on meat does not exhaust 
available income.  Spatial Partial Equilibrium model 
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i / ) * ( =   
 
Using Roy’s identity, the following Marshallian demands QD are derived: 
 










F QD - + =   [Xi_] 
 
where  the  Fi  and  Gi  are  the  first  derivatives  of  F  and  G  versus  own  prices.  The 







i r PD D F ￿ =   [FGl_] 
where 
r
i D  represents the constant terms of the Marshallian demand functions and can 
be  interpreted  as  “minimum  commitment  levels”  or  consumption  quantities 
independent of prices and income. The term in brackets, that is, 
r
i F Valuesum-  in the 
Marshallian demands above, captures the expenditure remaining after the value of 
price and income independent commitments F had been subtracted from available 
income Valuesum. The function G, based on the Generalised Leontief formulation is 
defined as: 
 










ij PD PD B B G * ) (    [GGl_] 
whereby  the  derivative  of  G  with  respect  to  the  product  price  is  labelled  Gi  and 
defined as: 
 











i PD PD B B Gi ) (   [GiGl_] 
Symmetry  is  guaranteed  by  a  symmetric  B  matrix  describing  the  price-dependent 
terms, correct curvature by non-negative off-diagonal elements of B, adding up is 
automatically given as Euler’s Law for a homogenous function of degree one: 
 Spatial Partial Equilibrium model 
 
 



























































and homogeneity is guaranteed by the functional forms as well. The expenditure 
function can be derived from the indirect utility functions and gives: 




F PD U e Valuesum - = =
 
Using the expenditure function above, the equivalent variation can be calculated in 
monetary terms as a measure of change in consumer welfare compared to a reference 
situation. This will be demonstrated in the next chapter while measuring consumer 
welfare.  
 
4.5.2  Calibration of demand elasticities 
 
The inconsistencies of elasticities derived from different sources motivated the need 
to calibrate the model based on microeconomic theory: Inconsistencies in the sense 
that, in some cases, short term elasticities were estimated while long-term elasticities 
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Table 4.5:  Raw elasticities for secondary livestock products
5 
Commodity  Poultry  Beef  Sheep meat  Pork 
Poultry  -0.315  0.180  0.051  0.131 
Beef  0.593  -0.871  0.216  0.131 
Sheep-meat      -0.850  0.574 
Pork  0.552  0.613    -1.171 
Income  0.480  0.480  0.904  0.347 
Source: Meyer, 2003 
 
The demand elasticities available from other studies have been derived from time 
series data using single equation estimates. However, as shown in Table 4.5, in some 
cases,  these  elasticities  (especially  the  cross  price  elasticities)  were  found  not 
significant  while  some  also  carry  the  wrong  signs  leaving  some  gaps  in  the  data 
matrix. It is necessary to ensure that omitted data are generated endogenously by 
imposing appropriate micro-economic restrictions in line with consumer theory (that 
is, the aggregate consumer maximizes utility under a budget constraint) while also 
ensuring that the modeling framework complies with these conditions. 
 
Taking into account that the budget share of the products is rather small, the added 
cross price elasticities for all products not included (other agricultural commodities, as 
well as non-agricultural - housing, medicare, transportation etc.) should be close to 
the income  elasticities,  so  that  the own  price  elasticity, in  absolute  terms,  can  be 
expected to be almost equal to the sum of cross-price effects for agricultural products. 
Based  on  the  above-mentioned  factors,  there  is  a  need  for  adjustment  of  the 
elasticities  in  order  to  define  a  well-behaved  demand  system;  hence  the  need  for 
calibration. 
 
                                                 
5 Missing cross price elasticities will be generated during simulation using appropriate constraints. Spatial Partial Equilibrium model 
 
 
  95 
Symmetry and non-negativity conditions are imposed during the calibration of the 
parameters (i.e. the price and income elasticities) estimated by Meyer (2003). The 
calibration necessitates derivatives of Marshallian demands versus prices and income 



































































The terms for the own price effects are somewhat more complicated, and therefore 
determined indirectly via the homogeneity condition for elasticities during calibration. 
The parameters  i D  are calibrated at the base year of the simulation period as  i X  in 
equation (4.7) above. The  i D s are then adjusted to observed demand quantities. 
 
In  order  to  close  the  system  all  other  products  not  introduced  in  the  model  are 
represented by a price index. The following steps had been taken to derive starting 
values for elasticities: 
·  The matrix was first filled with the available (raw) elasticities.  
·  Missing own price elasticities were set to –0.8 for the meat products in the 
model. 
·  Missing income elasticities for the meat products in the model were set to +1. 
·  Missing cross price elasticities were calculated from the symmetry condition, 
but were restricted to +/-2%. 
                                                 
6 An alternative to the Generalized Leontief demand system used is this study, which was also tested, is 
a  normalized  quadratic  expenditure  system.  According  to  the  family  of  indirect  utility  functions 
discussed above, the function G is then replaced by a form that is quadratic in normalized prices. 
However, Cholesky decomposition is then necessary to ensure correct curvature during the calibration 
process, which renders the solution more cumbersome. An advantage of the NQ system is the fact that 
it allows formally for complementarity in the Hicksian effects. In practice, that would mean that the 
Marshallian elasticities created by the calibration of the NQ system have to be checked carefully for 
such complementarities to ensure a plausible behaviour of the demand system in simulations. However, 
complementarities are not of interest to this modeling system as all products currently included can be 
safely assumed to be Hicksian substitutes. Spatial Partial Equilibrium model 
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·  Where cross price elasticities were missing between commodities, they were 
constructed by dividing 0.8 by the quantity of meat products consumed in that 
province. 
·  The elasticity with respect to changes in the price index for other products was 
then calculated from the homogeneity condition. 
·  The income elasticity for other products not included in the model was derived 
from the adding condition for income elasticities, cross price elasticities based 
on the symmetry condition and the own price elasticity calculated from the 
homogeneity condition. 
 
After  the  defining  the  starting  values  for  elasticities,  a  non-linear  optimization 
program defines a set of parameters for each province, which lead to point elasticities 
minimizing  squared  differences  between  the  raw  elasticities  and  these  calibrated 





















subject to all the conditions earlier defined.  
 
where 
trim e  = calibrated elasticities 
orig e  = raw (original) elasticities 
 
The results for the calibrated elasticities are reported in Table 4.6. As expected, the 
added up cross price elasticities for all products not included in the model are close to 
the  income  elasticities  in  absolute  terms.  Also  the  own  price  and  cross  price 
elasticities carry the expected signs. However, the own price elasticity in absolute 
terms is not exactly equal to the sum of cross-price effects for meat products, due to 
their low budget-share. Spatial Partial Equilibrium model 
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Table 4.6:  Calibrated elasticities for secondary livestock products 
Commodity  Poultry  Beef  Mutton  Pork 
Poultry  -0.315  0.603  0.225  0.551 
Beef  0.041  -0.871  0.233  0.615 
Mutton  0.005  0.007  -0.850  0.371 
Pork  0.015  0.021  0.037  -1.171 
Others  -0.211  -0.240  -0.719  -0.633 
Income  0.216  0.245  0.736  0.648 
Source: Own computations 
 
4.6  Summary 
 
This chapter covers the empirical framework, data specification, model properties as 
well as the procedure followed for calibrating the spatial equilibrium model. Firstly, 
the chapter defines the sets and parameters used and how they were used to generate 
the  variables  needed  for  modelling.  Secondly,  the  model  properties  were  briefly 
defined and the market equilibrium property demonstrated by the base interregional 
shipment of secondary products (beef, pork, mutton and poultry). The transfer of all 
the  secondary  products  among  the  domestic  regions  and  the  rest-of-the-world 
reflected the adequacy of the model structure to provide analyses and forecasts under 
alternative scenarios. 
 
Lastly, the model was calibrated in line with theory using a Generalized Leontief 
demand system. The driving force for this process was the need for well-behaved 
behavioral  parameters  as  a  requirement  for  a  model  which  explicitly  incorporates 
consumer welfare in the objective function. The results of the calibration generate 
own and cross price elasticities with expected signs. Also as expected, the income Spatial Partial Equilibrium model 
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elasticity was, in absolute terms, almost equal with the cross-price elasticities of all 
other products not included in the model.   However, the own price elasticities in 
absolute  terms  are  not  exactly  equal  to  the  sum  of  cross-price  effects  for  meat 
products. This is not unexpected as the budget share of meat products is low relative 
to other products unaccounted for.  
  99 
CHAPTER ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF ECONOMIC MODEL 




5.1  Theoretical framework 
 
TRQs are not ‘pure’ import restrictions per se, as they allow more market access to 
imports than a quota in principle; in practice however many over-quota tariffs are so 
high that they effectively exclude imports in excess of the quota. For instance, South 
Korea on average charges in-quota tariffs of 21%, while charging a hefty 366% for 
over-quota imports (Kuhn, 2003). TRQs are indeed a useful tool for import rationing.  
 
Theoretical evidence has established that the lowering of in-quota tariffs will always 
lead to a welfare gain or at least no harm to imports. However it will require empirical 
studies of this kind to measure the impact of the two other instruments (that is, over-
quota tariff and quota limit) under a TRQ regime (Skully, 2001b). In addition, it has 
become a burden for many of the analytical models that have been developed to account 
for these important facets of TRQ functioning (Nicholson and Bishop, 2001). 
 
In order to replicate the regime switching inherent in TRQs (that is, the change in the 
binding instrument among the three – in-quota tariff, over-quota tariff and the quota 
limit), a formulation that can accommodate a non-smooth policy measure such as a two-
tier tariff is needed. Nicholson et al. (1994) showed that the Spatial Price Equilibrium 
(SPE) model with discriminatory ad valorem tariffs (that is, tariffs on imports that differTRQ liberalization scenarios 
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by  importing  region)  cannot  be  directly  solved  using  a  simple  optimisation  model, 
because the value of the tariff depends on the endogenously determined supply price
7. It 
becomes even more difficult when modelling TRQs within an SPE framework. 
 
5.1.1  The Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
 
For any general optimization problem written as 
Equ (5.1)  Max Z =  ) (X f   
such that: 
Equ (5.2)  0 ) ( £ X g
i , all i  
Equ (5.3)  0 ³ j X , all j  
 
Kuhn-Tucker  (1951)  provided  the  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  which  must  be 
satisfied by  X  if it is to be an optimal solution to the problem.  A version of these 
conditions can be expressed by equation (5.5) below in terms of the Langragian function 
L in equation (5.4), i.e. 
 
Equ (5.4)  ) ( ) ( X g X f L
i





































 all i and j 
Equations 5.4 and 5.5 show that with each variable type, i.e. the choice variables  ) ( j X  
and the Langragian multipliers  ) ( i l , there is a corresponding marginal condition that 
must be satisfied by the optimal solution. However, the last two terms in equation 5.5 are 
known as the “complementary slackness conditions”.  
                                                 
7 It is possible however, to iteratively solve the SPE as an optimisation problem to obtain unit tariff values 
equivalent to the applicable ad valorem tariff. TRQ liberalization scenarios 
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Bishop et al. (2001) summarized the three possibilities for the optimal solution for each 
j X , i.e. 
 
·  that  the  marginal  condition  holds  with  a  strict  equality  (as  in  the  classical 
context); or 
·  the choice variable in question must take on a zero value; or 
·  both of the conditions hold. 
 
The same way, for each  i l , it is either that the associated marginal conditions hold as an 
equality in the optimal solution (which means that the 
th i constraint is satisfied exactly) 
or  the  Langragian  multiplier  vanishes  (i.e.  becomes  zero)  or  both.  In  the  economic 
sense, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions show that, in an optimal solution, when a constraint 
holds with a strict equality, then by complementarity slackness, the associated shadow 
prices must be zero (the Langragian multipliers are regarded as shadow prices). In the 
same way, if an activity level is strictly greater than zero, then the associated marginal 
condition must hold with strict equality. 
 
5.1.2  Complementary slackness conditions 
 
As mentioned, the last two terms in equation 5.5 are known as the “complementary 
slackness  conditions”.  These  conditions  provide  a  bridge  between  constrained 
optimisation and the mixed complementarity problem (MCP) problem (Bishop et al., 
2001). For instance the demand and supply equations of a basic spatial equilibrium 
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j Q     = quantity demanded in region  j  
s
i Q     = quantity supplied in region i 
ij x     = quantity shipped from supply region i to demand  
   region j  
d
j P     = demand price in region  j  
s
i P     = supply price in region i 
ij c   = constant unit transport costs from supply region i to  










j Q g   = inverse supply function in supply region j 
 
The problem of endogenous regime switching (found in the TRQ) can be easily handled 
as a MCP by modifying the condition relating supply and demand prices of the basic 
SPE model as follows: 
 




j C P P t + + £  or  0 ³ ij X  
where the ￿ represents the ad valorem tariffs imposed by demand region j on imports 
from supply region i. It should be noted that the above equation allows for both price 
and quantity values to be simultaneously and directly constrained. Because both prices 
and quantities can be simultaneously constrained, policy instruments that target prices or 
quantities (like price supports, ad valorem tariffs, and tariff rate quotas) can be modelled 
simultaneously and directly. With the implementation of a TRQ, both the quota limit 
and tariffs have been incorporated, since a TRQ embodies both quantitative restrictions TRQ liberalization scenarios 
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in the form of a quota and a price instrument in the form of a tariff (which may be 
specific or ad valorem).  
 
However,  due  to  the  fact  that  the  present  model  does  not  solve  for  the  first  order 
condition of an optimum, a specification that is compatible with the model framework 
and which also replicates the TRQ mechanism will be employed. 
 
5.1.3  The “fudging” sigmoid function approach 
 
It has been shown that the TRQ mechanism can be replicated by a sigmoid function to 
be able to smoothly replicate the functioning of a TRQ (Von Lampe, 2000; Britz, 2001, 
Kuhn, 2002; Junker et al., 2003). The use of this approach, that is, the “fudging” of an 
if-else condition by the help of a sigmoid function has its origin in a short note by Arne 
Drud, the developer behind the CONOPT solvers (Junker et al., 2003). This approach 
fudges the TRQ mechanism by expressing it as an effective tariff while the effective 
tariff is a function of imports. 
 
The sigmoid function is based on the following equation: 
 
Equ (5.12)  ))) ( exp( 1 /( )) 0 , exp(min( ) ( X abs X X Sigmoid - + =  
This expression is symmetrically S-shaped and is overall differentiable. Its limits are 
zero for X = -¥, and one for X =¥, respectively. The function yields 0.5 when X 
equals zero. 
 
When used for the representation of a two-tiered tariff line such as TRQs, the sigmoid 
function ensures that the preferential tariff is the effective tariff on the in-quota quantity 
of imports while the MFN tariff is effective on over-quota imports. Von Lampe (2000) 
summarized the three general cases as follows: 
 
·  Quota unfilled: effective tariff at preferential level 
·  Over-quota imports: effective tariff at MFN level TRQ liberalization scenarios 
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·  Quota exactly filled: effective tariff between the two 
 











Figure 5.1:  TRQ modelling solution using the sigmoid function 




PW:    average domestic price for the corresponding country aggregate 
TMFN:  domestic price plus most favourite nation specific tariff (for the ad-valorem 
TMFN * PW) 
TPREF:    domestic price plus preferential specific tariff (for the ad-valorem TPREF*PW) 
TAPPL:    domestic price plus applied tariff (reflects the margin of error incurred when 
    using this functional form) 
TRQ:    level of quota 
 
Figure 5.1 shows how a TRQ works using the sigmoid approximation function. The 
TRQ is not binding when imports are above the quota but binding for import flows not TRQ liberalization scenarios 
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deviating much from the quota (say + or – 1% deviation). The public revenue generated 
by imports combined with the imposition of preferential tariffs for a single product is 
given by the average domestic price with or without tariff (this is shown by the blue area 
of the diagram). 
 
5.2  Empirical framework 
 
5.2.1  Tariff rate quota handling 
 
Based  on  the  sigmoid  function,  the  functioning  of  the  two-tier  tariff  (TRQ)  can  be 
represented by the following expression: 
 































i TARR    = Effective tariff (ad-valorem or specific) 
pref
i TARR    = Preferential tariff 
MFN
i TARR    = Most favoured nation tariff 
i QIMP    = Gross import quantity 
i TRQ      = Tariff rate import quota  
a      = Positive parameter 
 
The following differences should be noted about the formulations in (5.13) as compared 
to the ordinary sigmoid expression in equation (5.12): 
(a) The in-quota tariff (
pref TARR ) is added as a constant term (even at zero imports, the 
in-quota tariff is applied) and is thus working as a lower bound for the function. 
(b) The sigmoid expression is pre-multiplied with the difference of the out-of-quota and TRQ liberalization scenarios 
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in-quota-tariff, i.e. if the term in outer round brackets becomes infinity; the second 
term is equal to the difference between the out- and in-quota tariffs, yielding together 
with the mentioned constant term the out-of-quota or MFN tariff. On the other hand, 
if the imports are at zero, the sigmoid expression gets a value close to zero, and 
(almost) solely, the in-quota tariff is applied. 
(c) The sigmoid function is applied to the relation of (Imports – TRQ*1.01) divided by 
the TRQ and multiplied with a positive parameter a. The bigger a, the faster the 
sigmoid expression reaches its limits. Very large a renders the function similar to a 
step  function,  and  will  hence  yield  numerically  to  an  (almost)  non-differential 
expression. In the model a is currently set to 100 for TRQs, a value which in practice 
still allows the solver to find a feasible solution for the market model. 
(d) The “1.01” factor in the equation ensures that a large fraction of the out-of-quota 
tariff is applied if imports are at the TRQ. Otherwise, exactly 50% of the difference 
between the two tariff lines would be added to the in-quota tariff if the imports fill the 
TRQ (Junker et al., 2003). 
 
Therefore combining equations (5.12) and (5.13) gives the expression that represents the 
implementation of effective tariffs in the model under a TRQ regime as: 
 
Equ (5.14)  
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With  this  expression,  effective  tariff  levels  have  now  become  a  variable  rather  than 
parameters. The preferential tariff and gross import values are observed in the base year 
but endogenously generated in the simulation year. The applied or effective tariff (either 
specific  or  ad  valorem)  generated  using  equation  (5.14)  may  be  different  from  the 
observed tariff rate by a value representing the error of approximation incurred by using 
the sigmoid function. TRQ liberalization scenarios 
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With the ad valorem and specific tariff values endogenously generated in the model, the 






r i r i r i TariffS TariffA Domprice pp , , , , )) * 01 . 0 . 1 ( * ) (( Im + + =  
where: 
r i pp , Im   = Import price 
r i Domprice ,   = Average domestic price 
eff
r i TariffS ,   = Effective specific tariff 
eff
r i TariffA ,   = Effective ad valorem tariff 
 
5.2.2  Simulation results 
 
In Chapter 3, the current South Africa tariff regime and the minimum market access 
quota commitments of South Africa for meat products were shown in Tables 3.4 and 3.5, 
respectively. Based on this information, four liberalization scenarios were modelled for 
all products. The different scenarios examined include: 
·  Scenario 1: A 33% expansion of quota 
·  Scenario 2: A 33% decrease in MFN ad valorem tariff. 
·  Scenario 3: A scenario combining the two reforms described above. 
·  Scenario 4: Full liberalization scenario with all tariffs set to zero. 
 
The objective of the scenarios was to examine how regional supply, demand and prices, 
as well as welfare will respond to policy changes under alternative policy reforms.  
 
Table 5.1 shows the border price on imports of meat products. The border price was 
derived from equation 5.15 as defined previously.  The border prices declined by between 
0.89 and 2.39 per cent for scenario one, 2.35 and 7.96 per cent for scenario two, 2.96 and 
9.97 per cent for scenario three and 8.25 and 25.19 per cent for scenario four. 
 TRQ liberalization scenarios 
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Table 5.1:  Impact of TRQ liberalization on border price of livestock meat products 


























Beef  11.71  11.43  -2.39  10.97  -6.33  10.78  -7.94  9.33  -13.47 
Mutton  16.48  15.98  -3.00  15.17  -7.96  14.83  -9.97  12.33  -25.19 
Pork  10.38  10.29  -0.89  10.14  -2.35  10.08  -2.96  9.53  -8.25 
Poultry  12.35  12.14  -1.69  11.80  -4.47  11.66  -5.62  10.54  -14.63 
Average  12.73  12.46  -1.99  12.02  -5.28  11.84  -6.62  10.43  -15.39 
 
Using a price transmission elasticity of unity between the border and domestic markets, 
and therefore assuming the same percentage change in border prices due to policy change 
on the domestic prices, the impact of TRQ liberalization on the domestic markets will be 
simulated for the four scenarios in subsequent sections. 
 
5.2.2.1 The impact of 33% quota expansion  
 
The impact of TRQ liberalization by expanding the quota by 33% on meat imports is 
derived  by  comparing  the  base-run
8  situation  with  a  situation  where  the  quota  is 
expanded by 33%. According to Table 5.2, the total beef supply in South Africa will 
reduce by 2 444 tons or 0.62%. Conversely, beef demand will increase by 8 635 ton or 
1.9% as a result of lower prices. Prices will on average drop by 2.08%; Western Cape, 
KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape will experience the largest decline in prices, while 







                                                 
8 The base-run was derived by setting the shift factors at one, so that the result reflects the base year 
situation. TRQ liberalization scenarios 
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Table 5.2:  The impact of 33% expansion of quota on the beef industry 
Beef supply (ton)  Beef demand (ton)  Beef price (R/kg)  Region 
Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change 
Western Cape  25663  25437  -0.88%  63445  64868  2.24%  12.77  12.44  -2.58% 
Northern Cape  21645  21529  -0.54%  11917  12126  1.75%  12.67  12.42  -1.97% 
Free State  37606  37405  -0.53%  34075  34671  1.75%  12.69  12.43  -2.05% 
Eastern Cape  46108  45690  -0.91%  50208  51333  2.24%  12.79  12.46  -2.58% 
KwaZulu-Natal   63693  63122  -0.90%  69826  71393  2.24%  12.77  12.44  -2.58% 
Mpumalanga  47829  47671  -0.33%  48620  49329  1.46%  12.78  12.57  -1.64% 
Limpopo  24006  23926  -0.33%  22297  22624  1.47%  12.70  12.49  -1.65% 
Gauteng  78351  77938  -0.53%  125265  127439  1.74%  12.80  12.55  -1.95% 
North West  49176  48915  -0.53%  28920  29425  1.75%  12.74  12.48  -2.04% 
Total  394077  391633  -0.62%  454573  463208  1.90%  12.74  12.48  -2.08% 
Deviation  -2444  8635  -0.26 
 
Table 5.3 shows that cattle supply in South Africa will reduce by 9 141 or 0.46% due to a 
33% expansion of quota. In addition, the number of cattle slaughtered in South Africa 
will reduce by 0.52% or 11 616. The producer price of cattle on average will decrease by 
1.46% or R27 per head.  
 
Table 5.3:  The impact of 33% expansion of quota on the cattle industry 
Cattle supply (number)  Cattle demand (number)  Producer price(R/head)  Region  
Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change 
Western Cape  82407  82088  -0.39%  146647  145525  -0.76%  1881  1854  -1.44% 
Northern Cape  80437  80047  -0.48%  123686  123148  -0.43%  1833  1806  -1.47% 
Free State  363323  361616  -0.47%  214892  213960  -0.43%  1831  1804  -1.47% 
Eastern Cape  337208  335747  -0.43%  263475  261402  -0.79%  1797  1770  -1.50% 
KwaZulu-Natal   406158  404291  -0.46%  363961  361130  -0.78%  1821  1794  -1.48% 
Mpumalanga  230499  229410  -0.47%  273306  272648  -0.24%  1878  1851  -1.44% 
Limpopo  170197  169410  -0.46%  137180  136845  -0.42%  1859  1832  -1.45% 
Gauteng  44642  44436  -0.46%  447720  445805  -0.43%  1868  1841  -1.45% 
North West  257878  256563  -0.51%  281008  279796  -0.43%  1855  1828  -1.46% 
Total  1972749  1963608  -0.46%  2251875  2240259  -0.52%  1847  1820  -1.46% 
Deviation  -9141  -11616  -27 
 
Table 5.4 shows the impact of a 33% expansion of the quota on the sheep meat sub-
sector. In total, the demand for sheep meat will increase by 1.99% or 2 335 ton in South 
Africa; supply however falls by 0.50% or 435 ton. This is caused by a price decrease of 
2.36% or R0.40 on the average. The Free State will experience the largest drop in price, 
i.e. 2.39 per cent. TRQ liberalization scenarios 
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Table 5.4:  The impact of 33% expansion of quota on the sheep meat industry 
Sheep meat supply (ton)  Sheep meat demand (ton)  Sheep meat price (R/kg)  Region 
Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change 
Western Cape  22061  21954  -0.49%  21365  21794  2.01%  16.61  16.22  -2.35% 
Northern Cape  26950  26815  -0.50%  3739  3813  1.98%  16.75  16.36  -2.33% 
Free State  9929  9879  -0.50%  7638  7790  1.99%  16.77  16.37  -2.39% 
Eastern Cape  15129  15050  -0.52%  11495  11724  1.99%  16.69  16.30  -2.34% 
KwaZulu-Natal   3475  3458  -0.49%  22571  23022  2.00%  16.77  16.38  -2.33% 
Mpumalanga  2402  2390  -0.50%  9510  9698  1.98%  16.88  16.49  -2.31% 
Limpopo  381  379  -0.52%  4084  4164  1.96%  16.88  16.49  -2.31% 
Gauteng  4040  4020  -050%  30523  31130  1.99%  16.88  16.49  -2.31% 
North West  2478  2465  -0.52%  6233  6358  2.01%  16.84  16.45  -2.32% 
Total  86845  86410  -0.50%  117158  119493  1.99%  16.79  16.39  -2.36% 
Deviation  -435  2335  -0.40 
 
According to Table 5.5, supply of sheep in South Africa will decline by 0.42% or 18 149 
as a result of the quota expansion. The number of sheep slaughtered will decrease by 
0.45% or 23 219. The producer price drops by 0.94% or R2 per head on average. The 
Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal will experience the largest drop in prices. 
 
Table 5.5:  The impact of 33% expansion of quota on the sheep industry 
Sheep supply (number)  Sheep demand (number)  Producer price(R/head)  Region  
Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change 
Western Cape  523956  521949  -0.38%  1297722  1292003  -0.44%  231  229  -0.87% 
Northern Cape  1184503  1178860  -0.48%  1585265  1578094  -0.45%  217  215  -0.92% 
Free State  924448  920776  -0.40%  584044  581361  -0.46%  211  209  -0.95% 
Eastern Cape  1050895  1046640  -0.40%  889929  885705  -0.47%  196  194  -1.0% 
KwaZulu-Natal  152274  151596  -0.45%  204434  203486  -0.46%  203  201  -0.99% 
Mpumalanga  296189  294913  -0.43%  141310  140662  -0.46%  206  204  -0.97% 
Limpopo  25328  25222  -0.42%  22435  22332  -0.46%  207  205  -0.97% 
Gauteng  16638  16568  -0.42%  237639  236569  -0.45%  217  215  -0.92% 
North West  106514  106072  -0.41%  145736  145083  -0.45%  218  216  -0.92% 
Total  4280745  4262596  -0.42%  5108514  5085295  -0.45%  212  210  -0.94% 
Deviation  -18149  -23219  -2.0 
 
The impact of a 33% expansion of the quota on the pork sub-sector is shown in Table 5.6. 
According to the results, pork supply will decline by 0.92% or 1 179 ton while demand 
will increase by 2.57% or 3 586 ton. Prices of pork will decline by 2.12% or R0.22 per kg 
on the average. The largest decline in prices will occur in the Western Cape and Gauteng 
since about 50% of pork supply in South Africa originates from these two provinces. TRQ liberalization scenarios 
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Table 5.6:  The impact of 33% expansion of quota on the pork industry 
Pork supply (ton)  Pork demand (ton)  Pork price (R/kg)  Region 
Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change 
Western Cape  20069  19880  -0.94%  25251  25929  2.69%  10.38  10.14  -2.31% 
Northern Cape  1553  1542  -0.71%  4222  4315  2.20%  10.49  10.29  -1.91% 
Free State  9470  9403  -0.71%  10334  10563  2.22%  10.46  10.26  -1.91% 
Eastern Cape  9200  9104  -1.00%  13739  14107  2.68%  10.40  10.17  -2.20% 
KwaZulu-Natal   22348  22191  -0.70%  18570  18988  2.25%  10.31  10.11  -1.94% 
Mpumalanga  4237  4193  -1.04%  12197  12520  2.65%  10.51  10.27  -2.28% 
Limpopo  8050  7967  -1.03%  4938  5070  2.67%  10.40  10.17  -2.21% 
Gauteng  45466  45018  -0.99%  41937  43059  2.68%  10.40  10.16  -2.31% 
North West  8274  8190  -1.02%  8388  8611  2.66%  10.46  10.22  -2.29% 
Total  128667  127488  -0.92%  139576  143162  2.57%  10.42  10.20  -2.12% 
Deviation  -1179  3586  -0.22 
 
According to Table 5.7, a 33% quota expansion will result in a reduction of 0.78% or 
16718 in pig numbers in South Africa. The number of animals slaughtered will drop by 
0.78% or 16 716. The producer price of pigs will drop by 2.02% or R7 per head on 
average. 
 
Table 5.7:  The impact of 33% expansion of quota on the pig industry 
Pig supply (number)  Pig demand (number)  Producer price(R/head)  Region  
Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change 
Western Cape  334475  331811  -0.80%  334475  331811  -0.80%  364  356  -2.20% 
Northern Cape  29666  29375  -0.98%  25883  25730  -0.59%  331  324  -2.11% 
Free State  250451  248426  -0.81%  157838  156909  -0.59%  339  332  -2.06% 
Eastern Cape  159419  158272  -0.72%  153328  151947  -0.90%  326  319  -2.15% 
KwaZulu-Natal  331256  328765  -0.75%  372461  370312  -0.58%  365  358  -1.92% 
Mpumalanga  296974  294661  -0.78%  70614  69991  -0.88%  336  330  -1.79% 
Limpopo  182505  181058  -0.79%  134162  132968  -0.89%  339  332  -2.06% 
Gauteng  296355  294078  -0.77%  757763  751340  -0.85%  364  357  -1.92% 
North West  263320  261257  -0.78%  137897  136697  -0.87%  352  345  -1.99% 
Total  2144421  2127703  -0.78%  2144421  2127705  -0.78%  346  339  -2.02% 
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The impact of a 33% expansion of quota on the poultry sub-sector is shown in Table 5.8. 
The results show that the total demand will increase by 7.06% or 60 115 ton while supply 
will reduce by -0.92% or 9 242 ton. Prices will drop by an average of 3.41% or R0.40 per 
kg. KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape and Western Cape will experience the greatest drop in 
prices.  
 
Table 5.8: The impact of 33% expansion of quota on the poultry meat industry 
Poultry meat supply (ton)  Poultry meat demand (ton)  Poultry meat price (R/kg)  Region 
Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change 
Western Cape  75568  75144  -0.56%  80543  85942  6.70%  11.82  11.42  -3.43% 
Northern Cape  15930  15743  -1.17%  16978  17839  5.07%  11.97  11.56  -3.39% 
Free State  52110  51688  -0.81%  55541  58969  6.17%  11.94  11.53  -3.40% 
Eastern Cape  123124  121670  -1.18%  131230  139860  6.58%  11.84  11.44  -3.43% 
KwaZulu-Natal  166838  164891  -1.17%  177822  191957  7.95%  11.82  11.41  -3.44% 
Mpumalanga  55258  54848  -0.74%  58896  63586  7.96%  11.95  11.54  -3.40% 
Limpopo  96762  95757  -1.04%  103132  110781  7.42%  11.98  11.58  -3.39% 
Gauteng  147324  146291  -0.70%  157023  167755  6.83%  11.93  11.52  -3.40% 
North West  66086  65626  -0.70%  70437  75028  6.52%  11.95  11.55  -3.40% 
Total  799000  791657  -0.92%  851602  911717  7.06%  11.91  11.51  -3.41% 
Deviation  -9242  60115  -0.40 
 
5.2.2.2  The impact of a 33% decrease in MFN ad valorem tariff  
 
Tables 5.9 and 5.10 show the impact of a 33% reduction in the MFN ad valorem tariffs 
on the beef and cattle sub-sectors respectively. According to Table 5.9, the total beef 
supply in South Africa will reduce by 7271 ton or 1.83%. Conversely, beef demand will 
increase by 25468 ton or 5.56% as a result of lower prices. Prices will on average drop by 
0.81%; Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape will experience the largest 
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Table 5.9: The impact of 33% decrease in MFN ad valorem tariff on the beef industry 
Beef supply (ton)  Beef demand (ton)  Beef price (R/kg)  Region 
Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change 
Western Cape  25663  25128  -2.08%  63445  67218  5.95%  12.77  11.90  -6.80% 
Northern Cape  21645  21264  -1.76%  11917  12570  5.48%  12.67  11.87  -6.31% 
Free State  37606  36940  -1.77%  34075  35942  5.48%  12.69  11.89  -6.30% 
Eastern Cape  46108  45123  -2.14%  50208  53188  5.94%  12.79  11.92  -6.80% 
KwaZulu-Natal  63693  62331  -2.14%  69826  73979  5.95%  12.77  11.89  -6.89% 
Mpumalanga  47829  47088  -1.55%  48620  51127  5.16%  12.78  12.02  -5.95% 
Limpopo  24006  23632  -1.56%  22297  23454  5.19%  12.70  11.94  -5.98% 
Gauteng  78351  76983  -1.75%  125265  132066  5.43%  12.80  12.00  -6.25% 
North West  49176  48317  -1.75%  28920  30497  5.45%  12.74  11.94  -6.28% 
Total  394077  386806  -1.83%  454573  480041  5.56%  12.74  11.93  -6.40% 
Deviation  -7271  25468  -0.81 
 
Table 5.10 shows that cattle supply in South Africa will reduce by 34 522 or 1.38% due 
to  a  33%  reduction  in  MFN  ad  valorem  tariff.  In  addition,  the  number  of  cattle 
slaughtered in South Africa will reduce by 1.52% or 34 522. The producer price of cattle 
on average will decrease by 4.38% or R81 per head on average.  
 
Table 5.10:  The impact of 33% decrease in MFN ad valorem tariff on the cattle industry 
Cattle supply (number)  Cattle demand (number)  Producer price(R/head)  Region  
Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change 
Western Cape  82407  81446  -1.17%  146647  144064  -1.76%  1881  1800  -4.31% 
Northern Cape  80437  79264  -1.46%  123686  121890  -1.45%  1833  1752  -4.42% 
Free State  363323  358201  -1.41%  214892  211750  -1.46%  1831  1750  -4.42% 
Eastern Cape  337208  332800  -1.31%  263475  258715  -1.81%  1797  1716  -4.51% 
KwaZulu-Natal  406158  400595  -1.37%  363961  357368  -1.81%  1821  1740  -4.45% 
Mpumalanga  230499  227237  -1.42%  273306  269882  -1.25%  1878  1797  -4.31% 
Limpopo  170197  167838  -1.39%  137180  135449  -1.26%  1859  1779  -4.31% 
Gauteng  44642  44025  -1.38%  447720  441272  -1.44%  1868  1787  -4.34% 
North West  257878  253938  -1.53%  281008  276963  -1.44%  1855  1774  -4.37% 
Total  1972749  1945344  -1.38%  2251875  2217353  -1.52%  1847  1766  -4.38% 
Deviation  -27405  -34522  -81 
 
Table 5.11 shows the impact of a 33% decrease in MFN ad valorem tariff on the sheep 
meat sub-sector. In total, the demand for sheep meat will increase by 5.14% or 6 021 ton 
in South Africa; supply however falls by 1.27% or 1 102 ton. The price will decline by 
6.13% or R1.03 on the average. The Eastern Cape will experience the largest drop in 
price, i.e. 6.29 per cent. TRQ liberalization scenarios 
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Table  5.11:  The  impact  of  33%  decrease  in  MFN  ad  valorem  tariff  on  the  sheep  meat 
industry 
Sheep meat supply (ton)  Sheep meat demand (ton)  Sheep meat price (R/kg)  Region 
Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change 
Western Cape  22061  21840  -1.00%  21365  22327  4.50%  16.61  15.73  -5.30% 
Northern Cape  26950  26586  -1.35%  3739  3937  5. 30%  16.75  15.70  -6.27% 
Free State  9929  9793  -1.37%  7638  8043  5.30%  16.77  15.72  -6.26% 
Eastern Cape  15129  14919  -1.39%  11495  12107  5.32%  16.69  15.64  -6.29% 
KwaZulu-Natal  3475  3428  -1.35%  22571  23766  5.29%  16.77  15.73  -6.20% 
Mpumalanga  2402  2370  -1.33%  9510  10010  5.26%  16.88  15.84  -6.16% 
Limpopo  381  376  -1.31%  4084  4298  5.24%  16.88  15.84  -6.16% 
Gauteng  4040  3987  -1.31%  30523  32130  5.26%  16.88  15.84  -6.16% 
North West  2478  2444  -1.37%  6233  6561  5.26%  16.84  15.80  -6.18% 
Total  86845  85743  -1.27%  117158  123179  5.14%  16.79  15.76  -6.13% 
Deviation  -1102  6021  -1.03 
 
According to Table 5.12, supply of sheep in South Africa will reduce by 1.11% or 47 348 
as a result of the drop in the MFN ad valorem tariff. The number of sheep slaughtered 
will decrease by 1.15% or 58 762. Producer price drops by 2.52% or R5.33 per head on 
average. The Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal will experience the largest drop in prices. 
 
Table 5.12:  The impact of 33% decrease in MFN ad valorem tariff on the sheep meat 
industry 
Sheep supply (number)  Sheep demand (number)  Producer price(R/head)  Region  
Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change 
Western Cape  523956  518624  -1.02%  1297722  1286041  -0.90%  231  226  -2.16% 
Northern Cape  1184503  1170046  -1.22%  1585265  1565828  -1.23%  217  211  -2.76% 
Free State  924448  915140  -1.01%  584044  576747  -1.25%  211  206  -2.37% 
Eastern Cape  1050895  1039329  -1.10%  889929  878742  -1.26%  196  190  -3.06% 
KwaZulu-Natal  152274  150509  -1.16%  204434  201902  -1.24%  203  197  -2.96% 
Mpumalanga  296189  292825  -1.14%  141310  139576  -1.23%  206  201  -2.40% 
Limpopo  25328  25032  -1.17%  22435  22169  -1.19%  207  202  -2.42% 
Gauteng  16638  16453  -1.11%  237639  234792  -1.20%  217  212  -2.30% 
North West  106514  105439  -1.01%  145736  143955  -1.22%  218  213  -2.29% 
Total  4280745  4233397  -1.11%  5108514  5049752  -1.15%  212  206  -2.52% 
Deviation  -47348  -58762  -5.33 
 
The impact of a 33% reduction in MFN ad valorem tariff on the pork sub-sector is shown 
in Table 5.13. According to the results, pork supply will decline by 2.37% or 3 054 ton, 
while demand will increase by 6.69% or 9 333 ton. Prices of pork will decline by 5.75% TRQ liberalization scenarios 
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or R0.60 per kg on average. The largest decline in prices will occur in the Western Cape, 
while the smallest decline will be experienced in Gauteng. 
 
Table 5.13:  The impact of 33% decrease in MFN ad valorem tariff on the pork industry   
Pork supply (ton)  Pork demand (ton)  Pork price (R/kg)  Region 
Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change 
Western Cape  20069  19570  -2.49%  25251  27049  7.12%  10.38  9.75  -6.07% 
Northern Cape  1553  1514  -2.51%  4222  4501  6.61%  10.49  9.90  -5.62% 
Free State  9470  9238  -2.50%  10334  11018  6.62%  10.46  9.87  -5.64% 
Eastern Cape  9200  8938  -2.85%  13739  14716  7.11%  10.40  9.77  -6.06% 
KwaZulu-Natal  22348  21805  -2.43%  18570  19824  6.75%  10.31  9.72  -5.72% 
Mpumalanga  4237  4119  -2.78%  12197  13055  7.03%  10.51  9.88  -5.99% 
Limpopo  8050  7826  -2.78%  4938  5289  7.11%  10.40  9.77  -6.06% 
Gauteng  45466  44524  -2.07%  41937  44524  6.17%  10.40  9.85  -5.29% 
North West  8274  8079  -2.36%  8388  8933  6.50%  10.46  9.88  -5.54% 
Total  128667  125613  -2.37%  139576  148909  6.69%  10.42  9.82  -5.75% 
Deviation  -3054  9333  -0.60 
 
According  to  Table  5.14,  a  reduction  in  the  MFN  ad  valorem  tariff  will  result  in  a 
reduction of 2.02% or 43 377 in pig numbers in South Africa. The number of animals 
slaughtered will drop by 2.02% or 43 378. The producer prices of pigs will drop by 
5.23% or R18.11 per head on average. 
 
Table 5.14:  The impact of 33% decrease in MFN ad valorem tariff on the pig industry 
Pig supply (number)  Pig demand (number)  Producer price(R/head)  Region  
Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change 
Western Cape  334475  327413  -2.11%  334475  327413  -2.11%  364  344  -5.49% 
Northern Cape  29666  28916  -2.53%  25883  25331  -2.13%  331  313  -5.44% 
Free State  250451  245183  -2.10%  157838  154517  -2.10%  339  321  -5.31% 
Eastern Cape  159419  156472  -1.85%  153328  149539  -2.47%  326  308  -5.52% 
KwaZulu-Natal  331256  324759  -1.96%  372461  364715  -2.08%  365  347  -4.93% 
Mpumalanga  296974  290978  -2.02%  70614  68918  -2.40%  336  319  -5.06% 
Limpopo  182505  178744  -2.06%  134162  130930  -2.41%  339  321  -5.31% 
Gauteng  296355  290570  -1.95%  757763  744553  -1.74%  364  346  -4.95% 
North West  263320  258009  -2.02%  137897  135127  -2.01%  352  334  -5.11% 
Total  2144421  2101044  -2.02%  2144421  2101043  -2.02%  346.22  328.11  -5.23% 
Deviation  -43377  -43378  -18.11 
 
The impact of a 33% reduction in MFN ad valorem tariffs on the poultry sub-sector is 
shown in Table 5.15. The results show that the total demand will increase by 18.05% or TRQ liberalization scenarios 
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159 553 ton, while supply will reduce by 2.38% or 72 092 ton. Prices will drop by an 
average of 9.05% or R1.08 per kg. KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape will experience the 
largest decline in prices.  
 
Table 5.15:   The impact of 33% decrease in MFN ad valorem tariff on the poultry 
meat industry 
Poultry meat supply (ton)  Poultry meat demand (ton)  Poultry meat price (R/kg)  Region 
Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change 
Western Cape  75568  74442  -1.49%  80543  94920  17.85%  11.82  10.74  -9.14% 
Northern Cape  15930  15435  -3.11%  16978  19268  13.49%  11.97  10.89  -9.02% 
Free State  52110  50984  -2.16%  55541  64661  16.42%  11.94  10.86  -9.05% 
Eastern Cape  123124  119295  -3.11%  131230  153985  17.34%  11.84  10.77  -9.04% 
KwaZulu-Natal  166838  161649  -3.11%  177822  215378  21.12%  11.82  10.74  -9.14% 
Mpumalanga  55258  54169  -1.97%  58896  71358  21.16%  11.95  10.87  -9.04% 
Limpopo  96762  94082  -2.77%  103132  123490  19.74%  11.98  10.90  -9.02% 
Gauteng  147324  144584  -1.86%  157023  185570  18.18%  11.93  10.85  -9.05% 
North West  66086  64870  -1.84%  70437  82524  17.16%  11.95  10.88  -8.95% 
Total  851602  779510  -2.38%  851602  1011155  18.05%  11.91  10.83  -9.05% 
Deviation  -72092  159553  -1.08 
 
5.2.2.3 The  impact  of  a  33%  quota  expansion  and  a  33%  decrease  in  MFN  ad 
  valorem tariffs 
 
As explained earlier in this chapter, the functioning of the sigmoid function is such that 
when the quota is unfilled, the effective tariff is at the preferential level. Therefore, a 
scenario of a reduction in the quota depicts this case. However, since the MFN tariff is 
the upper bound, a decrease in the MFN tariff would mean a reduction in over-quota 
tariff. Hence, a scenario combining an expansion of the quota and a reduction in the MFN 
tariff would entail the combination of the two conditions applicable to the in-quota and 
over-quota tariff just described. 
 
Tables 5.16 and 5.17 show the impact of a 33% quota expansion and a 33% reduction in 
the MFN ad valorem tariffs on the beef and cattle sub-sectors, respectively. According to 
Table 5.16, the total beef supply in South Africa will reduce by 9179 ton or 2.30%. 
Conversely, beef demand will increase by 32 181 ton or 6.93% as a result of lower prices. TRQ liberalization scenarios 
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Prices will on average drop by 8.04% or R1.04 per kg; Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal 
will experience the largest decline in prices, while Limpopo will experience the lowest 
decline in prices. 
 
Table 5.16:  The impact of a 33 % quota expansion and decrease in MFN ad valorem 
tariff on the beef industry 
Beef supply (ton)  Beef demand (ton)  Beef price (R/kg)  Region 
Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change 
Western Cape  25663  24995  -2.60%  63445  68176  7.46%  12.77  11.68  -8.54% 
Northern Cape  21645  21150  -2.29%  11917  12751  6.70%  12.67  11.65  -8.05% 
Free State  37606  36747  -2.28%  34075  36459  6.70%  12.69  11.67  -8.04% 
Eastern Cape  46108  44881  -2.66%  50208  53945  7.44%  12.79  11.70  -8.52% 
KwaZulu-Natal  63693  62008  -2.65%  69826  75034  7.46%  12.77  11.67  -8.61% 
Mpumalanga  47829  46846  -2.06%  48620  51861  6.67%  12.78  11.80  -7.67% 
Limpopo  24006  23625  -1.59%  22297  23640  6.02%  12.70  11.82  -6.93% 
Gauteng  78351  76584  -2.26%  125265  133954  6.94%  12.80  11.78  -7.97% 
North West  49176  48062  -2.27%  28920  30934  6.96%  12.74  11.72  -8.01% 
Total  394077  384898  -2.30%  454573  486754  6.93%  12.74  11.72  -8.04% 
Deviation  -9179  32181  -1.02 
 
Table 5.17 shows that cattle supply in South Africa will reduce by 34 671 or 1.75%. In 
addition, the number of cattle slaughtered in South Africa will reduce by 1.90% or 43 
574. The producer price of cattle on average will decrease by 5.52% or R102 per head.  
KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape will experience the largest drop in prices. 
 
Table 5.17:  The impact of a 33 % quota expansion and decrease in MFN ad valorem 
tariff on the cattle industry 
Cattle supply (number)  Cattle demand (number)  Producer price(R/head)  Region  
Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change 
Western Cape  82407  81198  -1.47%  146647  143423  -2.20%  1881  1779  -5.42% 
Northern Cape  80437  78958  -1.84%  123686  121347  -1.89%  1833  1731  -5.56% 
Free State  363323  356837  -1.79%  214892  210828  -1.89%  1831  1729  -5.57% 
Eastern Cape  337208  331647  -1.65%  263475  257554  -2.25%  1797  1695  -5.68% 
KwaZulu-Natal  406158  399088  -1.74%  363961  355833  -2.23%  1821  1719  -5.60% 
Mpumalanga  230499  226367  -1.79%  273306  268722  -1.68%  1878  1776  -5.43% 
Limpopo  170197  167213  -1.75%  137180  135492  -1.23%  1859  1757  -5.49% 
Gauteng  44642  43861  -1.75%  447720  439364  -1.87%  1868  1766  -5.46% 
North West  257878  252909  -1.93%  281008  275738  -1.88%  1855  1753  -5.50% 
Total  1972749  1938078  -1.75%  2251875  2208301  -1.90%  1847  1745  -5.52% 
Deviation  -34671  -43574  -102 
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Table 5.18 shows the combined impact on the sheep meat sub-sector. In total, the demand 
for sheep meat will increase by 6.49% or 7 596 ton in South Africa; supply, however, 
falls by 1.60% or 1 392 ton. Price decreases on average by 7.72% or R1.30 per kg. The 
Eastern Cape will experience the largest drop in price, i.e. 7.81 per cent. 
 
Table 5.18:  The impact of a 33 % quota expansion and decrease in MFN ad valorem tariff 
on the sheep meat industry 
Sheep meat supply (ton)  Sheep meat demand (ton)  Sheep meat price (R/kg)  Region 
Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change 
Western Cape  22061  21764  -1.35%  21365  22618  5.86%  16.61  15.47  -6.86% 
Northern Cape  26950  26500  -1.67%  3739  3987  6.63%  16.75  15.44  -7.82% 
Free State  9929  9761  -1.69%  7638  8145  6.64%  16.77  15.46  -7.81% 
Eastern Cape  15129  14866  -1.74%  11495  12262  6.67%  16.69  15.38  -7.85% 
KwaZulu-Natal  3475  3416  -1.70%  22571  24070  6.64%  16.77  15.46  -7.81% 
Mpumalanga  2402  2362  -1.67%  9510  10137  6.59%  16.88  15.57  -7.76% 
Limpopo  381  375  -1.57%  4084  4353  6.59%  16.88  15.57  -7.76% 
Gauteng  4040  3973  -1.66%  30523  32537  6.60%  16.88  15.57  -7.76% 
North West  2478  2436  -1.69%  6233  6645  6.61%  16.84  15.53  -7.78% 
Total  86845  85453  -1.60%  117158  124754  6.49%  16.79  15.49  -7.72% 
Deviation  -1392  7596  -1.30 
 
In the sheep sub-sector, as in Table 5.19, sheep supply will decline by 1.41% or 60 244. 
The number of sheep slaughtered will also decrease by 1.45% or 74 176. The producer 
price drops by 3.31% or R7 per head. The impact generated by this scenario is again 
greatest in KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape. 
Table 5.19:   The impact of a 33 % quota expansion and decrease in MFN ad    
    valorem tariff on the sheep industry 
Sheep supply (number)  Sheep demand (number)  Producer price(R/head)  Region  
Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change 
Western Cape  523956  517416  -1.25%  1297722  1281969  -1.21%  231  224  -3.03% 
Northern Cape  1184503  1165865  -1.57%  1585265  1561271  -1.51%  217  210  -3.23% 
Free State  924448  912254  -1.32%  584044  575094  -1.53%  211  204  -3.32% 
Eastern Cape  1050895  1036491  -1.37%  889929  875882  -1.58%  196  189  -3.57% 
KwaZulu-Natal  152274  150064  -1.45%  204434  201256  -1.55%  203  196  -3.45% 
Mpumalanga  296189  291899  -1.45%  141310  139152  -1.53%  206  199  -3.40% 
Limpopo  25328  24975  -1.39%  22435  22091  -1.53%  207  200  -3.38% 
Gauteng  16638  16403  -1.41%  237639  234100  -1.49%  217  210  -3.23% 
North West  106514  105134  -1.30%  145736  143523  -1.52%  218  211  -3.21% 
Total  4280745  4220501  -1.41%  5108514  5034338  -1.45%  212  205  -3.31% 
Deviation  -60244  -74176  -7 TRQ liberalization scenarios 
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In the case of pork, the results show that pork supply will decline by 3.02% or 3 881 ton, 
while demand will increase by 8.48% or 11 842 ton. Prices of pork will decline by 7.30% 
or R0.76 per kg on the average. The largest decline in prices will occur in the Western 
Cape, while the smallest decline will be experienced in Gauteng. 
 
Table 5.20:   The impact of a 33 % quota expansion and decrease in MFN ad valorem 
tariff on the pork industry 
Pork supply (ton)  Pork demand (ton)  Pork price (R/kg)  Region 
Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change 
Western Cape  20069  19443  -3.12%  25251  27506  8.93%  10.38  9.59  -7.61% 
Northern Cape  1553  1504  -3.16%  4222  4577  8.41%  10.49  9.73  -7.25% 
Free State  9470  9176  -3.10%  10334  11205  8.43%  10.46  9.70  -7.27% 
Eastern Cape  9200  8877  -3.51%  13739  14964  8.92%  10.40  9611  -7.60% 
KwaZulu-Natal  22348  21663  -3.07%  18570  20155  8.54%  10.31  9.56  -7.27% 
Mpumalanga  4237  4091  -3.45%  12197  13273  8.82%  10.51  9.72  -7.52% 
Limpopo  8050  7772  -3.45%  4938  5378  8.91%  10.40  9.61  -7.60% 
Gauteng  45466  44234  -2.71%  41937  45277  7.96%  10.40  9.69  -6.83% 
North West  8274  8026  -3.00%  8388  9083  8.29%  10.46  9.72  -7.07% 
Total  128667  124786  -3.02%  139576  151418  8.48%  10.42  9.66  -7.30% 
Deviation  -3881  11842  -0.76 
 
In the pig sub sector, supply will decline by 2.57% or 55 130 pigs. The number of pigs 
slaughtered will drop by 2.57% or 55 129. The producer price of pigs will drop by 6.68% 
or R23 per head on average. Northern Cape and Eastern Cape will experience the greatest 
drop in producer prices. 
 
Table 5.21:   The impact of a 33 % quota expansion and decrease in MFN ad    
    valorem tariff on the pig industry 
Pig supply (number)  Pig demand (number)  Producer price(R/head)  Region  
Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change 
Western Cape  334475  325619  -2.65%  334475  325619  -2.65%  364  339  -6.87% 
Northern Cape  29666  28709  -3.23%  25883  25185  -2.70%  331  308  -6.95% 
Free State  250451  243708  -2.69%  157838  153638  -2.66%  339  316  -6.78% 
Eastern Cape  159419  155648  -2.37%  153328  148672  -3.04%  326  303  -7.06% 
KwaZulu-Natal  331256  323024  -2.49%  372461  362692  -2.62%  365  342  -6.30% 
Mpumalanga  296974  289356  -2.57%  70614  68516  -2.97%  336  314  -6.55% 
Limpopo  182505  177724  -2.62%  134162  130164  -2.98%  339  316  -6.78% 
Gauteng  296355  288980  -2.49%  757763  740428  -2.29%  364  341  -6.32% 
North West  263320  256523  -2.58%  137897  134378  -2.55%  352  329  -6.53% 
Total  2144421  2089291  -2.57%  2144421  2089292  -2.57%  346  323  -6.68% 
Deviation  -55130  -55129  -23 TRQ liberalization scenarios 
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For poultry, the results show that the total demand will increase by 23.45% or 199 701 
ton while supply will decline by -3.06% or 26 059 ton. Prices will drop by an average of 
11.33% or R1.35 per kg. KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape will experience the largest 
decline in prices.  
Table 5.22:   The impact of a 33 % quota expansion and decrease in MFN ad    
    valorem tariff on the poultry meat industry 
Poultry meat supply (ton)  Poultry meat demand (ton)  Poultry meat price (R/kg)  Region 
Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change 
Western Cape  75568  74162  -1.86%  80543  98512  22.31%  11.82  10.47  -11.42% 
Northern Cape  15930  15310  -3.89%  16978  19842  16.87%  11.97  10.62  -11.28% 
Free State  52110  50708  -2.69%  55541  66938  20.52%  11.94  10.59  -11.31% 
Eastern Cape  123124  118298  -3.92%  131230  159930  21.87%  11.84  10.49  -11.40% 
KwaZulu-Natal  166838  160365  -3.88%  177822  224749  26.39%  11.82  10.47  -11.42% 
Mpumalanga  55258  53899  -2.46%  58896  74486  26.47%  11.95  10.6  -11.30% 
Limpopo  96762  93414  -3.46%  103132  128575  24.67%  11.98  10.63  -11.27% 
Gauteng  147324  143891  -2.33%  157023  192730  22.74%  11.93  10.58  -11.32% 
North West  66086  64546  -2.33%  70437  85701  21.67%  11.95  10.6  -11.30% 
Total  851602  825543  -3.06%  851602  1051303  23.45%  11.91  10.56  -11.33% 
Deviation  -26059  199701  -1.35 
 
5.2.2.4  The impact of the removal of all tariffs (full liberalization) 
 
The last scenario involves the removal of all tariffs applicable to meat products. This 
scenario, when compared to the base, gives an indication of the overall effectiveness of 
the tariff regimes on meat products in South Africa in rationing imports. 
 
Table 5.23 shows the impact of the removal of all tariffs on the beef industry. The total 
beef  supply  in  South  Africa  will  reduce  by  22  000  ton  or  5.54%.  Conversely,  beef 
demand will increase by 76 947 ton or 16.84% as a result of lower prices. Prices will on 
average  drop  by  19.34%  or  R2.46  per  kg.  The  Western  Cape,  Eastern  Cape  and 
KwaZulu-Natal  will  experience  the  largest  decline  in  prices,  while  Limpopo  will 
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Table 5.23:  The impact of the removal of all tariffs on the beef industry 
Beef supply (ton)  Beef demand (ton)  Beef price (R/kg)  Region 
Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change 
Western Cape  25663  24160  -5.86%  63445  74441  17.33%  12.77  10.23  -19.89% 
Northern Cape  21645  20436  -5.59%  11917  13937  16.95%  12.67  10.21  -19.42% 
Free State  37606  35606  -5.32%  34075  39719  16.56%  12.69  10.27  -19.07% 
Eastern Cape  46108  43350  -5.98%  50208  58895  17.30%  12.79  10.25  -19.86% 
KwaZulu-Natal  63693  59904  -5.95%  69826  81932  17.34%  12.77  10.23  -19.89% 
Mpumalanga  47829  45293  -5.30%  48620  56658  16.53%  12.78  10.36  -18.94% 
Limpopo  24006  22845  -4.84%  22297  25847  15.92%  12.70  10.38  -18.27% 
Gauteng  78351  74033  -5.51%  125265  146293  16.79%  12.80  10.33  -19.30% 
North West  49176  46450  -5.54%  28920  33798  16.87%  12.74  10.27  -19.39% 
Total  394077  372077  -5.54%  454573  531520  16.84%  12.75  10.28  -19.34% 
Deviation  -22000  76947  -2.46 
 
Table 5.24 shows that cattle supply in South Africa will reduce by 83 228 or 4.19% due 
to the total removal of tariffs. In addition, the number of cattle slaughtered in South 
Africa will reduce by 104 406 or 4.6%. The producer price of cattle on average will 
decrease by 13.27% or R245 per head.  KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape will experience 
the largest price drop. 
 
Table 5.24:  The impact of the removal of all tariffs on the cattle industry 
Cattle supply (number)  Cattle demand (number)  Producer price(R/head)  Region  
Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change 
Western Cape  82407  79507  -3.52%  146647  139457  -4.90%  1881  1636  -13.02% 
Northern Cape  80437  76886  -4.41%  123686  117954  -4.63%  1833  1588  -13.37% 
Free State  363323  347755  -4.28%  214892  205476  -4.38%  1831  1586  -13.38% 
Eastern Cape  337208  323865  -3.96%  263475  250282  -5.01%  1797  1552  -13.63% 
KwaZulu-Natal  406158  389207  -4.17%  363961  345833  -4.98%  1821  1576  -13.45% 
Mpumalanga  230499  220569  -4.31%  273306  261346  -4.38%  1878  1633  -13.05% 
Limpopo  170197  163016  -4.22%  137180  131790  -3.93%  1859  1614  -13.18% 
Gauteng  44642  42767  -4.20%  447720  427248  -4.57%  1868  1623  -13.12% 
North West  257878  245949  -4.63%  281008  268083  -4.60%  1855  1610  -13.21% 
Total  1972749  1889521  -4.19%  2251875  2147469  -4.60%  1847  1602  -13.27% 
Deviation  -83,228  -104406  -245 
 
Table 5.25 shows the impact of the total removal of tariffs on the sheep meat sub-sector. 
In total, the demand for sheep meat will increase by 15.27% or 17 892 ton in South 
Africa; supply however falls by 3.77% or 3 278 ton. The price declines by 18.05% or TRQ liberalization scenarios 
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R3.03 per kg on the average. The Eastern Cape will experience the largest drop in price, 
i.e. 18.27 per cent. 
 
Table 5.25:  The impact of the removal of all tariffs on the sheep meat industry 
Sheep meat supply (ton)  Sheep meat demand (ton)  Sheep meat price (R/kg)  Region 
Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change 
Western Cape  22061  21301  -3.44%  21365  24514  14.74%  16.61  13.73  -17.34% 
Northern Cape  26950  25918  -3.83%  3739  4316  15.43%  16.75  13.71  -18.15% 
Free State  9929  9544  -3.88%  7638  8817  15.44%  16.77  13.72  -18.19% 
Eastern Cape  15129  14521  -4.02%  11495  13278  15.51%  16.69  13.64  -18.27% 
KwaZulu-Natal  3475  3338  -3.94%  22571  26054  15.43%  16.77  13.73  -18.13% 
Mpumalanga  2402  2309  -3.87%  9510  10968  15.33%  16.88  13.84  -18.01% 
Limpopo  381  367  -3.67%  4084  4710  15.33%  16.88  13.83  -18.07% 
Gauteng  4040  3886  -3.81%  30523  35203  15.33%  16.88  13.84  -18.01% 
North West  2478  2383  -3.83%  6233  7190  15.35%  16.84  13.80  -18.05% 
Total  86845  83567  -3.77%  117158  135050  15.27%  16.79  13.76  -18.05% 
Deviation  -3278  17892  -3.03 
 
Table 5.26 shows that total sheep supply will decline by 3.36% or 143777. The total 
number of sheep slaughtered will drop by 3.42% or 174579. The producer price will 
decline by 7.61% or R16 per head on average. 
 
Table 5.26: The impact of the removal of all tariffs on the sheep industry 
Sheep supply (number)  Sheep demand (number)  Producer price(R/head)  Region  
Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change 
Western Cape  523956  508067  -3.03%  1297722  1257351  -3.11%  231  215  -6.93% 
Northern Cape  1184503  1139989  -3.76%  1585265  1530255  -3.47%  217  200  -7.83% 
Free State  924448  895221  -3.16%  584044  563549  -3.51%  211  195  -7.58% 
Eastern Cape  1050895  1016798  -3.24%  889929  857548  -3.64%  196  180  -8.16% 
KwaZulu-Natal  152274  147015  -3.45%  204434  197131  -3.57%  203  187  -7.88% 
Mpumalanga  296189  286128  -3.40%  141310  136316  -3.53%  206  190  -7.77% 
Limpopo  25328  24492  -3.30%  22435  21644  -3.53%  207  191  -7.73% 
Gauteng  16638  16089  -3.30%  237639  229435  -3.45%  217  201  -7.37% 
North West  106514  103169  -3.14%  145736  140706  -3.45%  218  202  -7.34% 
Total  4280745  4136968  -3.36%  5108514  4933935  -3.42%  212  196  -7.61% 
Deviation  -143777  -174579  -16 
 
The impact of the total removal of tariffs on the pork sub-sector is shown in Table 5.27. 
According to the results, pork supply will decline by 7.22% or 9 289 ton, while demand 
will increase by 20.25% or 28 262 ton. Prices of pork will decline by 17.32% or R1.80 TRQ liberalization scenarios 
 
  123 
per kg on the average. The largest decline in prices will occur in the Western Cape, while 
the smallest decline will occur in Gauteng. 
 
Table 5.27: The impact of the removal of all tariffs on the pork industry 
Pork supply (ton)  Pork demand (ton)  Pork price (R/kg)  Region 
Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change 
Western Cape  20069  18615  -7.25%  25251  30494  20.76%  10.38  8.54  -17.73% 
Northern Cape  1553  1436  -7.53%  4222  5071  20.11%  10.49  8.69  -17.16% 
Free State  9470  8765  -7.44%  10334  12419  20.18%  10.46  8.66  -17.21% 
Eastern Cape  9200  8473  -7.90%  13739  16586  20.72%  10.40  8.56  -17.69% 
KwaZulu-Natal  22348  20763  -7.09%  18570  22312  20.15%  10.31  8.54  -17.17% 
Mpumalanga  4237  3908  -7.76%  12197  14699  20.51%  10.51  8.67  -17.51% 
Limpopo  8050  7423  -7.79%  4938  5961  20.72%  10.40  8.56  -17.69% 
Gauteng  45466  42321  -6.92%  41937  50228  19.77%  10.40  8.65  -16.83% 
North West  8274  7674  -7.25%  8388  10068  20.03%  10.46  8.67  -17.11% 
Total  128667  119378  -7.22%  139576  167838  20.25%  10.42  8.62  -17.32% 
Deviation  -9289  28262  -1.80 
 
In the pig sub sector, the total removal of tariffs will result in a reduction of 6.15% or 131 
985 in pigs supplied in South Africa. The number of animals slaughtered will drop by 
6.15% or 131 986. The producer price of pigs will drop by 15.95% or R55 per head. 
Northern Cape and Eastern Cape will experience the largest fall in producer prices. 
 
Table 5.28: The impact of the removal of all tariffs on the pig industry 
Pig supply (number)  Pig demand (number)  Producer price(R/head)  Region  
Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change 
Western Cape  334475  313888  -6.16%  334475  313888  -6.16%  364  306  -15.93% 
Northern Cape  29666  27363  -7.76%  25883  24222  -6.42%  331  276  -16.62% 
Free State  250451  234284  -6.46%  157838  147792  -6.36%  339  284  -16.22% 
Eastern Cape  159419  150318  -5.71%  153328  142921  -6.79%  326  271  -16.87% 
KwaZulu-Natal  331256  311414  -5.99%  372461  349947  -6.04%  365  310  -15.07% 
Mpumalanga  296974  278643  -6.17%  70614  65909  -6.66%  336  282  -16.07% 
Limpopo  182505  171018  -6.29%  134162  125189  -6.69%  339  284  -16.22% 
Gauteng  296355  278550  -6.01%  757763  713205  -5.88%  364  309  -15.11% 
North West  263320  246958  -6.21%  137897  129362  -6.19%  352  297  -15.63% 
Total  2144421  2012436  -6.15%  2144421  2012435  -6.15%  346  291  -15.95% 
Deviation  -131985  -131986  -55 
 
The impact of total removal of tariffs on the poultry meat sub-sector is reported in Table 
5.29.  The results show that the total demand will increase by 54.64% or 465 315 ton, TRQ liberalization scenarios 
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while supply will reduce by 7.12% or 60 634 tons. Prices will drop by an average of 
26.39% or R3.14 per kg. KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape will experience the largest 
decline in prices.  
 
Table 5.29: The impact of the removal of all tariffs on the poultry meat industry 
Poultry meat supply (ton)  Poultry meat demand (ton)  Poultry meat price (R/kg)  Region 
Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change  Base run  Scenario  Change 
Western Cape  75568  72288  -4.34%  80543  122345  51.90%  11.82  8.68  -26.57% 
Northern Cape  15930  14484  -9.08%  16978  23661  39.36%  11.97  8.82  -26.32% 
Free State  52110  48837  -6.28%  55541  82128  47.87%  11.94  8.79  -26.38% 
Eastern Cape  123124  111895  -9.12%  131230  197987  50.87%  11.84  8.7  -26.52% 
KwaZulu-Natal  166838  151756  -9.04%  177822  287005  61.40%  11.82  8.68  -26.57% 
Mpumalanga  55258  52097  -5.72%  58896  95135  61.53%  11.95  8.81  -26.28% 
Limpopo  96762  88982  -8.04%  103132  162299  57.37%  11.98  8.84  -26.21% 
Gauteng  147324  139310  -5.44%  157023  240292  53.03%  11.93  8.78  -26.40% 
North West  66086  62511  -5.41%  70437  105937  50.40%  11.95  8.81  -26.28% 
Total  851602  790968  -7.12%  851602  1316917  54.64%  11.91  8.77  -26.39% 
Deviation  -60634  465315  -3.14 
 
5.2.3  Model specification for welfare measurement 
 
The  traditional  measurement  of  welfare  uses  the  consumer  and  producer  surplus 
concepts.  The consumer welfare (CS) measures the difference between what consumers 
are willing to pay for a good and what he/she has to pay. Moreover, it can be used to 
measure the effect on the consumer’s welfare of a change in price of a good, ceteris 
paribus.  Producer’s  surplus  (PS),  on  the  other  hand,  measures  the  effect  on  the 
producer’s welfare of a change in price of a good, ceteris paribus. 
 
In addition, and following Britz (2003), this modelling framework uses the equivalent 
variation to integrate a well-behaved demand system to welfare analysis, as an extension 
of  the  Takayama-Judge  type  spatial  equilibrium  models.  This  is  presented 
mathematically as: TRQ liberalization scenarios 
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r Pop     = population by province 
r
i PerCap   = per capita demand per commodity per province 
r EquVar   = Equivalent variation in by province 
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The objective function comprises the sum of revenues plus equivalent variation (first 
line), minus production costs as the integral under the marginal cost function (second 
line), minus slaughtering costs and profits as the integral under the marginal variable cost 
function of the slaughter houses (third line), minus imports and transport costs. 
 
The equivalent variation measures the per capita income change necessary to reach at 
simulated prices the same utility level as at original prices. For a decrease in one of the 
prices, it is always positive and greater than savings in expenditure for that product at 
fixed demand quantities, at least for a well-behaved demand system. 
 
Constraint (a) is the market clearing identity, and equations (b) to (d) state that marginal 
willingness to pay respective marginal costs are equal to prices. Equation (c) states that 
the prices for meat are equal to the marginal costs to operate the slaughterhouses plus the 
price of the slaughtered animal per ton of meat produced. 
 
It can be easily checked that the derivative of the objective function for the quantity 
variables (meat, supply, slaughter) returns the prices comprised in constraints (b) to (d).  
 
5.2.3.1  Welfare measurement 
 
The welfare implication of changes in prices due to the four scenarios was measured 
using the CS and PS measures as well as equivalent variation as a money-metric measure 
of consumer welfare compared to the base situation. For a demand system which satisfies 
the micro-economic conditions, a decrease in one of the prices should result in a positive 
value, and greater than savings in expenditure at fixed demand quantities. 
 
￿  CS and PS measures 
 
In terms of scenario 1, Table 5.30 shows that consumers will experience welfare gains 
of R230.8 million. This translates into a 0.04% increase in real gross national income or 
0.06% increase in real disposable income. Table 5.30 also shows that producers’ welfare TRQ liberalization scenarios 
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will  drop  by  a  total  of  R77.6  million.  The  loss  in  producers’  welfare  will  be  more 
pronounced in KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape and the Free State – the three provinces 
that  contribute  the  largest  share  of  South  Africa’s  total  livestock  production  (NDA, 
2004). Relative to the real gross farm income, the total loss in producer welfare is 0.24 
per cent, while it represents 0.96% of real net farm income. 
 
Table 5.30: Change in welfare as a result of an expansion in the quota (scenario 1) 
Consumer surplus  Producer surplus  Region 
   Total monetary change (Million rand) 
Western Cape  36.0  -5.8 
Northern Cape  5.4  -4.6 
Free State  13.9  -13.6 
Eastern Cape  24.5  -12.5 
Kwazulu-Natal  35.9  -13.8 
Mpumalanga  17.2  -9.2 
Limpopo  30.9  -6.1 
Gauteng  54.9  -3.3 
North West  12.1  -8.7 
South Africa  230.8  -77.6 
 
According to Table 5.31, the welfare implications of a 33% reduction in MFN tariff 
amounts to an increase in consumer welfare of R592.1 million, while producers welfare 
will decline by R220.1 million. The welfare change to consumers amounts to only a 
0.10% increase in real gross national income or a 0.16% increase in real disposable 
income. As a percentage of the real gross farm income, the total loss in producer welfare 
is 0.69 per cent, while it represents 2.7% of real net farm income.  
 
The results obtained for scenarios 1 and 2 have quite important policy implications, 
especially  over  the  short  to  medium  run  if  one  considers  the  positive  impact  on 
consumer  welfare  compared  with  the  relatively  large  impact  on  producer  welfare 
combined with the status and potential welfare creation capabilities of this industry.  On 
the one hand, consumers could benefit from cheaper meat, but one also has to take 
cognizance of the potential impact on the livestock industry since this sub-sector is 
vitally important to the rural economy of South Africa, and hence the economy as a 
whole.    A  potential  recommendation  based  on  the  relative  difference  between  the TRQ liberalization scenarios 
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impacts of these two scenarios therefore, is that further liberalization if considered in the 
South African livestock industry should first be implemented by expanding the existing 
quota rather than reducing tariffs.  
 
Table 5.31: Change in welfare as a result of a reduction in MFN tariff       
Consumer surplus  Producer surplus  Region 
   Total monetary change (Million rand) 
Western Cape  92.7  -16.0 
Northern Cape  16.4  -13.3 
Free State  42.5  -38.7 
Eastern Cape  66.4  -35.6 
Kwazulu-Natal  98.2  -39.4 
Mpumalanga  56.0  -25.3 
Limpopo  25.0  -17.0 
Gauteng  159.4  -8.9 
North West  35.5  -25.9 
South Africa  592.1  -220.1 
 
A combination of scenarios 1 and 2 will result in a welfare gain to consumers amounting 
to R753.6 million; while the total loss to producers’ will be R277.9 million (see Table 
5.32). The total welfare gain to consumers’ amounts to a 0.13% increase in real gross 
national income or 0.20% increase in real disposable income.  Welfare loss to producers 
translates into a drop of 0.87% in real gross farm income or 3.4% in real net farm 
income.  
 
Table 5.32:   Change in welfare as a result of a combined expansion of quota and   
    reduction in MFN tariff 
Consumer surplus  Producer surplus  Region 
   Total monetary change (Million rand) 
Western Cape  118.0  -20.0 
Northern Cape  21.0  -16.9 
Free State  54.5  -48.9 
Eastern Cape  83.8  -45.2 
Kwazulu-Natal  124.3  -49.6 
Mpumalanga  72.1  -31.9 
Limpopo  29.8  -21.4 
Gauteng  204.6  -11.3 
North West  45.5  -32.7 
South Africa  753.6  -277.9 TRQ liberalization scenarios 
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Table 5.33 shows the welfare implications of a complete removal of tariffs on both the 
producers  and  the  consumers.  In  total,  consumers  will  have  a  welfare  increase  of           
R1 880.8 million. This amounts to only a 0.33% increase in real gross national income 
or a 0.50% increase in real disposable income.  On the producers side welfare will drop 
by a total of R656.89 million.  This represents a drop of 2.05 per cent in real gross farm 
income or 8.1% in net farm income. 
 
Table 5.33: Change in welfare as a result of a complete removal of tariff 
Consumer surplus  Producer surplus  Region 
   Total monetary change (Million rand) 
Western Cape  292.6  -46.9 
Northern Cape  52.5  -39.8 
Free State  134.6  -115.4 
Eastern Cape  204.2  -106.4 
Kwazulu-Natal  303.1  -117.6 
Mpumalanga  183.7  -75.79 
Limpopo  79.4  -50.9 
Gauteng  516.3  -26.7 
North West  114.4  -77.4 
South Africa  1880.8  -656.89 
 
Evidently, the complete removal of tariffs will result in net welfare gains to the society, 
but the impact on the agricultural sector would be much more substantial in relative 
terms.  
 
Cognisance should be taken that CS and PS estimations assume quasi-linearity of the 
demand and supply curves, whereas the model used in this study accounts for the non-
linearity of demand and supply curves.  Hence, the CS and PS estimates could be an 
over-estimation of the welfare impacts.  For this reason welfare was also estimated with 
the equivalent variation. 
 
￿  Equivalent variation 
Equivalent variation defines the minimum (maximum) amount of money which would 
have to be given to (taken away from) an individual to make them as well off as they 
would have been after the price fall (rise).  TRQ liberalization scenarios 
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Table 5.34 shows the equivalent variation due to potential policy changes expressed by 
the  four  scenarios.  In  respect  of  scenario  1,  it  will  require  R60.6  million  to  make 
consumers as well off as they would have been after the price fall. Consumers in the 
Western Cape, Gauteng, Northern Cape and Mpumalanga require the largest change in 
income.  Expressed as a percentage of real gross national income it translates into 0.01 
per cent change or 0.02% change in real disposable income under this scenario. 
 
Table 5.34: Equivalent variation as a result of the four trade liberalization scenarios  
Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3  Scenario 4  Region 
   Total monetary change (Million rand) 
Western Cape  9.4  25.0  35.5  73.2 
Northern Cape  8.5  22.5  28.2  65.4 
Free State  7.1  18.8  23.6  54.9 
Eastern Cape  5.1  13.4  16.8  39.0 
Kwazulu-Natal  5.5  14.5  18.2  42.3 
Mpumalanga  8.4  22.3  28.0  65.2 
Limpopo  2.5  6.6  8.3  19.4 
Gauteng  8.8  23.3  29.3  68.0 
North West  5.3  14.0  17.6  40.8 
South Africa  60.6  160.4  205.5  468.2 
 
In terms of scenario 2 consumers will require an income increase of R160.4 million to 
make them as well off as they would have been after the price fall. In relative terms, the 
equivalent variation represents a change of 0.03% in the real gross national income or 
0.04% in real disposable income. 
 
The  equivalent  variation  due  to  the  combined  effect  of  quota  expansion  and  the 
reduction of ad valorem MFN tariff (scenario 3) amounts to R205.5 million.  Consumers 
in the Western Cape will be the most affected and consumers in Limpopo the least 
affected.  In relative terms, the equivalent variation represents a change of 0.04% in the 
real gross national income, or 0.05% in real disposable income under this scenario.   
 
In a scenario of full liberalisation income would have to rise by R462.8 million to make 
consumers as well off as they would have been after the price fall.  In relative terms, the TRQ liberalization scenarios 
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equivalent variation represents a change of 0.08% in the real gross national income, or 
0.12% in real disposable income. 
 
5.3  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter the model discussed in chapter 4 was applied by simulating the effects of 
four TRQ liberalization scenarios on the demand, supply and prices of livestock products 
in  South  Africa.  The  welfare  effects  were  also  measured,  first  by  using  the  more 
traditional  consumer  and  producer  surplus  measurements  and  then  by  the  equivalent 
variation method. 
 
In  order  to  make  well-informed  policy  decisions  that  balance  the  interests  of  both 
consumers as well as producers, it was necessary to investigate the relative effects of 
these scenarios on consumers and producers. Taking this into consideration, the gains to 
consumers were related to the real gross national income and the real disposable income 
while producers’ losses were related changes in the real gross farm income and real net 
farm  income.    In  the  case  of  further  liberalization  of  the  South  African  livestock 
industry, policy makers should first consider expanding the existing quotas rather than 
reducing tariffs.  This is even more so if one considers the fact that the rural economy of 
South Africa (e.g. the livestock sector) has a GDP multiplier of 1.53 (Mullins, 2004). In 
effect, a one rand drop in the production of livestock will result in a R1.53 drop in the 
GDP of South Africa. 
 
One could relax the assumption of comparative static analysis (that producers react to a 
price drop by cutting down on production) used in this study and argue that a reduction 
in prices due to further liberalization would induce increased productivity, i.e. a move of 
the supply curve outward. This would mean an increase in the producer surplus for 
those producers that remain in the industry (i.e. those who have been able to increase 
productivity) rather than exit due to lower prices.  However, the question that arises is 
that  how  much  productivity  can  be  increased, given  the  available  natural  resources, 
volatility in input prices (especially maize) and the dependency and interaction of the TRQ liberalization scenarios 
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livestock sector with related agricultural sub-sectors. In many areas in South Africa, at 
least as far as the commercial sector is concerned, only a marginal level of productivity 
increase would be possible (for instance, the calving percentage in this sector is between 
80 and 90 per cent while off-take rate is approximately 25 per cent). In addition, in 
many areas livestock farming is the only viable agricultural enterprise, whilst it also 
provides some form of security (reduces overall risk of mixed farming enterprises). 
 
In terms of the emerging commercial sector, large productivity improvements can be 
made and should be made. Currently off-take rates are between 5 and 10 per cent while 
calving percentage is approximately 30 per cent. Should this sector be able to achieve 
the productivity level of the commercial sector, one could expect significant increases in 
supply. However, significant changes to the extent mentioned are not likely over the 
short to medium run due to impediments inherent in this sub-sector. Therefore it will 
take considerable time to effect an appreciable level of change in productivity due to 
issues  such  as  training,  infrastructure  impediments,  the  current  composition  of  the 
emerging commercial sector herds, etc. In addition, and as earlier alluded to, not all 
producers will be able to make the necessary changes, causing some to exit the industry 
to be replaced by other/new producers. The extent and the ability of the producers to act 
will also be determined by the value of the marginal product in relation to input prices, 
i.e. trends in input prices are upward and volatile, whilst end product prices will be 
further forced down. This raises the question of what gap producers have left to absorb 
lower prices even if productivity increases. 
 
This  issue  however  falls  beyond  the  scope  of  this  study  and  needs  to  be  further 
researched. Given the absence of concrete evidence on the ability of producers to absorb 
lower prices through increased productivity, policy makers need to adopt the second 
best option. Incorrect decisions in terms of trade policy could seriously damage the 
livestock industry with marginal benefits to consumers. In addition, it will impede on 
presidential imperatives on lowering poverty and establishing a vibrant rural economy.  
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CHAPTER ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
The focus of this study was to model TRQs with the aim of measuring their impact on 
the livestock industry in South Africa. The study involved a literature survey which 
aimed at a better understanding of the functioning of TRQs. It further identified two 
major approaches to modelling TRQs from empirical literature and applied the one 
which better suits the modelling framework to be used. Moreover, due to the fact that 
the objective function of the present model is of the quadratic functional form, it does 
not solve for the first order condition of an optimum.  Therefore a representation which 
is compatible, i.e. the sigmoid approximation function, was used for the representation 
of TRQs.  In addition two different concepts of welfare measurement were employed. 
 
The model, which was set up in the General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS), is 
further  strengthened  by  the  specification  of  a  generalized  Leontief  demand  system 
which  was  calibrated  in  line  with  micro-economic  theory.  The  next  section  of  this 
chapter discusses the implications of the results generated from this study. The last 
section provides policy recommendations on the application and liberalization of TRQs 
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6.2  Summary of findings of the study 
 
6.2.1  South Africa’s meat trade 
 
The study employed Lorenz curves and GINI-coefficients to measure the concentration 
in meat imports by South Africa.  The imports of meat products by South Africa are 
highly concentrated for beef, sheep meat, pork and poultry.  Over 80 per cent of South 
Africa’s imports of beef in 2003 originated from Brazil and Argentina.  Sheep meat 
imports mainly originated from Australia in 2003; it accounted for approximately 80
per cent of South Africa’s imports of this product. In the case of pork, three countries, 
namely  Brazil,  France  and  Belgium,  supplied  about  80  per  cent  of  South  Africa’s 
imports in 2003.  For poultry, Brazil supplied 76 per cent of South Africa’s imports in 
2003.   
 
Intra-industrial trade was measures with the intra-industrial trade coefficient (IIT).  The 
results revealed a relatively high IIT for beef since 1994.  The IIT for pork shows a 
declining trend since 1992, while sheep meat maintained a low IIT over the whole 
period.  Poultry has a low, but fluctuating IIT.  
 
Trade  statistics  since  1994  show  that  the  increase  in  import  demand  for  agricultural 
commodities and products in South Africa is unevenly distributed among sub-sectors and 
product groups. Therefore, the challenge of monitoring the impact of import demand viz a 
viz trade policy would prove more rewarding if conducted on a sub-sector level.   
 
6.2.2  The use of TRQs in South Africa’s meat trade 
 
After  the  liberalization  of  the  agricultural  sector  and  phasing  out  of  protection 
mechanisms  South  Africa  introduced  a  process  of  tariff  reform  in  compliance  with 
WTO regulations.  Furthermore, a system of TRQs was introduced in compliance with 
WTO regulations; this is achieved by imposing a lower in-quota tariff to imports within Summary and recommendations 
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the quota limit imposed, while imports above this level attract a higher tariff (in meat 
trade, the applied tariff represents the over-quota tariff rate). 
 
Of all imports of meat products in South Africa in 2003 (which is worth about R1.01 
billion), TRQs were used to administer 35 per cent (worth about R0.36 billion).  At a 
product-specific level, TRQs opened for bovine meat covered a greater value of trade 
than those of the other products. The value of TRQ imports of the meat and edible offal 
of poultry followed while sheep meat carries the lowest value. However, as a percentage 
of total imports, TRQs applicable to sheep meat followed those of bovine meat, ahead of 
swine meat and meat and edible offal of poultry, respectively.  All meat products, except 
bovine meat have a fill rate of 100%.  Overall, the average quota fill rates expressed in 
value terms was 94%. 
 
6.2.3  The impact of tariff and TRQ liberalization 
 
The different scenarios examined in this study include: 
 
·  Scenario 1: A 33% expansion of quota 
·  Scenario 2: A 33% decrease in MFN ad valorem tariff. 
·  Scenario 3: A scenario combining the two reforms described above. 
·  Scenario 4: Full liberalization scenario with all tariffs set to zero. 
 
Using the SPE model it was estimated that border prices for the mentioned products will 
declined by between 0.89 and 2.39 per cent for scenario one, 2.35 and 7.96 per cent for 
scenario two, 2.96 and 9.97 per cent for scenario three and 8.25 and 25.19 per cent for 
scenario four.  Using a price transmission elasticity of unity between the border and 
domestic markets, the impact of tariff and TRQ liberalization on the domestic markets 
was simulated. 
 
The main findings per scenario can be summarized as follows: 
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·  Scenario 1: A 33% expansion of quota 
 
Beef:   Total beef supply in South Africa will reduce by 0.62%, while 
demand will increase by 1.9%.  Beef prices will on average drop 
by 2.08%. 
Cattle:  Total cattle supply and demand in South Africa will reduce by 
0.46% and 0.52%, respectively.  Cattle prices will on average 
drop by 1.46%. 
Sheep-meat:   Total sheep meat supply in South Africa will reduce by 0.50%, 
while demand will increase by 1.99%.  Sheep meat prices will on 
average drop by 2.36%. 
Sheep:  Total sheep supply and demand in South Africa will reduce by 
0.42% and 0.45%, respectively.  Sheep prices will on average 
drop by 0.94%. 
Pork:   Total pork supply in South Africa will reduce by 0.92%, while 
demand  will  increase  by  2.57%.  Pork  prices  will  on  average 
drop by 2.12%. 
Pigs:  Total  pig  supply  and  demand  in  South  Africa  will  reduce  by 
0.78% and 0.78%, respectively.  Pig prices will on average drop 
by 2.02%. 
Poultry:   Total poultry supply in South Africa will reduce by 0.92%, while 
demand will increase by 7.06%.  Poultry prices will on average 
drop by 3.41%. 
 
·  Scenario 2: A 33% decrease in MFN ad valorem tariff 
 
Beef:   Total beef supply in South Africa will reduce by 1.83%, while 
demand  will  increase  by  5.56%.  Beef  prices  will  on  average 
drop by 0.81%. Summary and recommendations 
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Cattle:  Total cattle supply and demand in South Africa will reduce by 
1.33% and 1.52%, respectively.  Cattle prices will on average 
drop by 4.38%. 
Sheep-meat:   Total sheep meat supply in South Africa will reduce by 1.27%, 
while demand will increase by 5.14%.  Sheep meat prices will on 
average drop by 6.13%. 
Sheep:  Total sheep supply and demand in South Africa will reduce by 
1.11% and 1.15%, respectively.  Sheep prices will on average 
drop by 2.52%. 
Pork:   Total pork supply in South Africa will reduce by 2.73%, while 
demand  will  increase  by  6.69%.  Pork  prices  will  on  average 
drop by 5.75%. 
Pigs:  Total  pig  supply  and  demand  in  South  Africa  will  reduce  by 
2.02% and 2.02%, respectively.  Pig prices will on average drop 
by 5.23%. 
Poultry:   Total poultry supply in South Africa will reduce by 2.38%, while 
demand will increase by 18.05%.  Poultry prices will on average 
drop by 9.05%. 
 
·  Scenario 3: A scenario combining scenarios 1 and 2 
 
Beef:   Total beef supply in South Africa will reduce by 2.3%, while 
demand  will  increase  by  6.93%.  Beef  prices  will  on  average 
drop by 8.04%. 
Cattle:  Total cattle supply and demand in South Africa will reduce by 
1.75% and 1.90%, respectively.  Cattle prices will on average 
drop by 5.52%. 
Sheep-meat:   Total sheep-meat supply in South Africa will reduce by 1.60%, 
while demand will increase by 6.49%.  Sheep-meat prices will on 
average drop by 7.72%. Summary and recommendations 
  138 
Sheep:  Total sheep supply and demand in South Africa will reduce by 
1.41% and 1.45%, respectively.  Sheep prices will on average 
drop by 3.31%. 
Pork:   Total pork supply in South Africa will reduce by 3.02%, while 
demand  will  increase  by  8.48%.  Pork  prices  will  on  average 
drop by 7.30%. 
Pigs:  Total  pig  supply  and  demand  in  South  Africa  will  reduce  by 
2.57% and 2.57%, respectively.  Pig prices will on average drop 
by 6.68%. 
Poultry:   Total poultry supply in South Africa will reduce by 3.06%, while 
demand will increase by 23.45%.  Poultry prices will on average 
drop by 11.33%. 
 
·  Scenario 4: Full liberalization scenario with all tariffs set to zero. 
 
Beef:   Total beef supply in South Africa will reduce by 5.54%, while 
demand will increase by 16.84%.  Beef prices will on average 
drop by 19.34%. 
Cattle:  Total cattle supply and demand in South Africa will reduce by 
4.19% and 4.6%, respectively.  Cattle prices will on average drop 
by 13.27%. 
Sheep-meat:   Total sheep-meat supply in South Africa will reduce by 3.77%, 
while demand will increase by 15.27%.  Sheep-meat prices will 
on average drop by 18.05%. 
Sheep:  Total sheep supply and demand in South Africa will reduce by 
3.36% and 3.42%, respectively.  Sheep prices will on average 
drop by 7.61%. 
Pork:   Total pork supply in South Africa will reduce by 7.22%, while 
demand will increase by 20.25%.  Pork prices will on average 
drop by 17.32%. Summary and recommendations 
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Pigs:  Total  pig  supply  and  demand  in  South  Africa  will  reduce  by 
6.15% and 6.15%, respectively.  Pig prices will on average drop 
by 15.95%. 
Poultry:   Total poultry supply in South Africa will reduce by 7.12%, while 
demand will increase by 54.64%.  Poultry prices will on average 
drop by 26.39%. 
 
6.2.4  Welfare measurements 
 
The study used the consumer and producers surplus concepts, as well as the equivalent 
variation concept to measure the impact on welfare of potential trade policy changes 
mentioned.  
 
The consumer and producer surplus measures revealed, as a priori expected, that a 
more liberalized trade regime for meat will result in net welfare benefits for South 
Africa.  An expansion of the current quotas by 33% would result in an increase in 
consumer welfare by R230.8 million. This is equivalent to a 0.04% increase in real 
gross national income or 0.06% increase in real disposable income. Producers’ welfare 
will drop by a total of R77.6 million. Relative to the real gross farm income, the total 
loss in producer welfare is 0.24 per cent, while it represents 0.96% of real net farm 
income. 
 
A reduction of 33% in the MFN ad valorem tariffs would increase consumer welfare by 
R592.1 million, while producers’ welfare will decline by R220.1 million. The total 
increase in consumers’ welfare amounts to only a 0.10% increase in real gross national 
income or a 0.16% increase in real disposable income.  As a percentage of the real 
gross  farm  income,  the  total  loss  in  producer  welfare  is  0.69  per  cent,  while  it 
represents 2.7% of real net farm income. 
 
A  combination  of  scenarios  1  and  2  will  result  in  a  welfare  gain  to  consumers 
amounting to R753.6 million, while the total loss to producers will be R277.9 million. Summary and recommendations 
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Total welfare gain to consumers amounts to a 0.13% increase in real gross national 
income  or 0.20%  increase in  real disposable income.    Welfare losses  by  producers 
translate into a drop of 0.87% in real gross farm income or 3.4% in real net farm 
income. 
 
A complete removal of tariffs will increase consumers’ welfare by R1 880.8 million. 
This amounts to only a 0.33% increase in real gross national income or a 0.50% increase 
in  real  disposable  income.    On  the  producers’  side,  welfare  will  drop  by  a  total  of 
R656.89 million.  This represents a drop of 2.05 per cent in real gross farm income or 
8.1% in net farm income. 
 
The equivalent variation concept revealed much more moderate changes to consumer 
well being.  The reason for this is that consumer and producer surplus estimations 
assume linearity of the demand and supply curves, whereas the model used in this study 
accounts for the non-linearity of demand and supply curves, hence, the over-estimation 
of  the  welfare  impacts.    Consumer  and  producers  surplus  estimates  nevertheless 
provide useful insight into the relative impact of trade policy changes.  
 
6.3  Policy recommendations 
 
￿  The high level of concentration of South Africa’s imports of meat products has 
important implications to the administration of tariff rate quotas applicable to the 
livestock  sector.  The  allocation  of  quotas  to  importing  countries  must  be 
competitive  and  market-based;  however,  the  level  of  support  afforded  to  such 
countries must be taken into consideration. Therefore further trade liberalization 
should  allocate  more  quotas  to  highly  competitive  but less  subsidized  exporting 
countries.  In  this  regard,  “mixed  allocation  methods”  of  quota  administration 
suitable to each product must be used in order to cater for imbalances introduced by 
highly  subsidized  countries;  this  requires  knowledge  of  and  expertise  in  TRQ 
administration. 
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￿  As a result of increased trade liberalisation producer prices of cattle and sheep will 
on average show the largest declines in the coastal regions of South Africa.  This is 
noteworthy since in the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal cattle and sheep numbers 
in the hands of emerging producers is more than that of the established commercial 
farmers.  Given the prominence of this sector in respect of achieving government’s 
development and poverty reduction objectives as highlighted in, amongst others, the 
Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy careful consideration should be 
given  to  the  measures  used  to  liberalise  meat  trade,  if  further  liberalisation  is 
considered at all given the results of this study. 
 
The results obtained for scenarios 1 and 2 have quite important policy implications, 
especially over the short to medium run, and if one takes into account the level of 
support afforded to, for example OECD countries.  On the one hand, consumers could 
benefit from cheaper meat, but one also has to take cognizance of the potential impact 
on producers of livestock (as stated this sub-sector are vitally important).  A potential 
recommendation  based  on  the  relative  difference  between the  impacts  of  these  two 
scenarios  is  that  TRQ  liberalization  (if  considered  necessary)  in  the  South  African 
livestock industry should first be implemented by expanding the existing quota rather 
than reducing tariffs.  Although, it could be argued that price reduction due to trade 
liberalization would induce increased productivity, the state of the livestock industry in 
South  Africa  does  not  support  this  argument  over  the  short  to  medium  run.  Also, 
proving this hypothesis falls beyond the scope of this study.   
 
6.4  Recommendations for further studies 
 
Further research on the following aspects is necessary: 
 
￿  Products  differentiated  by  place  of  origin:  The  model  assumes  perfect 
substitution (homogeneity) between domestic and imported goods. The model can 
be improved by differentiating commodities and products (i.e. assume imperfect 
substitution) based on the Armington assumption. This would further strengthen the Summary and recommendations 
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analytical capacity of the model in that it would allow further disaggregating of 
products  based  on  the  HS  classification.    It  will  also  allow  for  the  handling  of 
bilateral trade flows. 
 
￿  Expansion of current modelling framework to include additional products: The 
linkages among commodities are mainly explored through the cross-price elasticity 
effects in multi-commodity models. Considering the linkage between the animal 
feed  sector  and  the  livestock  industry,  further  developments  to  the  modelling 
framework should explore the effects of changes in the feed sector on the livestock 
industry and vice-versa. 
 
￿  Sub-sector modelling of the current and additional products: the current model 
takes a sectoral approach. Further insights could be gained if modelling is done at 
sub-sector level, in which case products are further disaggregated. However, the 
challenge associated with the use of this approach is largely that of insufficient data.  
 
￿  Explicit modelling of TRQ: The present model allows for measuring the price, 
demand and supply impacts of TRQs on the domestic market. However, there are 
yet other aspects of this instrument not yet explored. The creation of rents and its 
distribution entail an effective administration method for TRQs. In South Africa 
however, this is not yet in place; whereas revenues from TRQ can serve as incentive 
for development as was practiced in Korea (Choi & Summer, 2000).  
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